4 ms·
$7.5k Google services mix-up (2018)
- lstamour 7y agoNote the timeline says this occurred in early 2018. The $7.5k is the reward, the bug itself was with Google Cloud API management and could theoretically allow users to enable billable APIs without enabling billing, or to access private APIs or to disable APIs for third-party projects.
- mbroshi 7y agoI think the link should be here: https://www.ezequiel.tech/2019/01/75k-google-cloud-platform-organization.html https://www.ezequiel.tech/2019/01/75k-google-cloud-platform-... And the date should be (2019)
- floatingatoll 7y agoIt was first posted at this URL in 2018-02: https://web.archive.org/web/20180215070105/https://sites.google.com/site/testsitehacking/-7-5k-Google-services-mix-up https://web.archive.org/web/20180215070105/https://sites.goo...
- shockinglytrue 7y agoI think any xoogler will agree https://sites.google.com/site/testsitehacking/-36k-google-app-engine-rce https://sites.google.com/site/testsitehacking/-36k-google-ap... is far more impressive. It seems fairly safe to assume someone has already snapped this guy up. I can't recall the last time I felt so impressed reading some security writeup
- ikiris 7y ago!
- jchw 7y agoThis one was good too, especially because the screenshot definitely gave many some heart palpitations. https://opnsec.com/2018/07/into-the-borg-ssrf-inside-google-production-network/ https://opnsec.com/2018/07/into-the-borg-ssrf-inside-google-...
- saagarjha 7y agoThat's a lot of internal information. I'm not sure I'd be comfortable publishing that, even if the company was friendly to security researchers.
- jchw 7y agoI think if I were an outsider I would’ve probably gotten pretty shy just after discovering an internal SSRF at a big corp. However, that also probably explains why I am not a security researcher.
- jotm 7y agoAm I reading this right? 13,337 for a unrestricted file access vulnerability? Seems rather cheap, I think even other interested parties would pay more :/
- jchw 7y agoIt was treated as an unrestricted file access vulnerability. I don’t want to accidentally disclose any non-public information (as an employee of Google) so I’ll just say I suspect there wasn’t really a ton more to see other than status and debug pages. Not to downplay the value of such a vulnerability, just saying that with defense-in-depth risks like this should be relatively well contained. It sounds like they got access to some confidential operational information but were nowhere near user data, and there was no obvious path to get there without much worse vulnerabilities.
- gameofcode 7y agoLooks like Google themselves have hired him as an intern: https://twitter.com/epereiralopez/status/1220781461504176129 https://twitter.com/epereiralopez/status/1220781461504176129
- LunaSea 7y agoAs an intern, wow, how charitable of them.
- OJFord 7y agoWhat do you expect, 18yo gets hired as director of product security?
- cameronbrown 7y agoInterns contribute a lot of value - they don't run around making coffee. Being an intern makes it much more likely to get an FTE role too which is more than most 18 year olds. Source: Also a 19 y/o Googler.
- LunaSea 7y agoRight, and are your valued contributions rewarded as such?
- jsmith45 7y agoNot a googler/xoogler, but if if FILE_GOOGLE3_ACCESS means what I think it means.... Yikes! (Especially since FILE_GOOGLE3_READ_ONLY_ACCESS is a separate permission, that implies the possibility of writes, but even read-only access is not something Google would want a random outsider to have.) And that is almost surely only a tiny subset of what could be done via the the whole run with arbitrary permissions thing. Most of the other don't jump out as me as much as that one does, but I may just not recognize the significance of some of the permissions. It is interesting that he could only make it work in the non-production environment, but I'm not sure if that would actually limit the capabilities meaningfully.
- nerdbaggy 7y agoI wonder if they detected the exploit an hour after he did because of internal alarms he was setting off.
- saagarjha 7y agoPrevious RCE by the author, which earned them a $36k bug bounty: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17118326 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17118326
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- Narkov 7y ago> About me > I am 18-year-old student at the University of the Republic So impressive! This is great work.
- Gunax 7y agoDamn... One hour. It's like the patenting of the telephone all over again.
- londons_explore 7y agoMy guess is the "independant discovery 1 hour earlier" wasn't truly independent. I'd guess that by messing with this stuff, it probably broke some internal systems that ended up firing alerts to engineers internally. Those engineers then 'discovered' the bug, and started fixing it. Most systems at scale are designed to reject bad input, log it, but nobody takes any action. A few systems have to process every record in order. For example, the billing system might go through every entry in a database table and add them to bills. If just one entry is malformed in some way and can't be added to the bill, it is retried. If there isn't success after a few retries, the whole process fails, and an engineer is paged to sort the problem. I saw this kind of thing multiple times... You think you have fully sanitized every input, but someone always finds a way to add a 30 gigabyte surname to the addressbook, choose a profile image with negative dimensions, have a million devices share the same mac address, etc.