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> This is the very problem of certificates, because self-signed was never trusted and is not an option. What I don't get, with DNSSEC getting rolled out more a
by mschuster91 7y ago
> This is the very problem of certificates, because self-signed was never trusted and is not an option.
What I don't get, with DNSSEC getting rolled out more and more, why can't every site operator simply stick the fingerprint of their HTTPS cert in DNS and have DNSSEC take care of the trust chain?
- pmlnr 7y agoCould you please point to a tutorial/howto on this? EDIT: why on earth was this question downvoted? It was genuine, I honestly don't know how to do it.
- mschuster91 7y agoIn theory there is the CERT DNS record type that could be used, but no OS/lib uses it unfortunately as prior to DNSSEC there was no way to prevent the CERT record from being manipulated/intercepted :/
- josteink 7y ago> What I don't get, with DNSSEC getting rolled out more and more, why can't every site operator simply stick the fingerprint of their HTTPS cert in DNS and have DNSSEC take care of the trust chain? This question is extremely relevant given how DNS-based authentication is the preferred way to authenticate with letsencrypt. If DNS is good enough for letsencrypt to validate you and give you a cert, why can't DNS be good enough for the browser alone, without needing to rely on some third party service? Letsencrypt has certainly made HTTPS easier in practice, but we really need to get rid of the whole CA-model entirely.
- sarakayakomzin 7y ago>Letsencrypt has certainly made HTTPS easier in practice, but we really need to get rid of the whole CA-model entirely. solve the root trust problem and claim your nobel prize.
- moray 7y agoA DKIM like service? For emails I find it very convenient, publish your public key with DNS and sign outgoing emails, outgoing emails are now "certified" coming from your server and the recipient can easily verify it, no CAs involved.
- mytailorisrich 7y agoWhat Letsencrypt does (and all other providers of certificates to end users do) is verify that you control the domain you are requesting a certificate for. That's well and good, but who are those Letsencrypt guys, anyway? That's why there is a chain of trust and Certificate Authorities. You, and your browser, cannot know everyone out there so you pick a few 'authorities' that are well-known and deemed serious enough to be trusted and go from there. DNSSEC operates on the same principle of a chain of trust from root.
- josteink 7y ago> What Letsencrypt does Letsencrypt is run by Mozilla. So lets instead make that: > What Mozilla does ... is that you control the domain you are requesting a certificate for. So Mozilla trusts me based on me controlling the DNS of my domain, and can issue me a security-token which Mozilla's browser (and other browsers) then can trust. Note: It does not trust me or verify me to be non-malicious, honest or have good intentions of any kind. It merely verifies that I control the DNS of the domain I request a certificate for. That's it. That is all. So why can't Mozilla's browser simply instead of trusting these magic tokens, instead just verify that the cert for the site matches the cert pinned in DNS, thus validating that the site-operator is indeed in control of the DNS of his domain? It will be exactly the same validation, except now we don't have to rely on a third-party service to do that for us. And then the web can finally be autonomous and decentralized again.
- tialaramex 7y ago> Letsencrypt is run by Mozilla. Let's Encrypt is a service of ISRG, a public benefit corporation https://www.abetterinternet.org/about/ https://www.abetterinternet.org/about/ Some key ISRG people were from Mozilla, but so what? > So why can't Mozilla's browser simply instead of trusting these magic tokens, instead just verify that the cert for the site matches the cert pinned in DNS Poor deployability and interoperability. Now your browser mysteriously doesn't work on a lot of the world's networks and the site doesn't work with other browsers.
- xoa 7y agoBut isn't the point here (and a source of confusion I share with all the other posters) that DNS is the actual root of trust? Heck, forget DNSSEC even, because it's not like Let's Encrypt demands it. You say that LE verifies >that you control the domain you are requesting a certificate for but it mostly seems to do it the exact same way any random person browsing to an HTTP site would: it checks the DNS records. It's not like there's an out of band channel here where they actually verify business records separately or something. So what exactly is the value of the middle man in this? Why not just have public sigs in the DNS records too? When DNS is the root of trust anyway and "Certificate Authorities" are reduced to fully automated systems, what value to "Certificate Authorities" even bring anymore in this context? It seems like a hack from a time when CAs were expected to provide some out of band verification that would actually be useful. But on the web that mostly hasn't happened or has been rendered moot (witness the death of EV). I can see how central CAs could still be useful in many other circumstances. But for anything where control of DNS directly correlates with control of the entire chain, it seems like it'd be a lot better to just decentralize into DNS.
- herio 7y agoThis was proposed already in 2012 with RFC6698. DNS based Authentication of Domain Entries, DANE. Hasn't really gone anywhere of importance. I personally think there's been a few factors as to why: * Distrust of DNSSEC and centralized authority. * Lagging DNSSEC deployment, not just in DNS but also in clients and applications. * Needs another DNS lookup on connection to validate certs, adding lag. I think it probably needs stapling support in some form just like cert validity checking. There's also been follow up RFC detailing it's use for SMTP, SRV records and PGP.
