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As someone who works in finance/banking, I can assure you that this is not uncommon. Almost everyone is engaging in not-so-best practices with password storage
by bob1029 7y ago
As someone who works in finance/banking, I can assure you that this is not uncommon. Almost everyone is engaging in not-so-best practices with password storage if they are using any 3rd party vendors. Only the institutions with the resources to rebuild in-house systems with modern security standards are the exception to this rule. There are only a handful of these. Ultimately, it's not some malicious intent or incompetence, but simply the acknowledgement that the legacy systems will not enjoy PBKDF hash+salt+iterations columns being added 30 years after the fact.
The risk analysis and mitigation discussion for these institutions goes something like this:
1) We cant have good password storage so we will require a 2nd factor and attempt to ensure these systems reside in our most secure network.
2) There is nothing we can do, so we will simply rely on the fact that if someone logs into an account illegally, we send in the men with guns. For some strange reason when a bank calls the FBI things move with a high level of expediency.
There is much more to this than just the technical aspect of "oh my goodness why aren't you hashing your passwords". How much ripping would HN impose on one of these institutions if they attempted a 100% best practices secure password upgrade and then subsequently had a complete IT disaster unfold (I can certainly link articles). For many banks and other financial institutions, going down for even 1 hour is a complete catastrophe. If people can't get their money out right away, they are leaving for the competition and you will likely get dinged by regulators. Bad people will continue to do bad things until the end of time. Killing your business to handle every edge case, even if it seems obvious, is not a good path to go down.
I would also consider this: These banks' IT systems are storing things that many of us would argue are much more valuable than your passwords. A bank's core system also represents the actual monetary value of every customer's account. We are talking about password security in a system domain where there are arguably far more valuable assets to secure. These assets are already implicitly protected by a massive apparatus extending as far as Ohio Class nuclear submarines patrolling the Pacific ocean.
- kevin_thibedeau 7y agoSo they can add columns for 2FA but strengthened password storage is not doable? This was forgivable 30 years ago. It was bad practice 20 years ago. Someone could have demonstrated leadership and developed a ten year plan to fix their legacy problem then.
- moviuro 7y ago> developed a ten year plan to fix their legacy problem then They did. And Pi factor came in. And budget was cut because those pesky fintech are a threat, and clearly money was better spent on a more modern offer than on those "security" concerns. And yes, it's possible to add 2FA to the front layer. However, the remnants of COBOL code running on the mainframe for the last 25 years weren't designed to handle passwords length 9 or more, and the last guy who knew how that code was built has retired some 15 years ago.
- marcus_holmes 7y agoThat COBOL layer that underlies almost all of our infrastructure. It was written when the cost/benefit calculation of writing it involved "downsizing" thousands of clerks who were doing the job manually. It can't be replaced because the cost/benefit calculation of replacing it does not involve anything like those kinds of numbers. The benefits of avoiding even a major security incident just don't compare to the costs. Y2K taught me this. Nothing has changed since.
- dx034 7y agoSome banks are replacing their core banking system with new software. It's extremely expensive, a huge risk (any delay in migration means time where customers can't use ATMs or cards) and the benefit vs just adding API layers on top isn't always clear. At some point everyone needs to modernize but there are very few people who'd want to take responsibility for a project that size. TSB customers have learned how painful it can be if the migration of a core banking system fails: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tsb-it-failure-cost-compensation-customers-switch-current-account-a8757821.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tsb-it-fail...
- marcus_holmes 7y agoNot only banks. I bought a house with the money I made on a Y2K project for a water authority's billing system. I doubt they've managed to work out how to replace that mess of COBOL without going broke.
- tentboy 7y agoAs someone who uses the bank being referred to in the OP, this makes me feel a little better... somehow. I use a unique password and 2FA and monitor my accounts but I am still considering switching banks to one that puts more emphasis on security. You mentioned that only a few banks have the resources to tear down their systems and create a new secure one. What banks are these?
- bob1029 7y agoI cannot say which ones specifically, but if you OrderByDescending market cap and pick the top 5, you'd probably be looking at the only ones. Developing an in-house core banking system is a massive undertaking that is even larger than starting an entirely new bank from scratch (which almost never happens now). We are talking billions of dollars locked up just to start the project. Not even god himself could tell you if/when that project would complete. Bank cores are some of the most complex monstrosities on earth.
- generalpass 7y agoYou can have maybe 3 banks types of accounts: 1. This has electronic transactions freely going in and out. 2. This initiates inbound electronic transactions. 3. This only works with you standing in the bank. Or some variant thereof.
- allemagne 7y ago>How much ripping would HN impose on one of these institutions if they attempted a 100% best practices secure password upgrade and then subsequently had a complete IT disaster unfold (I can certainly link articles). I'm definitely interested in examples of this
- bob1029 7y agoHere is one recent example I just dug up: https://www.itnews.com.au/news/massive-cba-outage-traced-to-failed-infrastructure-upgrade-532586 https://www.itnews.com.au/news/massive-cba-outage-traced-to-... Not specifically related to password security upgrade, but it illustrates the impact of a bank's IT systems going down. Being able to run a credit card transaction and receive your paycheck is fundamental to the fabric of our society. When these processes are disrupted, people get very anxious and things start to fall apart rapidly. When is the last time you insert your card into the reader and thought "I sure hope this works"?
