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United Kingdom to introduce security labelling on connected devices
- have_faith 7y agoUnrelated to article content. I can't believe someone thought it was a good idea to set body text to 60% opacity...
- frou_dh 7y agohttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9238739 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9238739
- have_faith 7y agoI would be totally fine with the comment section being split in two, the main section being on-topic and a bottom section for related but less core discussion. I doubt many on HN would like the idea though.
- frou_dh 7y agoWe can just bikeshed inside our own mind. It needn't be articulated.
- have_faith 7y agoHonestly a depressing thought ha. Rules control the fun.
- rat9988 7y agoPlease apply your own advice and bikeshed in your mind. Let people who come here for discussions discuss.
- BurningFrog 7y agoTagging would be a more 2020 version.
- TeMPOraL 7y agoI would, as long as both sections are on the same page. Or even three sections: on topic, tangents, on medium - in that order (or even fourth section at the end, meta). Point being, I love me the occasional rant about a page's bad design decisions, or some vaguely on-topic meta angles. I want to read them all, but preferably in order, and not mixed up together.
- have_faith 7y agoOn-topic / Meta would simply be enough. Like you I get some value from the occasional side discussion. I can appreciate why people would want to keep the main discussion on topic though, I just think it would be best to keep the meta discussion and just section it off.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- gorpomon 7y agoI'll kindly say this: while it might be technically bikeshedding, accessibility on the web is important and it only gets better when we call it out, respectfully, every chance we get. OP should have chosen better words, but the sentiment is valid. It's very likely that as a high ranking HN article the owners of mender.io will read these comments and improve their blog. I don't have sight accessibility issues and I struggled to read this content.
- frou_dh 7y agohttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22226562 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22226562
- gorpomon 7y agoFeedback sent via their contact form. Nothing further to discuss here really, happy reading everyone.
- ralphmender 7y agoThank you for the feedback. I'm with Mender.io and we will be addressing this.
- lewiscollard 7y agoHere's the original gov.uk press release, and as always (kudos to their team) it's beautifully legible: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-strengthen-security-of-internet-connected-products https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-strengthen-...
- sonofgod 7y agoTrying to work out what I'd want in a first pass. At an absolute minimum: * A commitment and ability to update any critical security issues for a specified amount of time * Standardised mechanisms for reporting critical updates to users which are not used for marketing * A basic checklist of best practice for internal self-audit (SQL injection, plaintext data, enumeration attacks) A low bar, but still far better than what we've currently got. (External audits are probably silver tier?)
- smhenderson 7y agoGood list. I would add a clear and accessible way to report a perceived problem without fear of some type of reprisal from the company. But I can also see how that could be abused by bad actors so I guess it would be a tricky part of the policy to do correctly.
- mattlondon 7y agoI'd add: - 2-factor auth support - federated login support (i.e. login with Google/Facebook/etc buttons) - some sort of indication of encryption in-flight and at-rest, and who handles the keys (e.g. is there a per-user key that tech support can't even access without user grant, or is there a single hard-codes AES key in the APK etc that everyone knows)
- fmajid 7y agoMost MCUs don't have a persistent real-time clock and thus if power is lost, there is a good chance TOTP based 2FA will no longer work.
- rkangel 7y agoThe 3rd one makes sense, the first two are system questions rather than device questions. In an open system there may be multiple service providers who's security should be judged separately from the security of a device.
- elliekelly 7y ago> A basic checklist of best practice for internal self-audit (SQL injection, plaintext data, enumeration attacks) I think this is a massive ask/knowledge expectation for the average person. A simple warning label about changing the device password from the default would be a major step in the right direction for consumers.
- xxpor 7y agoThe question to me is: how do we avoid another FIPS-like disaster, where the government standards fall behind the times and lead to worse security then you'd otherwise get?
- bigiain 7y agoWe can’t. That’s pretty much how government works in the best case. In the worst case we’ll get both mandatory worse security _and_ a rentseeking monopoly granted to donors and ex politicians to supply/enforce it as well.
