8 ms·
Rather than browsers arbitrarily only trusting certain lengths of certs, of much greater concern to me is the number of root CAs trusted by every major browser,
by walrus01 7y ago
Rather than browsers arbitrarily only trusting certain lengths of certs, of much greater concern to me is the number of root CAs trusted by every major browser, some of which are companies under the control of authoritarian states (Turkey, China).
Go take a look at how many CAs your browser trusts, and tell me with a straight face that you absolutely trust every one of those CAs to always do the right thing.
Certificate issuance transparency helps, but doesn't get rid of the fundamental issue.
- riobard 7y agoWas there any proposal to limit which root CAs can sign what TLDs? Or is DANE still a thing?
- tptacek 7y agoIt's a thing in that there are recordsets you can create to implement DANE for your zone, and software you can install that will validate those records. It is not a thing in that no mainstream browser will look at DANE, and in that virtually no popular sites (especially in the technology industry) use DANE. DANE is a dead letter standard.
- riobard 7y agoAre there any viable alternatives to DANE, or is this a dead end in general and we're stuck with CA forever?
- duskwuff 7y agoCAA, which many CAs (including Let's Encrypt) already use: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_Certification_Authority_Authorization https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_Certification_Authority_Au...
- riobard 7y agoIt looks like CAA does not prevent bad CAs at all? A rogue CA can just skip CAA altogether, no?
- JoachimSchipper 7y agoRogue CAs can do almost anything, but the browsers will kill any CA that is found to be (repeatedly) mis-issuing. And checking the CAA has apparently been in the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements since 2017. That said, LetsEncrypt just had a nasty bug around CAA checking, and ended up not quite revoking all certificates for which insufficient checks had been executed: https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/2020-02-29-caa-rechecking-bug/114591 https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/2020-02-29-caa-recheckin....
- crote 7y agoTheoretically, a client could also query the record and check it against the certificate presented. That would basically be the same as a DANE CA constraint. I'm not aware of anyone actually doing this, though. Certificate Transparency requirements are probably enough to prevent any CA from attempting to cheat with CAA.
- tialaramex 7y agoDon't do this. CAA is not "This is the list of CAs that are trustworthy for this domain". CAA is "This is the list of CAs that can issue for this domain right at this precise moment". If you aren't a CA you should only be looking at CAA either to debug a weird problem, out of curiosity or for some research purpose. Do not use it to make security decisions if you are not a CA.
- Avamander 7y agoI've long wished for a browser extension that did DNSSEC and DANE validation and displayed which country's CA signed the current cert. CT helps somewhat, but given that Firefox doesn't enforce it leaves a lot of people vulnerable.
- tptacek 7y agoThat browser extension exists, or at least it used to. Of course, you run aground of the fact that nobody signs their zones (other than European domains whose registrars sign them automatically, which is, when you think about it, just theater). I don't know what you mean by "Firefox doesn't enforce [CT]". Mozilla has been instrumental in dis-trusting misissuing CAs.
- garrettr_ 7y ago> I don't know what you mean by "Firefox doesn't enforce [CT]". They mean Firefox, unlike Chrome and Safari, doesn't require proof of inclusion in a CT log for recently issued TLS certificates to be considered valid. Source: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Certificate_Transparency#Browser_Requirements https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Certif....
- tialaramex 7y agoMozilla has lots of policy but Firefox has very little policy enforcement. This is important for practical reasons I explained only the other day. For example Firefox doesn't check for SCTs so if you show my Firefox an apparently brand new certificate for which there are no SCTs (because maybe it's actually bogus) it will carry on as if nothing happened. It also doesn't check validity periods. If you show Firefox a certificate from Let's Encrypt claiming notBefore 1986-03-02 and notAfter 2024-09-16 it considers that seems fine, never mind that the Web PKI didn't exist in 1986 or that nobody is allowed to issue leaf certificates that last almost 40 years - it doesn't care about that.
- alwillis 7y agoThe latest survey of 250 million zones [1] shows that 10,787,502 zones are DNSSEC signed. And that number continues to increase steadily. [1]: https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#summary https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#summary
- Santosh83 7y agoOn the one hand we argue the Internet should be global and not get Balkanized and on the other hand we arbitrarily select certain countries to place lesser or higher trust in. Someone in China could legitimately have a similar low level of trust for US root certs and he/she would not be far wrong given that NSLs can gag companies into complying with arbitrary dictums that no one ever knows about.
