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DoH is such a weird concept to me. It feels like HTTP is a pretty poor protocol to be eating the world. I can easily imagine that the resources being spent on
by dijit 7y ago
DoH is such a weird concept to me. It feels like HTTP is a pretty poor protocol to be eating the world.
I can easily imagine that the resources being spent on DoH are many orders of magnitude more than was spent on actually fixing or updating the DNS protocol.
This is not in defence of the current DNS system, I'm just sad that the only way we can think to fix DNS is to make it not DNS, but some form of HTTP name resolution.
- mytailorisrich 7y agoThere is no DNS-related reason to use HTTPS. This is a tactical move to obfuscate and make port filtering more difficult because suddenly DNS uses the same protocol and same port as 99% as your traffic. This is versus DNS-over-TLS that offers the same privacy BUT still uses a DNS-specific port so is easier to detect and block. Of course you can still block by IP... Other than that, it is exactly the same DNS messages. It's just that they are encoded in HTTP messages.
- kees99 7y agoI think you're right on the money here. DNS-over-TLS uses port 853, so is trivial to block on a firewall and force fallback to plain-text DNS. DoH is resilient to such an attacker - be it sketchy guy in starbucks trying to steal your cookies, or yourself trying to run pi-hole adblock.
- dijit 7y agoNot sure why you couldn't do TLS over port 53 though, we've had STARTTLS for decades, you can even inform software not to fallback. The downside is, of course, that Starbucks can't redirect you to their "please accept our TOS" portal.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- mytailorisrich 7y agoPort 53 is already used for UDP and TCP DNS, so trying to use it for TLS (over TCP) on top of that would impact existing DNS infrastructure. The idea of these new transports is not to impact existing DNS.
- iso1631 7y agoEither way, as a network admin, DoT is easy to block -- you simply redirect all port 53 traffic to your own DNS. DoT will either fail, or fallback to plain text. Can't easily block all port 443 traffic (may as well not give any service), and as servers grow maintaining a blacklist of DoH would be problematic - especially when the DoH server is hidden behind normal sites on cloudflare etc. Of course a sysadmin can always establish a VPN on any port to any IP with TCP, UDP, ICMP, or even running a VPN over unencrypted DNS, and bypass all that network work other than very specific IP whitelisting. As a network admin and a sysadmin, I want to be able to control my systems from my network without losing control. I like the idea of DoH, I just don't want to have to reconfigure my DoH server everytime I want to connect to a split-brain network, or have an alternative PTR server, and I certainly don't want my browser using a different source for DNS to my other applications.
- dijit 7y agoI'm also a network/server admin. I don't see things as you do. Specialised protocols are better than generalised ones because they have understandable failure modes. If DNS goes down, name resolution fails. But if DoH goes down, it could still be DNS, it could be TLS Suites, it could be incorrect headers, it could be mishandling of the proxy (or the proxy forwarding garbage), it could be anything. that's why we consider DNS to be Layer 6 and not Layer 7, as things on Layer 7 may depend on it.
- iso1631 7y agoSo DNS is easier to debug? So are many protocols. It doesn't mean we should still be using http, rlogin, or snmpv1. There are significant benefits to the end user of DoH in bypassing malicious networks. It's out there, it's not going away. I'd like it to integrate well in a situation where I am the user, sysadmin and netadmin.
- dijit 7y agorlogin -> ssh. unless you're saying we should replace SSH with HTTP. And yes, DNS is easier to debug than HTTP if HTTP depends on HTTP.
- livre 7y ago>or yourself trying to run pi-hole adblock. If you are smart, at this point you'd have already switched to a DoH server using your own certificate (I use a local AdGuard Home instance for that). You can then point not just your browser (either using its configuration page or group policies) but also the operating system and secure the whole thing. After that your only threat is the same as it has always been, a device bypassing your local server, it is safe to assume those are compromised and should be put behind a firewall or disconnected from the network (it is also safe to assume that a firewall rule to capture and modify its DNS queries has never been a 100% reliable solution). DoH already happened, there's no point in arguing against it like it's the end of the world as we know it. It's now time to adapt and update (or replace) the blocking mechanisms we are used to using. This may mean the end of pi-hole should they fail to add a DoH server to the default installation but we already have alternatives.
