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UK centralised contact-tracing app probably won't work well, may be illegal
- samizdis 7y ago> Despite what the NCSC has continued to imply, the app will not, as it stands, work all the time on iOS and Android since version 8. The operating systems won't allow the tracing application to broadcast its ID via Bluetooth to surrounding devices when it's running in the background and not in active use.
- drumhead 7y agoThey're testing app on the Isle of Wight now, we'll soon see how effective it is. If it doesnt work, then I'm assuming they'll fall back to the Apple/Google option?
- jon889 7y agoahah, more likely the company (I think Palantir, might be wrong) will get paid anyway and won't care what the results are.
- Endlessly 7y agoPalantir’s contract for this is £1. Google [palantir £1 nhsx] to confirm.
- e2le 7y agoThat makes this all much more suspicious. Given the shadiness of Palantir, I have to wonder what they are hoping to get out of this.
- andygates 7y agoKudos and good feelings, and probably operating costs going forward. Palantir's shady reputation could benefit from some good feelings.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- rjknight 7y agoFrom https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-52441428 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-52441428 > The UK's coronavirus contact-tracing app is set to use a different model to the one proposed by Apple and Google, despite concerns raised about privacy and performance. > The NHS says it has a way to make the software work "sufficiently well" on iPhones without users having to keep it active and on-screen. > That limitation has posed problems for similar apps in other countries. > Experts from GCHQ's National Cyber Security Centre have aided the effort. At the time, I definitely saw people assuming that this meant that some kind of exploit was being used to achieve access to Bluetooth while the app was inactive, even though regular APIs do not permit this. The new technical information doesn't directly address this point, though the Register article does suggest a plausible alternative, whereby one user with an actively-running app can cause the app to wake on other users' phones by sending out a Bluetooth LE broadcast. I've no idea how this would perform in practice.
- lb1lf 7y ago-I'd be surprised if some unknown exploit was being used to gain access to Bluetooth - basically, it would probably be too useful for other, more nefarious purposes, so it would be unlikely to be used in an app deployed to millions. The Norwegian NHS equivalent had a similar app developed, running off-screen on both Android and iOS, using Bluetooth - though I have no idea how they pull it off. Edit: The above paragraph is incorrect; my apologies. I did some research and found that the app only uses Bluetooth on iOS when the phone is unlocked; however the app itself may be off-screen. While the phone is locked, it relies on GPS for positioning and presumably correlates location and time data to indicate whether you may have been exposed to an infected person or not. Irrelevant anecdote - as I am typing this, Spotify put on The The's 80s hit 'Infected'. Hah!
- Svip 7y agoGermany turned on a dime, and is going to use the Google/Apple solution. Denmark is about to turn on the same dime, as our solution mirrored the Norwegian solution, but had the same iOS problems (I only read that the government was strongly considering the Google/Apple solution, but no verdict yet).
- jamespeters168 7y agoThere are also some people raise privacy concern
- aclelland 7y agoCould someone explain how the new APIs that are being proposed by Google/Apple will actually be delivered to Android handsets? I'm running a 2 year old Android device which generally gets security updates 2-3 months behind Google devices. Will I be at the mercy of my phone manufacturer before I'll be able to use the new Google/iOS apps?
- 72deluxe 7y agoNot definitive but I think they push APIs out in Google Play Services, which is a big blob of an APK. They did this a few Android versions ago so that they could bypass the lack of OS updates from manufacturers.
- barbegal 7y agoThe technical aspects discussed are slightly wrong because they are different between iOS and Android. >The NHS has insisted its engineers have worked around this problem "sufficiently well" by waking the app after it detects itself running on a nearby phone emitting an ID: the software is blocked from sending out its ID when in the background but it can passively listen for IDs of apps still allowed to broadcast. However, this assumes there are a sufficient number of phones running the tracing app nearby still broadcasting to keep enough people's apps awake: there needs to be a critical mass of users while we're all supposed to be socially distancing. If two or more people pass each other and their apps have stopped broadcasting, the software will never know they came in contact. Bluetooth LE has four main states: scanning, advertising, peripheral connection, and central connection. In order to exchange the data that the app needs it needs one device in the peripheral connection mode and the other in the central connection mode. This means one device must have previously been advertising and the other scanning. The two important states are advertising and scanning. Android devices can advertise in the background but they can't scan reliably, they can do this for a short period of time enforced by the Android time limits on apps running in the background and possibly manufacturer specific power savings measures. These limits are not well documented and cause issues on any device using Bluetooth. iOS devices can't advertise in the background, however they do advertise an Apple specific advertisement which can't be controlled by the app but can still be connected to. iOS devices also can't reliably scan in the background however they can scan more reliably for iBeacons (special adverts) [1] Combined this makes it difficult to work well in the background, Android devices can't reliably connect to any device, iOS devices can't connect to each other but iOS devices may be able to connect to Android devices. [1] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/determining_the_proximity_to_an_ibeacon_device https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/deter...