- pjc50 7y ago> Both the United Kingdom and Singapore have aligned their IoT security plans and programs with the draft European Standard EN 303 645 ‘Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things’. > https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/303600_303699/303645/02.00.00_20/en_303645v020000a.pdf https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/303600_303699/303645/02... About 30 pages of broad points. Judicious use of "where applicable".
- crazygringo 7y agoNo matter how great security labeling may be, I fear the incentives are completely and utterly in the wrong place. An individual consumer who purchases a poorly protected network device is unlikely to suffer any meaningful individual harm, like having their computer ransomwared. Rather, it makes things like botnets possible that can be used for all sorts of things, e.g. DoS attacks against a third party. So why should a consumer do anything but ignore the label? It's the rational choice if the less-secure product is cheaper. If we want security standards, they need to be legislated democratically and applied to all devices -- not left up to consumer choice. Now whether a legislature is capable of doing that effectively is certainly an open question. But I'm afraid labeling may be no more than an ineffective band-aid.
- JumpCrisscross 7y ago> An individual consumer who purchases a poorly protected network device is unlikely to suffer any meaningful individual harm It opens the door to liability for companies who purchase insecure network devices. If your peers are buying good hardware while you're buying self-identifying garbage, someone harmed by a botnet running on your metal has a better argument, now, that you were knowingly reckless.
- thfuran 7y agoBut if there are a hundred million compromised TVs, toasters, refrigerators, and thermostats, liability for those few enterprises is largely a moot point.
- TheRealPomax 7y agoI don't understand what you're trying to say here. The fact that companies will now be liable means that if even a single person is affected, not only is there clear liability, the kind of offenses that aren't sued for right now, because the payoff is to low to cover the court costs, are suddenly perfectly viable class action suits for amounts in the hundreds of millions of dollars against single manufacturers. That's a huge shift, and about as far from "moot" as you can get.
- genmon 7y agoCould be worth them looking at the Trusted Technology Mark which has been doing the hard work of figuring out how to certify connected devices: https://web.archive.org/web/20190212185530/https://trustabletech.org/about/ https://web.archive.org/web/20190212185530/https://trustable... (edit: linking via archive.org as the site appears to be redirecting at least some clicks to scam sites) The axes are interesting and a good starting point. From their site: * Privacy & Data Practices: Is it designed using state of the art data practices, and respectful of user rights? * Transparency: Is it made clear to users what the device does and how data might be used? * Security: Is it designed and built using state of the art security practices and safeguards? * Stability: How robust is the device and how long of a life cycle can a consumer reasonably expect? * Openness: How open are both the device and the manufacturer‘s processes? Is open data used or generated?
- ancarda 7y agoThat URL opened up a scam site for me claiming I was going to win something, I think a phone. I closed the tab too quickly to see How did that happen? I have JavaScript disabled and an adblocker installed... Edit: My browser's history: * https://trustabletech.org/about/# https://trustabletech.org/about/# * http://www.wosemdesy.site/ http://www.wosemdesy.site/[...loads of crap here...] * http://competition5783.primeluck26.live/*******/ http://competition5783.primeluck26.live/*******/[...loads of crap here...]
- genmon 7y agoLooks like a Wordpress hack. I've dropped a note to the site maintainers and heard back already -- they're on it.
- Digit-Al 7y agoThe irony :-/
- droithomme 7y agoI got competition6155.primeluck2.live redirecting to mobile-app-market-here1.info redirecting to updatelive.yourultimatesafevideoplayer.info. Which is obviously a malware download. Fun stuff. Gives me tons of confidence TrustableTech can be trusted and certifying device security globally. Trusted Technology Mark? To me this will mean "unsafe".
- gumby 7y agoThese are stickers; I was hoping they would be cryptographic labels that you could validate over the network. Still, it's a start.
- toby- 7y agoIt's a start of sorts; I seriously hope it develops into a wider set of reasonable policies and practices. The UK gov't does a lot right when it comes to IT and security, but it also gets a lot wrong — I'm hoping this develops sensibly.