- EE84M3i 7y agoIs this true? I thought DoH used a JSON format of DNS messages, not the DNS wire format?
- mytailorisrich 7y agoIt uses the DNS wire format. It encodes the wire format DNS messages in Base64 for requests and plain hex for responses (rfc8484). That's basically only an adaptation layer to fit into http messages. Which is good because, really, there is no need to change DNS messages and this makes implementation easier. The aim clearly is to add a new transport for messages with as little impact as possible.
- EE84M3i 6y agoAh, apparently now (RFC8484) it's standardized to use DNS wireformat, but originally Google DNS implemented "DNS-over-HTTPS" to be JSON[1] on 4/2/16 and added DNS wire format on 6/27/19[2]. Cloudflare also has the JSON format available[3] [1]: https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/public-dns-announce/p2iYauFuzIg https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/public-dn... [2]: https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/public-dns-announce/bRG0lpEJs9c https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/public-dn... [3]: https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/dns-over-https/json-format/ https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/dns-over-https/jso...
- MaxBarraclough 7y agoThere's value in solving the security challenges of HTTPS once, and to then resist reinventing the wheel elsewhere. Using it for DNS doesn't strike me as a particularly bad case of shoehorning. What specifically don't you like about the use of HTTPS? Would you prefer DNS-over-TLS? Apparently [0] that's an option too. I don't think it would be possible to be quite as lightweight as the plain old UDP-based DNS protocol while giving the desired security properties. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS
- dijit 7y agoI specifically mentioned "HTTP" and not "HTTPS" because, while there are some security extension headers in http; the majority of HTTPS's security is a solved-once situation already in the form of TLS. The reason I don't like HTTP for all purposes is because, while it has proven to be expandable, I feel like we're going to have this "oh shit" moment in 10 years where we realise all the cruft we've added to it and how it's bogging down otherwise simple communication. DNS was designed to be incredibly low latency, QUIC is a response to the high latency of TCP for HTTP in general; but then you're still sending a fair amount of content that is completely unneeded. A few dozen bytes here and there don't matter much, but that mentality is why computers today have worse input lag than computers 30 years ago, despite being many hundreds of times faster.
- MaxBarraclough 7y agoI can see where you're coming from. I share your disdain for avoidable bloat. I suspect you know rather more about QUIC than I do. DNS-over-QUIC sounds like a secure, low-latency solution, at least on the face of it. Would it really be possible to shave off much overhead there?
- swiley 7y agoDoH does not fix the security issues with DNS. My ISP hijacks it and sends you to a page full of ads when you visit a missing domain just like older DNS. The browser vendors even provide explicit instructions for this. Literally all this does is break things.
- belorn 7y agoDoH is the simple idea that instead of proxying your DNS request to whatever and whoever is configured by the local network operator, usually the ISP, we will proxy it to google under https if you use chrome or cloudflare if you use firefox. (Technically both browsers allow for this setting to be overwritten) Once the proxied package arrive at google/cloudflare it is back to normal dns operations. An other way to see it is that DoH is a https based VPN that the browser has chosen for you, but which only proxy dns traffic. Fixing the dns protocol is what DoT is for, and especially aDoT which would allow in the future for end-to-end encryption between end user and DNS server. Sadly aDoT is only a draft right now, and there is a lot of resistance to the idea of moving away from the caching proxy model.
- tptacek 7y agoThis is obviously incorrect, right? Google has ad nauseam repeated that they're not shifting Chrome users to Google DNS, but rather upgrading users to DoH iff their current provider supports it. How does that fact not refute your central claim here?