- gowld 7y agoDon't confuse a "country" with a "government". The Internet is global, but that doesn't mean I trust every person on it. That's why we have spam filters and block lists and cert trust lists.
- bananabreakfast 7y agoThat's some nice whataboutism you got there
- tuxracer 7y agoThe risk of the communication being compromised isn't necessarily the sole concern. There are also varying levels of consequences for various types of communication for different countries. When it comes to a country that has developed extensive censorship mechanisms and it's casually accepted that one could face a visit from the police or jailed for criticizing its leader or party it doesn't seem completely arbitrary to have some additional concern when it comes to that country possibly compromising your communication.
- chongli 7y agoThe original hacker dream of the internet was that it would break down borders and open up the free flow of information. Now that non-hacker types (politicians and bureaucrats, mainly) have had access for a few decades, they've realized how powerful a tool it is for empowering their authoritarian impulses. Call me cynical but I think it's only a matter of time before the internet becomes totally Balkanized. Heck, it's almost there right now.
- ferzul 7y ago
- advisedwang 7y agoThere's also Certificate Authority Authorization DNS records (checked by CA so defends against abusive CSRs, but not an abusive CA).
- tptacek 7y agoI think we're generally on a trajectory towards addressing the fundamental issue --- a few major firms will implement free certificates, like LetsEncrypt and ACM, and the industry will consolidate around them. And browsers will get stricter about transparency requirements for the oddball CAs. But it seems like we're definitely going to salami slice our way out of this problem.
- wnevets 7y agoinfamously the hong kong post office is/was a trusted CA https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=373537 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=373537
- computerfriend 7y agoWhat's infamous about it?
- cpeterso 7y agoMore infamous is the request to add the root certificate for "Honest Achmed's Used Cars and Certificates": https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959
- Fnoord 7y agoI guess because it is an unusual relatively small entity who's position as a CA is unusual. Plus, without certificate pinning [ie. before HSTS] you don't want rogue CAs.
- 0x0 7y agoHSTS has nothing to do with pinning, you're probably thinking of the deprecated HPKP
- Dahoon 7y agoWhat's wrong with that? Is it worse than Comodo?
- wnoise 7y agoWouldn't it be nice if you could have certs signed by multiple CAs, so detrusting bad CAs would be easier without wrecking as much stuff?
- emilecantin 7y agoThere's nothing keeping you from getting multiple certs, signed by different CAs, and switching as soon as there's an issue with one of them. Of course, you'd have to do the switching manually.
- drdaeman 7y agoTLSv1.3 removed the requirement on the certificate ordering. I haven't tried but I believe you can supply multiple certificates (and chains) in there.
- tialaramex 7y agoThe constraint loosening says your Leaf must be first. If you obtain different leaf certificates from different CAs then you can't "put the leaf first" for all of them. In today's browsers the first leaf will be treated as your apparent leaf (so the Subject needs to match the hostname in the URL), other leaves presented will either be discarded or cause an error. So no benefit.
- lmm 7y agoYou wouldn't need multiple leaves though? You generate your own certificate and send the CSR to the CA, no?
- tialaramex 7y agoYou've definitely misunderstood something here, I'm going to guess and explain the bit I think you have wrong, but if I guessed wrong and that's not the bit you were unclear on we can try again. So, a Certificate Signing Request is a request that a CA signs some certificate but especially in the Web PKI it's an error to think of it as a request to sign one particular certificate. The result of sending CSRs to two or more CAs is not two otherwise identical documents with different signatures. Experts talk about "signing a CSR" knowing that's not exactly what they mean even though in a toy CA built out of OpenSSL it seems like that works. In reality a properly created CSR is proof that you know some private key (not revealed to the CA) corresponding to a public key (which is) and you want a certificate for some names. But the Certificate Authority will need to at least choose their own random serial number, fill out their own Issuer name and key, and choose appropriate date-time values for the certificate's lifespan (notBefore / notAfter). In reality they often at least partially discard the names you filled out because their rules may forbid issuing certain names you've asked for. If you use automation like Certbot the names requested exactly match what you wanted, but if you're building CSRs with OpenSSL or some 1990s Java web forms on an appliance chances are the names in the CSR are semi-bogus and issuing for them is forbidden so the CA needs to figure out what you actually needed. Anyway, as a result for each CA you'd get a distinct Leaf certificate which (if you follow the DAG backwards) gets to a different trusted root. But you are only permitted to send one Leaf in TLS despite the otherwise relaxed constraints.