- markstos 7y agoOn the other hand, malicious actors have been remotely draining banks, especially small banks, remotely due to their poor IT practices. So a bank system that is "up but insecure" is only a recipe to be horribly hacked later. I rather my bank be down for a few hours and come back online with my money intact than be hacked and drained and but online.
- dx034 7y agoTSB had a major IT meltdown when it tried to migrate to a different core banking system: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tsb-it-failure-cost-compensation-customers-switch-current-account-a8757821.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tsb-it-fail...
- tantalor 7y ago> For many banks and other financial institutions, going down for even 1 hour is a complete catastrophe. Are you joking? It's a common trope for bank websites to go down for "scheduled maintenance". Not to mention real-world bank branches keep bizarre hours and close for random holidays like Presidents' Day and Veterans' Day. Why do banks and credit card companies need to perform "scheduled maintenance" during which users are unable to access their information online? https://www.quora.com/Why-do-banks-and-credit-card-companies-need-to-perform-scheduled-maintenance-during-which-users-are-unable-to-access-their-information-online https://www.quora.com/Why-do-banks-and-credit-card-companies...
- milkytron 7y agoEven though websites are really important, I think they mean other business critical services going down for an hour. Imagine if all credit cards with a company failed to process transactions for an hour, or depositing/withdrawing money didn't make a change to your balance. Those types of issues are much more severe than a customer not being able to log in to the website.
- mqus 7y agoYou know, those kind of things already happen. Even I sometimes had issues with my credit card when paying online and usually there's another way or you could just pay an hour later.
- katbyte 7y agoReally? I’ve never experienced my credit or debit card not working (except in America where my Canadian debut card often will just not work)
- Guest0918231 7y agoThe Canadian Revenue Agency website is down from 3am to 6am every single day for maintenance. They are also scheduled to be down for days at a time. https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/e-services/cra-login-services/hours-service.html https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/e-services/... This site is used for everything. Reviewing your taxes, reading mail and notifications you've received from the government, filing returns, making payments, etc.
- tzs 7y ago> Ultimately, it's not some malicious intent or incompetence, but simply the acknowledgement that the legacy systems will not enjoy PBKDF hash+salt+iterations columns being added 30 years after the fact. Are banks running their web interface on 30+ year old legacy systems? I'd expect the web stuff to be on much more modern systems, which call upon the 30+ year old stuff to do the underlying financial stuff.
- overgard 7y agoHonestly 30 sounds young. Cobol is alive and well in these companies
- sli 7y agoMaybe, that COBOL codebase doesn't contain the web-facing stuff. It's not handling user auth and all of that. It doesn't seem to make much sense for the web-facing side to be so directly connected to the financial backend, anyway, because some kinda privilege escalation or crafted input exploit on the web side could give someone direct access to the financial backend. Those two things are likely pretty heavily separated. So instead, it seems like the stuff holding just account holder information was given a password field to use on their fancy new HTML 2.0 webpage, but then just mostly left there ever since. The age of the financial side is fairly irrelevant in this scenario.
- TheGrumpyBrit 7y ago> As someone who works in finance/banking, I can assure you that this is not uncommon. Your assurance is not reassuring.
- whatshisface 7y ago>These assets are already implicitly protected by a massive apparatus extending as far as Ohio Class nuclear submarines patrolling the Pacific ocean. A lot of good they will do you when a clever hacker from an unknown country logs in to your account, takes some money, and disappears untraceably because the bank's poor IT practices didn't involve enough logging! The bank might not even realize they need to call the FBI. The only practical security solution is to stop the money from being stolen in the first place: law enforcement rarely recovers all of the stolen assets.
- akatechis 7y ago> These banks' IT systems are storing things that many of us would argue are much more valuable than your passwords. A bank's core system also represents the actual monetary value of every customer's account. We are talking about password security in a system domain where there are arguably far more valuable assets to secure. The password is what secures the more valuable things inside the account (the money). In fact, in nearly every case a password is used, no one really cares much about the password itself, but what's inside. That's why services require password in the first place. EDIT: Also, don't be so sure that passwords are not useful. If you can compromise a password in one service, there is a significant chance that the user in question is re-using the same password on other (or all?) services. If your password is "joe123" on somewebsite.com, if I can crack that, I can try to use that information to guess your login on somebank.com, somedoctor.com and somegovernmentservice.gov. The more things become "cloud"-based, the higher the value of cracking a password. I think the bigger consideration is actually how to exfiltrate money from an account that you compromise: If you initiate a wire transfer to some account you control, that leaves a paper trail, and typically has a lag time, during which the institution/customer have a chance to react. This is also why scam centers in India ask you to send them cash equivalents: gift card codes they can redeem/resell.