- 72deluxe 7y agoIt'll be interesting to see how often it gets killed due to the heavy-handed battery management of some vendor's phones: https://dontkillmyapp.com https://dontkillmyapp.com
- jka 7y agoRegarding communication from Android devices - BLE connections may be difficult, but as I understand it, BLE broadcasting is a workable alternative. I'm by no means an expert, and would refer to the TCN Coalition's current explanation of their approach to cross-platform device communication: https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN/blob/37add39f7ddb91fade91832bc16903dcb74a487f/README.md#tcn-sharing-with-bluetooth-low-energy https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN/blob/37add39f7ddb91fade9...
- gorgoiler 7y agoIn the article, regarding the site of John Snow’s famed epidemiological discovery of cholera in 19th century London water supplies: > There is a plaque and a [water] pump, and the John Snow pub opposite The plaque and pump were removed several years ago, much to my dismay as an amateur London tour guide. The pump was then reinstated in 2018 but it was still jaw dropping that such a landmark was removed in the first place. https://lookup.london/john-snow-water-pump/ https://lookup.london/john-snow-water-pump/ Quite interesting
- AJRF 7y agoThe John Snow pub is great, it's so cheap!
- drcongo 7y agoSurprised to realise it's now 11 years that I've been boycotting it. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/apr/15/john-snow-kiss-in-london https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/apr/15/john-snow-kiss-in...
- jjgreen 7y agoRubbish beer anyway, the Ship is two minutes away and they have a fabulous pint of London Pride. Or rather, had. <sniff>.
- AJRF 7y agoI had no idea about this, I revoke the part about it being great. Still cheap though, can't take that away from my original statement.
- drcongo 7y agoI'm not 100% sure, but I don't think it's run by the same people as it was back then. It just stuck in my mind a particularly nasty thing to do so I never went back.
- dTal 7y ago
- DanBC 7y agoIt all sucks. HSJ (a specialist news source for healthcare in the UK) has an article here: https://www.hsj.co.uk/technology-and-innovation/exclusive-wobbly-tracing-app-failed-clinical-safety-and-cyber-security-tests/7027564.article https://www.hsj.co.uk/technology-and-innovation/exclusive-wo... I might have installed something created by Google and Apple, or by NHS X. But I'm not going to install this thing. > Ben Warner a data scientist advises the govt & sits on SAGE meetings. His brother called Marc. Who's also also very pally with Dominic Cummings. Surprisingly he won a £250m NHS contract not long ago. Now he has the contract for NHS tracking app. This needs to be questioned. https://twitter.com/JonJonesSnr/status/1257369738281463809?s=20 https://twitter.com/JonJonesSnr/status/1257369738281463809?s... > NEW: Critics, including doctors & MPs, are warning that govt is using the pandemic to accelerate the privatisation of the NHS without proper scrutiny. "Deloitte, KPMG, Serco, Sodexo, Mitie, Boots and the US data mining group Palantir are all involved.' https://twitter.com/Mandoline_Blue/status/1257410287931658241?s=20 https://twitter.com/Mandoline_Blue/status/125741028793165824...
- drcongo 7y agoThis should be the top reply in this thread.
- hazeii 7y agoSpeaking of Ben Warner, I see his and Dominic Cummings names are missing from the recently-disclosed list of participants in SAGE [0]. I also note that exactly 2 participants decided not to disclose their participation. [0] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage-coronavirus-covid-19-response-membership/list-of-participants-of-sage-and-related-sub-groups https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-adviso...
- Silhouette 7y agoThe technical explanation[1] provided by the NCSC is a lot more interesting than the casual write-up on El Reg, IMHO. As a strong advocate of privacy and limiting government surveillance, I was somewhat reassured reading those details. In particular, that paper identifies several specific threats to the operation of the system, some of which have not been widely discussed in the media and a few of which raise potential concerns about decentralised systems as proposed or recently adopted elsewhere. TL;DR: Yes, there are some rational privacy concerns about the NHS app being centralised in nature. However, the people designing this system aren't morons and there is no perfect solution that is invulnerable to all conceivable attacks and abuses. [1] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/NHS-app-security-paper%20V0.1.pdf https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/NHS-app-security-paper%20V0.1....