- kodablah 7y ago> Certificate issuance transparency helps, but doesn't get rid of the fundamental issue. I think the real innovation in transparency will be client side. I have been wanting to develop a "root CA" hit counter that tracked locally which of the sites you visit used which CA. You could say the logical addition from there is to allow users to disable unused CAs (or do it automatically when unused) and have a opt-in when a disabled one is used, but I think that's too much. Just a client-side plugin to let me see which CA is used and keep track alongside history (i.e. not in incognito) would be nice. I am waiting for this Chromium issue to implement such a thing: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=628819 https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=628819 (looks already done in FF)
- tialaramex 7y agoYes, the Firefox plug-in "Certainly Something" uses the equivalent APIs in Firefox and works today, giving back a nicer version of their old "View certificate" UI only to the fraction of people who care, rather than weighing down the actual Firefox browser with more and more X.509 features most users will never need. You probably should not encourage lay users to disable CAs they aren't using, it's like those plastic "child safety" plug inserts in the UK - kids already can't actually do the thing the insert pretends to prevent, safety shutters mandated by law in your power sockets keep tiny fingers out of the live power - but the plastic insert is exactly the perfect shape for a kid to defeat the safety protection and electrocute themselves.
- saber6 7y ago> You probably should not encourage lay users to disable CAs they aren't using, it's like those plastic "child safety" plug inserts in the UK - kids already can't actually do the thing the insert pretends to prevent, safety shutters mandated by law in your power sockets keep tiny fingers out of the live power - but the plastic insert is exactly the perfect shape for a kid to defeat the safety protection and electrocute themselves. Your analogy is unnecessary. This is simply a case of determining which issuing authorities you want to trust. Do I want to trust ones in China? No. That's not racist by the way.
- 7y ago
- amluto 7y agoI have absolutely no problem trusting a Turkish CA for a Turkish domain. I don’t want to trust it for .com. I cannot fathom why browsers can’t pull this off.
- Cpoll 7y agoIt might lead to a false sense of security. I don't think it'd be overkill to send a request to all 52 CAs (and fail if you get conflicting answers). Then the most a trusted CA could do is DoS some sites.
- tialaramex 7y agoThey can, and Mozilla (in Firefox) does: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Additional_Trust_Changes https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Additional_Trust_Changes > The Turkish Government CA is name-constrained to a set of turkish toplevel domains - that is, .gov.tr, .k12.tr, .pol.tr, .mil.tr, .tsk.tr, .kep.tr, .bel.tr, .edu.tr and .org.tr.
- HappyDreamer 7y agoWhat if there was a country flag or something, indicating where the CA was located -- in which country / jurisdiction? Then, let's say it's in China or Turkey or Kazakhstan, etc etc, then I would know that the politicians/police there might have decided to man-in-the-middle listen to anything I type into that website. And what if there was a Freedom of Press index number (or sth like that) next to this flag? (because who can remember all flags)
- gsich 7y agoDon't expect too much. Browsers can't even display punycode to avoid being scammed.
- tialaramex 7y agoYou absolutely can build a plugin for Firefox (and Chrome? Maybe? Sounds like some APIs needed are not finished) to add this UI feature for people who want it. Experience shows that if everybody wants a UI feature from a plug-in it won't take long until the people you were plugging into implement it natively and you can choose to take that as praise or shake your fist at them for "stealing". I recommend the former. But I doubt your new "Freedom of the Press of the CA issuer of this site" UI will be very popular because it's not at all obvious what anybody can do with that information or how to even interpret it.