- snowwrestler 7y ago> The password is what secures the more valuable things inside the account (the money). I think the broader point of the parent is that in banks, there is actually a lot more than just the password securing the money in the bank. There is careful surveillance of the activity of accounts at the bank--separate from the website login system, and backed by regulatory accountability and ultimately the police. Unlike a modern service like Facebook or Google, your bank's website is not the same thing as the entire bank. When you log into your bank's website or app, you're logging into a public-facing system that in turn interacts with the "real" systems that the bank uses to manage money. Those "real" systems are secured in various ways too, and not just based on the web password. I once attended a talk by Bruce Schneier talking about the resilience of the financial system. Beyond the prevention of bad actions (for example by authentication), he emphasized that the financial system is highly engineered to make it possible to recover from bad actions. That includes some technical means, but also methods of accounting, and insurance.
- spurdoman77 7y ago"For some strange reason when a bank calls the FBI things move with a high level of expediency." Is this really true? AFAIK illegal account accesses such as phishing etc is fairly commonplace. Criminals steal low value from lots of accounts, and also the way they steal is not really traceable, not at least easily. How would they even know where to send the guns? And also I'm not really convinced that FBI priorizes bank cases, they probably prioritize all cases based on monetary value and maybe some harm factors, but I dont think banks get special treatment on principle. Sounds like bullshit to me to be frank.
- dontbenebby 7y agoI once heard an ancedote, I forget if it was the FBI or Secret Service (who deal with some financial matters due to the weird hybrid nature of the agency), but one or the other, at the time, allegedly would not even begin to investigate a matter of less than 5000 USD. Now if you can establish it's one person making many sub-5K transactions they may, but that's hard to do if they won't take notice. (The more I think the more I think it was the FBI, since the person also relayed that crimes against people often got short shrift since unfortunately one's feelings when threatened or harassed don't have an objective dollar amount)
- obmelvin 7y agoHonestly, this is bananas to me. I work for an IoT company with contracts to places like gas stations and chain restaurants. Freakin Wendy's and places like that absolutely don't want our product on their network and we have a base station connected to cell network along with our own local wireless network. (fwiw I agree, I think its best we aren't on their network) I know this is an apples to oranges comparison, but I just find it weird that payment processors (not the banks, I know I know) are the main driver behind these restaurant IT security measures, but other financial institutions have things like this that they do.
- dx034 7y agoI don't think network security is the issue here. Storing plain text passwords is likely a legacy problem, not an active implementation decision. And especially because some systems within the network can be vulnerable, locking down the network as much as possible at every possible point is even more important. Core banking systems can only run on 50 year old code because you have to get through many layers just to get close to accessing them.
- jdc 7y agoI don't even know where to begin.. you store customer passwords in plaintext because everyone else does it and that's okay because the FBI will handle it? What. The. Fuck?
- ConcernedCoder 7y ago"For some strange reason when a bank calls the FBI things move with a high level of expediency." Except when these hackers are in China, etc...
- buckminster 7y agoNone of this explains why the passwords are exposed to customer service reps.
- carapace 7y ago> As someone who works in finance/banking, I can assure you that this is not uncommon. And so, each time, you've reported them to this US-CERT thing the (current) top comment mentions so that proper steps can be taken, riiiiight? If you know about this and do nothing that's also part of the problem.
- dontbenebby 7y ago>As someone who works in finance/banking, I can assure you that this is not uncommon. Almost everyone is engaging in not-so-best practices with Are there any standards that doing this violates, and if so do banks have a person in the org (or external to the org) that violations of said standard can report to? > We are talking about password security in a system domain where there are arguably far more valuable assets to secure. My worry is that because this is such a simple thing, if we allow ourselves to not do the best practice, where does it end? Especially since large organizations have many parts that don't communicate. I agree we should think critically about risk, but I've also met lots of people who seem to backdate their logic - first they decide it's too onerous/costly to do a thing, then game out a reasonable enough reason why. The problem with the latter is eventually your focus on compliance and handwaving will bite you hard, and you may not get a chance to be reactive because the breach will be so bad.
- sangnoir 7y agoLook at it this way - banks will continue to support check payments for the foreseeable future, and checks violate every single security best practice by today's standards. The infrastructure to support checks without fraud burning everything to the ground was built up over centuries and works fairly well, this infrastructure works and has been extended to deter electronic fraud - so why waste time on technological navel gazing?
- richardc123 7y agoMaybe they cannot change the database schema, but surely they can change the UI so the password is not shown to the call-center staff.
- ta999999171 7y agoPeople, if you work for these companies, you legitimize their practices, and make it easier for them to keep existing. No, I don't care that you've grown accustomed to your fancy lifestyle. No, I don't care that your spouse is gonna shit on you if you take a pay cut until you can find similar work. No, I don't care that "someone else will take your place and do the same thing". Sorry - stand up for what's right, or this shit will continue to get worse. Engineering/architecture have some principles, why the hell shouldn't we? Signed, Someone Who Left Their Comfy Salary Because of Unethical Wankers