- timthorn 7y agoThis is a good point to remind citizens to keep an eye on the Government consultations that come out from time to time - at least in the UK, we all have the opportunity to contribute to this type of regulation through responding to the relevant consultations. https://www.gov.uk/search/policy-papers-and-consultations?order=updated-newest https://www.gov.uk/search/policy-papers-and-consultations?or...
- flareback 7y agofrom the press release linked to in the article (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-strengthen-security-of-internet-connected-products https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-strengthen-...): - All consumer internet-connected device passwords must be unique and not resettable to any universal factory setting - Manufacturers of consumer IoT devices must provide a public point of contact so anyone can report a vulnerability and it will be acted on in a timely manner - Manufacturers of consumer IoT devices must explicitly state the minimum length of time for which the device will receive security updates at the point of sale, either in store or online
- jchw 7y agoThis all seems reasonable. Frankly, though, imagine the benefit we would see if this was also enforced for consumer network equipment, like routers...
- bigiain 7y agoMostly reasonable, but shortsighted it seems to me. How do they expect to enforce these requirements on the manufacture of the IoT crap sold by the vendor “Best Security Happiness Store” on AliBaba, and the unnamed (or outright counterfeit named) Chinese manufacturer they bought it from? And conversely, they could obviously easily apply this to the UK based Raspberry Pi foundation, but who’s responsible for enforcing the “no way to reset to a known factory password” for the pi:raspberry login from a stock Rasbian install? (Or do we just hand wave that away and say “that’s not a consumer device, even though we’ve shipped over 30 million of them!”?)
- hakfoo 7y agoI suspect the Raspberry Pi issue is avoided because technically, it doesn't do squat until you install software on it. You might get a preflashed Raspbian card in the box, but I could just as easily be running RiscOS
- jl6 7y agoI don’t see a time limit on that second point. For how long will companies be expected to act upon vulnerability reports? What’s a reasonable end of life?
- kragen 7y agoI think a reasonable basic set of requirements would be the following: - There is no non-free firmware or other software on the device. - The consumer is provided full source code to the software and can effectively replace the preinstalled version with a version they have compiled themselves. - The manufacturer provides updated versions of any software or firmware (again, including full source code) to patch any discovered security vulnerability for the expected life of the device: at least three years for most devices, but perhaps as long as 30 to 60 years for some devices. This lifetime is disclosed. - The device does not transmit any personally identifiable information back to the manufacturer in its default configuration; for example, audio recordings, power usage measurements, accelerometer readings, temperature readings, or customer login names or account numbers. Unfortunately, I don't think such requirements are viable in the current political situation. That doesn't change the fact that any device that fails to comply with them introduces a serious security vulnerability: there is no way for the users to defend themselves against malicious actors who penetrate the manufacturer. The Dieselgate scandal and the Huawei prohibition are only the mildest taste of what we are in for. Of course it is not practical for every person to audit the source code of the firmware for every TV remote control and power brick they use, but it is possible for people to organize consumer watchdog agencies that do perform such audits.
- swamifil 7y agoI think some kind of indicator that networked devices are at risk is a smart thing to do. I posted this "Show HN" a little while ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22343786 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22343786 Part of the idea is that people will modify their behavior when there's visible indication they're conducting a risky activity.
- bob1029 7y agoI fail to see how this really improves anything for the average consumer. Government getting involved in this sort of thing just feels like more of the same TSA-style security theater nonsense. I'd prefer my network device manufacturers focus their efforts on the actual hard stuff rather than spending time and money getting certified for some bullshit box label.
- timthorn 7y ago> focus their efforts on the actual hard stuff The trouble is, they (or at least, a good number of them) aren't doing so at the moment. This will get them to at least address the easy stuff.
- bigiain 7y agoThey are extremely good at focusing on “the hard stuff”, of shaving tenths of a cent off production costs. To a first approximation, nobody cares about anything except price in the low end of gadgets.