- tialaramex 7y ago> Go take a look at how many CAs your browser trusts, and tell me with a straight face that you absolutely trust every one of those CAs to always do the right thing. OK. There are 52 of them, listed here: https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/CAInformationReport https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/CAInformationR... although perhaps don't bang on Salesforce's poor server, it seems like for some reason this isn't trivial for them to do? I do in some sense trust them to always do the right thing, but, as the saying goes "Trust but verify". As well as trusting them I also pay attention to what I see and other people see and press them to do better when they fall short. I actually think their record has been fairly good, and is gradually improving. It could always be better, but on the whole what I see from CAs is exactly what I'd expect from humans generally, they are lazy and incompetent and so we have to design things to take that into account. I'd expect no more from any of us.
- ori_b 7y ago>As well as trusting them I also pay attention to what I see and other people see and press them to do better when they fall short. Can you give an example of how you have personally pressed them and how they responded?
- tialaramex 7y agoSure, after Let's Encrypt posted initially at the end of February about their uh, bug, I responded in part: > That is, how many certificates were really issued to multiple FQDNs (if a single FQDN the bug described has no effect) more than 8 hours after initial correct CAA checks ? Intuitively this should be almost none, but intuitions can be misleading. Jacob responded by saying that they were "working on this analysis today" although in fact the next we heard was a complete list of arguably misissued certificates a few days later in an announcement that was linked from Hacker News and which you've hopefully seen. I wrote (in that Hacker News thread) that this was one way to answer my question :D
- bogomipz 7y ago>"Certificate issuance transparency helps ..." Could you elaborate on what transparency you are referring to here? How does it help with the amount of root CAs trusted by the browser? Thanks.
- 0x0 7y agoCertificate Transparency means SSL certs must have been logged to public CT log databases to be considered valid. This ensures that any monkey business MITMing with rogue certificates will be detected quickly, either by site owners seeing unknown certs for their sites in the log, or browsers rejecting unlogged certs. http://www.certificate-transparency.org/home http://www.certificate-transparency.org/home
- tialaramex 7y agoTwo related things are happening here, and a third thing isn't actually happening today but is an active subject of research. 1. All the trusted CAs log either all the certificates they issue or the vast majority of certificates intended for use on the public Internet. They do this because it's a good idea, and (as we'll see in #2) because it makes commercial sense. The effect is that if you have a way to trick a CA into issuing something that shouldn't exist, or if they just issue it through the usual human fallibility (e.g. an operator fat fingers something at a console) researchers can see it, the same way they'd see if your Senator doesn't bother attending Congress - it's a matter of public record. 2. Google's Chrome, and later Apple's Safari require SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) from logs before they accept newer certificates. The cheap easy way to arrange this is to log "pre-certificates" which get you valid SCTs and then you bake those inside the real certificate given to a subscriber. If you use Let's Encrypt, this is how SCTs got inside all your certificates, no extra work for you. There are fancier options that let you get a certificate and then obtain SCTs later separately, but they're rather niche. This means if you can obtain an apparently valid certificate but only a new enough one (thus after enough time in the future, any certificate) but no SCTs for it, it won't be valid in those browsers. The logs aren't supposed to give out an SCT without logging the certificate. So now an attacker needs to either log their bogus certificate (if they can) and show it to the world, or corrupt the logs too, a big ask on top of whatever attack they've done to trick or corrupt the CA issuer or bypass them. 3. Eventually the intention is a Gossip protocol. The idea here is, when you browser sees an SCT we should like to verify that the associated certificate was really logged irrevocably for everybody to see. But we'd like not to undo your privacy in the process. You don't want to tell everybody "Hey I like Balloon Porn" but you'd ideally like to be sure the certificate on your Balloon Porn website is seen in the logs by everybody, not just a special version of the log shown only to you and six other people under investigation for liking Balloon Porn. Figuring out the best way to approach this is an active research topic.
- Dahoon 7y ago> (Turkey, China) I don't get why it is always authoritarian states that is pointed fingers at when history clearly shows us that it isn't authoritarian states that are the biggest problem but so-called democratic states. I get why one would dislike authoritarian states (I do too) but the smart move is to look at who history tells us not to trust - not just believing the bogyman is coming.
- microcolonel 7y agoI personally only whitelist some authorities, but I think the threats to the CA infrastructure are sadly more mundane than the problems caused by weird fascist state actor CAs.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]