8 ms·

Has it not evolved at all in any implementation, particularly gnupg?

tptacek 7y ago
No, not really. The Efail attack is a pretty good example of how PGP's flawed design really just sets the system up for researchers to dunk on it; the GnuPG team's belief that they can't make breaking changes without synchronizing with the IETF OpenPGP working group ensures it'll remain like this for a long time. See also: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html
- upofadown 7y ago
  The Efail attack was almost, if not entirely, a client issue where those clients were leaking information from html emails. There were no real weaknesses in the OpenPGP standard or the GnuPG implementation of that standard. >... the GnuPG team's belief that they can't make breaking changes without synchronizing with the IETF OpenPGP working group ... That does not actually sound like a bad thing to me. The linked rant against OpenPGP/GnuPG takes the form of a semi-random list of minor issues/annoyances associated with the OpenPGP standard and the GnuPG implementation mixed together in no particular order. It ends with the completely absurd solution of just abandoning email all together. So you have to explain which parts of it support your contention. The OpenPGP standard is in reality one of the better written and implemented standards in computing (which isn't saying much). There may in the future be something better but it is downright irresponsible to slag it without coming up with any sort of alternative. It is here and it works.
  - tptacek 7y ago
    I think it's interesting that when a pattern of vulnerabilities is discovered that exfiltrates the plaintext of PGP-encrypted emails, a pattern that simply cannot occur with modern secure messaging constructions, the immediate impulse of the PGP community is to say "it's not our fault, it's not OpenPGP's fault, it's not GnuPG's fault". Like, it happened, and it happened to multiple implementations, including the most important implementations, but it's nobody's fault; it was just sort of an act of God. Like I said, interesting. Not reassuring, but interesting.
    - upofadown 7y ago
      It is well known that end-points are the weak parts of any sort of privacy system involving cryptography. So not really all that interesting. It was literally not GPG's fault or the fault of the standard.
      - akerl_ 7y ago
        What portion of the implementations have to fall victim to the exact same misbehavior before, in your opinion, it’s plausible to suggest that the issue is a foot-gun on the part of the overall standard/ecosystem?
        upofadown 7y ago
        The list is at the bottom of this: * https://efail.de/ https://efail.de/ Throwing out the discontinued things (Outlook 2007) and the webmail things that PGP can't be even sort of secure on (Roundcube, Horde) we end up with 7 bad clients out of a total of 27 good clients. So 26%. To get that they allegedly had to downgrade GPG.
        akerl_ 7y ago
        Sorry, to clarify, I’m not asking what percentage of clients were vulnerable in this case. I’m asking what the threshold is, beyond which you would consider the possibility that the issue was with the broader spec/ecosystem rather than the individual tools.
        upofadown 7y ago
        Obviously something higher than 26% or zero depending on what you believe happened here.... ... and just to be clear, we are only talking about Efail here... There is no pattern of client information leakage issues... So it is hard to generalize.
        akerl_ 7y ago
upofadown 7y ago
It has evolved in the standard as well as the implementations. It is a bit silly to claim that the current thing is bad because there was a program once with a similar name.

No, not really. The Efail attack is a pretty good example of how PGP's flawed design really just sets the system up for researchers to dunk on it; the GnuPG team's belief that they can't make breaking changes without synchronizing with the IETF OpenPGP working group ensures it'll remain like this for a long time. See also: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html

upofadown 7y ago
The Efail attack was almost, if not entirely, a client issue where those clients were leaking information from html emails. There were no real weaknesses in the OpenPGP standard or the GnuPG implementation of that standard. >... the GnuPG team's belief that they can't make breaking changes without synchronizing with the IETF OpenPGP working group ... That does not actually sound like a bad thing to me. The linked rant against OpenPGP/GnuPG takes the form of a semi-random list of minor issues/annoyances associated with the OpenPGP standard and the GnuPG implementation mixed together in no particular order. It ends with the completely absurd solution of just abandoning email all together. So you have to explain which parts of it support your contention. The OpenPGP standard is in reality one of the better written and implemented standards in computing (which isn't saying much). There may in the future be something better but it is downright irresponsible to slag it without coming up with any sort of alternative. It is here and it works.
- tptacek 7y ago
  I think it's interesting that when a pattern of vulnerabilities is discovered that exfiltrates the plaintext of PGP-encrypted emails, a pattern that simply cannot occur with modern secure messaging constructions, the immediate impulse of the PGP community is to say "it's not our fault, it's not OpenPGP's fault, it's not GnuPG's fault". Like, it happened, and it happened to multiple implementations, including the most important implementations, but it's nobody's fault; it was just sort of an act of God. Like I said, interesting. Not reassuring, but interesting.
  - upofadown 7y ago
    It is well known that end-points are the weak parts of any sort of privacy system involving cryptography. So not really all that interesting. It was literally not GPG's fault or the fault of the standard.
    - akerl_ 7y ago
      What portion of the implementations have to fall victim to the exact same misbehavior before, in your opinion, it’s plausible to suggest that the issue is a foot-gun on the part of the overall standard/ecosystem?
      - upofadown 7y ago
        The list is at the bottom of this: * https://efail.de/ https://efail.de/ Throwing out the discontinued things (Outlook 2007) and the webmail things that PGP can't be even sort of secure on (Roundcube, Horde) we end up with 7 bad clients out of a total of 27 good clients. So 26%. To get that they allegedly had to downgrade GPG.
        akerl_ 7y ago
        Sorry, to clarify, I’m not asking what percentage of clients were vulnerable in this case. I’m asking what the threshold is, beyond which you would consider the possibility that the issue was with the broader spec/ecosystem rather than the individual tools.
        upofadown 7y ago
        Obviously something higher than 26% or zero depending on what you believe happened here.... ... and just to be clear, we are only talking about Efail here... There is no pattern of client information leakage issues... So it is hard to generalize.
        akerl_ 7y ago

upofadown 7y ago

It has evolved in the standard as well as the implementations. It is a bit silly to claim that the current thing is bad because there was a program once with a similar name.