- olyjohn 7y agoExactly. It's going to be a list of check-boxes that the manufacturer will do the bare minimum to meet. Or they twist their process and wording to make it look like they are meeting the requirement.
- FpUser 7y agoI would even read it were it not for light grey text on white background. I am declaring personal vendetta against visual design decisions that ignore any common sense.
- jotm 7y agoSo is this like the "Smoking kills" labels on cigarette packs and limits/warnings on beer cans or what? I'd say literally everyone ignores those.
- kfarr 7y agoOr like prop 65 warning in CA
- tialaramex 7y agoAll the packs of cigarettes say "Smoking kills". I presume the idea is that your Apple Foozle is safe, and so is this Famous Brand Foozle and this Obviously Rebadged Generic Foozle that's half the price of the Apple product, but the foozle your mate got from the geezer who used to get him pirate DVDs doesn't have the sticker. No surprise when your mate gets ransomware a few months later. They saw him coming.
- logifail 7y agoQ: is this content (at mender.io) supposed to be hard to read, or is it just my eyeballs?
- michaelatmender 7y agoDefinitely not our intention to make it hard to read! Now that it's been pointed out, we've changed the text color on the blogs. Hopefully that will make it easier to read for everybody.
- londons_explore 7y agoLet me write the source code for the label printer... def IsDeviceSecureEnoughForUKGovernment(): if manufacturer=='Huawei': return "Not Secure. Use sparingly" return "Certified Secure"
- ellius 7y agoI saw this design on /r/security and thought it was a good idea: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22343786 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22343786 It seems like if we want to solve this problem we need to somehow modify users' behavior by making them aware that indiscriminate browsing is a risk.
- noizejoy 7y agoI often wonder why IOT devices aren’t regulated more analogous to cars, since the Internet is a bit analogous to a road system [0], i.e. a shared resource where mistakes and misbehaviour impact other participants. A couple of car analogies might be, that car manufacturers are required to have cars repairable for x years, and that recalls to repair dangerous defects are mandatory. In the case of IOT, the recalls could just be mandatory updates. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_superhighway https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_superhighway
- jdnenej 7y agoBecause technology progresses faster than laws and by the time the laws catch up there are already powerful corporations established based on the lack of those laws. For example its an obvious public and environmental benefit to require that all phones have a user replaceable battery but until recently they almost all did and now it's too late because every phone maker would lobby against it.
- Hokusai 7y ago> Because technology progresses faster than laws and by the time the laws catch up there are already powerful corporations established based on the lack of those laws. I see another aspect of this. Societies have allowed tech companies to run unregulated in a trader-off between safety and technological advance. Medical equipment, cars or planes are examples were regulations were put in place as safety failures have more dangerous consequences. As devices are more ubiquitous and the economy and lives depend more on them, further regulation will be pushed forward. > and now it's too late because every phone maker would lobby against it. I agree that will take political will to regulate the tech industry. But, in the same way that phone manufacturers do not want replaceable batteries the rest of industries will see their costs reduced by such a regulation. So, there is also opposing forces that want big tech to play nicer with the rest of the industry ecosystem. And, in democratic countries, population will also push for change as their lives are disrupted by the lack of regulation.
- noizejoy 7y agoWouldn't that also have precedence in the history of the automobile? Pretty much a free-for-all while development was advancing fast, large & powerful corporations dominating the industry and good chunks of the economy - and then a Ralph Nader[0] comes along and at the right place and the right time with the right tenacity, things change. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ralph_Nader https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ralph_Nader
- ardy42 7y ago> The idea is that similar to how bluetooth and wifi labels help consumers feel confident their products will work with these wireless communication protocols, a Security label will instill confidence in consumers that their device is safe and secure according to standards. I would like a warning label if the device requires an internet connection for normal operation or features that don't really need it, so I can decide not to buy it if the requirement is unreasonable.
- tinus_hn 7y agoAt the very least a required disclosure that shows how long the product will receive security updates would be really helpful.
- alicestyles 7y agoThat would be mind-blowing to me.