- ameliaquining 7y agoLet's Encrypt doesn't have to worry about firewalls and middleboxes blocking their DNS queries. Browsers do.
- marcosdumay 7y agoYes, and browsers solution has been to tunnel those queries over some protocol that middleboxes can not mess with. Because losing the DNSSEC fields is the lesser of the problems they cause.
- ameliaquining 7y agoThere are a bunch of reasons why this doesn't work, but first among them is this: This would require browsers to make DNSSEC queries, and if those queries were blocked or otherwise failed, the browser would have to fail closed and present a certificate error. (The alternative, failing open and allowing users to visit a site if the browser doesn't get a response to the DNSSEC query, would be completely insecure, because the whole point of HTTPS is to defend against MITM attacks, and an MITM could simply block all DNSSEC traffic.) This is impractical because there are a bunch of existing firewalls and middleboxes that don't understand DNSSEC and that (contra Postel's Law) block DNS traffic that they don't understand; implementing this change would be cutting off everyone behind those firewalls and middleboxes from the Web. There are also a lot of other objections to it, including that it's too centralized (see https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&query=author%3Atptacek%20DNSSEC&sort=byPopularity&type=comment https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que...), but that's the basic reason why it can't be deployed.
- josteink 7y ago> This is impractical because there are a bunch of existing firewalls and middleboxes that don't understand DNSSEC and that (contra Postel's Law) block DNS traffic that they don't understand; implementing this change would be cutting off everyone behind those firewalls and middleboxes from the Web. Funny how this was never an argument when HTTPS was forced on everyone (to solve the problem with JavaScript being insecure), despite almost the exact same reasons holding up with middle-boxes, proxies and the like. Now that there is an alternate, much simpler HTTPS-solution everyone is "oh noes that would break corporate environments". What's different this time around? Why is breaking things bad this time? If we could just sit down, and all agree that the only reason we "need" HTTPS everywhere is because running JavaScript in a browser represents a security-issue, the quicker we can start solving the real problem: JavaScript as a default-permission. The quicker we can phase that out from web-pages (which honestly more often than not, simply represents documents), the better.
- acdha 7y ago> Funny how this was never an argument when HTTPS was forced on everyone (to solve the problem with JavaScript being insecure), This misunderstanding is where your argument went off the rails: people wanted HTTPS because they are sending data over networks which aren’t perfectly trustworthy. Starting in the late 1990s there was string consumer demand to feel safe entering credit cards and other personal information even if the site used no JavaScript - our household-name clients expected it even if they only used JS for mouseover effects. That was before WiFi became common, too, and people realized the risks of letting everyone at Starbucks see their information. DNSSEC has no equivalent because it took so long to be adopted that it offers no meaningful user benefit over HTTPS, and it’d need to be a substantial win to balance out the poor user experience and implementation challenges.
- AndyMcConachie 7y agoWhat you're talking about is DANE. RFC 6698 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Na... I wrote a short explanation of how it works a while back. https://www.metafarce.com/adventures-in-dane.html https://www.metafarce.com/adventures-in-dane.html The short answer is that DANE has been seeing deployment success for SMTP, but has yet to see much deployment success for HTTPS. https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/
- AndyMcConachie 7y agoI'm one of the few weirdos that actually validates DANE for HTTPS using some software I wrote called Danish. Once in Python https://github.com/smutt/danish https://github.com/smutt/danish And again in Rust. https://github.com/smutt/danish-rust https://github.com/smutt/danish-rust An old explanation can be found here. https://www.middlebox-dane.org/ https://www.middlebox-dane.org/ Both middlebox-dane.org and metafarce.com have DNS TLSA records that match their certificate from Let's Encrypt. You can do this, but almost no one is. There is some pickup in The Netherlands where I live. For example, www.digid.nl has delpoyed DANE for HTTPS.
- jlgaddis 7y ago> ... DANE has been seeing deployment success for SMTP, ... Since "DANE for e-mail" is still relatively new / obscure, for the uninitiated, RFC7672 [0] describes "SMTP Security via Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", which requires DNSSEC -- and, as a result, comes with all of its associated disadvantages / trade-offs. An alternative, more recent method of providing authenticated and encrypted delivery of e-mail is described in RFC8461 [1], "SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)", which uses DNS and HTTPS -- and, thus, relies on CAs / PKIX. MTA-STS doesn't require DNSSEC but it is then susceptible to "malicious downgrades". Although we're not going to see all e-mail being encrypted in transit anytime soon (if we ever do), it's good to know that there are folks working on solutions, including at some of the largest e-mail providers. --- [0]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7672 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7672 [1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461