- belorn 7y agoThe central claim is that doh operate identical to the communication between the stub resolver and the recursive resolver, and it is simply the client proxying the resolving request to a third party. The specific transport layer, that of https, is basically irrelevant to the security design of the dns protocol itself which is unaware if it got proxied through https, by unencrypted udp packages, or tunneled through a vpn service. The default behavor of chrome is to automatically use their DoH service if the users broadband ISP supports it. I don't dispute that or intended to comment on it. If my above comment implied something else I am sorry as that was not the intention nor the central message of the comment. The comment was not a critique of googles default choice in chrome, but rather an attempt to explain how DoH relate to the DNS protocol and how aDoT, which is based on DoT, might actually fix the security faults of the dns protocol by enabling end-to-end encryption between the user and the dns server.
- 6y ago
- Kalium 7y ago> I can easily imagine that the resources being spent on DoH are many orders of magnitude more than was spent on actually fixing or updating the DNS protocol. You're absolutely right. It's obvious that a better way forward is to fix and update DNS. Is it possible that you are so right that everyone concerned agrees with you, and has for years? There have been efforts to improve, fix, and upgrade DNS for decades now. They've consistently run afoul of intractable political problems in getting improvements into actual use. Long story short, there's a vast number of parties involved, most of whom have no reason to want to upgrade. You're right. This is sad. It's also the way forward that people have been able to find after literal decades of trying to improve DNS.
- tptacek 7y agoNo. There have been literal decades of effort to deploy DNSSEC, which (1) is a server-to-server protocol that doesn't protect last-mile browser lookups at all, and (2) doesn't encrypt messages or provide any privacy. There have been desultory efforts to tack some kind of last-mile security onto the DNSSEC stack, like TSIG, but even that doesn't encrypt messages or provide privacy. Despite getting DNSSEC deployed at most of the DNS roots almost a decade ago, and to a point where companies can actually turn it on if they want, DNSSEC adoption hasn't cracked 2% of .COM, and, if you measure popular domains outside the US government, its adoption gets even worse: virtually no major platforms or tech companies use it. Those companies have security teams with people who specialize in evaluating technology and getting it deployed, and they have all come to the conclusion that what the IETF worked on to "improve DNS" wasn't worth it. Meanwhile, virtually every major ISP in America monetizes DNS lookups for their customers. Not only that, but most real DNS spoofing attacks are either last-mile interceptions or phishing attacks on registrars. Which is to say, while the IETF was futzing around with a 1990s-cryptography signature scheme nobody is going to use, the real problem was right there waiting to be solved. Thankfully, Mozilla solved it, and in just a couple years DoH has protected more people on the Internet than DNSSEC is likely ever to.
- Kalium 7y agoI mean, DNS is a protocol from the dinosaur days of the internet, where cryptography just wasn't a concern for anything. It's also foundational. Moving to a truly encrypted, private, not-transparently-backward-compatible protocol was never likely to see better adoption than DNSSEC. IMO, telling all this to someone who has no historical context and innocently asks "Why not just fix DNS?" is lighting a candle with a flamethrower. Plus all the strong emotions that get conjured by DNSSEC and its history (at some point someone will chip in asking about DNSCurve...). The important points for the casual observer are that people have considered updating DNS and that DNS is unfixable for political and economic reasons. Which is why the best answer we have today is to tunnel it over HTTPS.
- tenebrisalietum 7y agoIt's still DNS - the protocol is the exact same except for some framing. It's just transported over HTTPS. The only security DoH provides is transport security. if your TLS connection between you and the DoH server is OK, then you can be assured that the DNS response you got has not been tampered with. It doesn't extend any trust beyond that.
- dijit 6y agoThat doesn’t make sense at all. It’s no longer the same protocol if it is framed by another protocol. You’re talking the protocol frame now, not the original protocol.
- tenebrisalietum 6y agoThat's like saying I'm no longer using HTTP in my browser because my VPN wraps up HTTP in another protocol.