3 ms·
>A countermeasure has been implemented in commit edc36f5, included in GnuPG version 2.2.18 (released on the 25th of November 2019): SHA-1-based identity signatu
by whatshisface 7y ago
>A countermeasure has been implemented in commit edc36f5, included in GnuPG version 2.2.18 (released on the 25th of November 2019): SHA-1-based identity signatures created after 2019-01-19 are now considered invalid.
Since SHA-1 was always possible to break, and since NSA probably gets access to big computers and sophisticated techniques before researchers, why doesn't this invalidate every SHA-1 signature ever made and not just ones from last year?
- Boulth 7y agoActually it's even worse than that: signature creation time is added by the signer so it's totally under control of the attacker. IMHO all SHA-1 based signatures should be ignored.
- im3w1l 7y agoThe signer is assumed to be trustworthy. That's why we care for their signature in the first place. It's the sign-ee that is presumed to be the attacker.
- NieDzejkob 7y agoIn this case, signature creation time isn't under control of the attacker. The attack scenario being considered is that Mallory can convince Alice to sign a key K1, provided by Mallory, such that it looks like Alice signed K2. The party creating the signature is honest here.
- tialaramex 7y agoThe problem is that the dates are part of the document being signed. Rather than keys, Alice will typically sign a document (e.g. an X.509 to-be-signed certificate) Mallory creates two documents, the legitimate seeming document A (a to-be-signed certificate Alice willingly signs) and document B (the content of which is controlled by Mallory to an extent depending on the details of the collision). In document A I'm sure Alice will insist on the date being roughly correct so you'd detect that. But Alice never sees document B, she isn't aware it exists, so it can specify any date, including one chosen not to set off alarms. For the Web PKI we were triply safe because: 1. We told Alice (the public CAs) never to sign anything at all with the dangerous algorithm after a set date. So long as Mallory wasn't able to develop and use a collision before that date and Alice did as she was told‡ this would be safe in perpetuity. 2. We already had a countermeasure in the documents, very early in each Web PKI X.509 certificate is the Serial Number, if you look at yours you'll notice it's a crazy huge number and seemingly not "serial" in any sense. It's random. Can't do a chosen prefix collision attack if you can't choose the prefix. 3. Since no more new documents were being signed clients in the Web PKI were able to stop recognising these signatures thus permanently ensuring the attack was impossible within about 18 months. ‡ A very small number of exceptions were explicitly granted, and a similarly small number of exceptional cases occurred for which no permission was asked. All investigated to everybody's satisfaction. As you may see if you poke around in the demo documents from this article, a collision document may not jump out as problematic from a crowd but it certainly isn't so innocuous as to survive careful scrutiny, and with such a small number of exceptions to look at this scrutiny was possible in a way it never would be for the wider Web PKI.
- pornel 7y agoNo, because this is a collision attack (without control over the hash value), not a preimage attack (where you match an existing hash). We know how to make pairs of new files that collide with each other, but there's no known way of creating a file that collides with something specific that existed before.