- sigwinch28 7y agoAlthough there are no perfect solutions, there are systems which willingly connect to and distribute contact data to government servers, and there are systems which do not.
- Silhouette 7y agoAs the paper notes, there are also systems that are vulnerable to various kinds of abuse by malicious actors and there are systems that are not. The price of using an unauthenticated, distributed system instead is likely to be greater vulnerability to some of those forms of attack and/or a dependency on verifiable test results that causes possibly very damaging delays in sending out notifications.
- zimpenfish 7y ago> there are also systems that are vulnerable to various kinds of abuse by malicious actors Some people consider GCHQ themselves to be malicious actors when it comes to the privacy of the UK public.
- Silhouette 7y ago
- galadran 7y agoGCHQ's technical design document is here: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/nhs-covid-19-app-privacy-security-report https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/nhs-covid-19-app-privacy-secu... Some observations on their design: They refresh the identifiers broadcast by each device every 24 hours. So any 3rd party can track an individual using the app for 24 hours before they rotate their identifier. No privileged access required. The payloads look huge (>100 bytes), so it looks like every interaction needs to be connection based (i.e. pairwise) rather than broadcast based (one to many). That's going to be hell on the battery. They broadcast a country code in plaintext, so any international deployment would reveal the probable nationality of nearby users. Can't see that ending well. They hold a master key which they can use to reveal the identifier of any individual using the system. Significant risk of mission creep e.g. a warrant / subpoena to reveal who was near person X during the time period Y.
- AJRF 7y agoAnyone from the Isle of Wight here to confirm how they are installing it for iOS specifically? I've not seen it in the iOS App Store and am very curious to see if they are side loading it.
- yadco 7y ago'the disastrous “herd immunity” policy'. I think it is to early to say that before seeing how countries that locked down earlier do in the comming months.
- drcongo 7y agoThe UK has 0.0859% of the global population and 11.43% of global covid-19 deaths. I don't think it's too early to say.
- eiji 7y agoThat sentence has no scientific meaning whatsoever. In January China had 99% of all global deaths. But hey, Kieren McCarthy from San Francisco is an "Inter all-rounder" journalist and surely a person with profound insights into virology to make grand remarks like that.
- drcongo 7y agoIn January it was an epidemic, not a pandemic.
- ProvideEvidence 7y agoWith the death certificates being manipulated and falsified, there are no accurate numbers, so these statistics are meaningless..
- Mvandenbergh 7y agoInteresting. Everyone seems so sure that DP-3T (the protocol that Google and Apple are adopting for their API) will work sufficiently well that the use of the PEPP/ROBERT protocol which is being used by NHSX, the French, and the Italians will be unnecessary. Since DP-3T discloses less information about your social graph to the central party (although in some edge cases more about your social graph to everyone in the network) this would mean that DP-3T is superior. Clearly if they both work well, then the one that discloses less data is better. It is important that we maintain context here: these are both "minimally disclosive" protocols which were designed to transmit as little information as possible while being effective tools. Compare this with the absolutely pervasive tracking being done in South Korea and other places. The difference is that NHSX and the designers of PEEP/ROBERT thinks that a higher level of disclosure is required than DP-3T to be effective. At the moment, we do not know if either of these will work, so it's not the case that we can say: "they both work, therefore only a surveillance state would pick the one that discloses more information". It is a balance and that will always lead to different people making different decisions. I suspect we will know this week whether the app as currently setup will work from the IoW trials. If it doesn't work, kills the battery, etc. then I hope NHSX has a DP-3T alternative in the background. Given current levels of infection in the UK, this will become important in the last week of May onwards for releasing lockdown measures so they have a few weeks to get a solution that works.
- tomduncalf 7y agoGreat comment, nice to see some rational/balanced thinking on this. To me it seems overly paranoid to suggest that the UK government would be doing this merely so they could track citizens movements or whatever - and I'm pretty sure the intelligence services are capable of doing that already if they want to. There are definite upsides to their approach from a surpressing the infection point of view, obviously they believe they are worth the trade-offs. It will be interesting to see how the trial plays out vs. other countries using the Apple/Google approach. I don't think the government would risk having another potential large failure in handling this crisis if the evidence clearly points to the Apple/Google approach being better. I did see a quote yesterday to the effect that nothing is set in stone and they can change the approach they are using if necessary, can't find the source right now.