5 ms·
In theory an adversary could deep-freeze the computer the moment the kill cord activates. Sufficiently cold RAM doesn't loose data immediately when it loses pow
by wongarsu 7y ago
In theory an adversary could deep-freeze the computer the moment the kill cord activates. Sufficiently cold RAM doesn't loose data immediately when it loses power, allowing the adversary to make a copy and read the decryption keys from RAM.
Though if this is part of your threat model you should be much more concerned about a thousand more mundane problems, like adversaries reconstructing keystrokes from keyboard vibrations that are easily measured with a laser, or reconstructing screen content from reflections on a spoon.
- faceplanted 7y agoHow long does it take RAM to lose that data though? Most laptops take far more time to remove the ram than a PC and it's soldered down in a lot of cases.
- jacquesm 7y agoSuprisingly long. I've played around with that a bit a while ago and sometimes up to minutes later you could still recover recognizable bitmaps. But definitely not something you should rely on if you want a bit perfect copy, the first bits start to flip immediately upon power loss, some of them take a lot longer and our brain is pretty good at such reconstruction from noisy data, especially if it knows what it is looking at. I guess the higher the RAM capacity the shorter it would be because of the decrease in physical cell size.
- beatgammit 7y agoIt doesn't need to be that long if you can plug in a bootable disk and copy the memory off.
- tyingq 7y agoThere's sdmem for Linux boxes. It has a -l and -ll option that makes it reasonably fast. So a combination of a duress encrypted volume, then killing only "sensitive processes", then clearing cache via /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches, then sdmem followed by halt might be reasonable protection. Your second point, though, makes sense. It won't always be someone physically grabbing your PC.
- jbarberu 7y agoIf your attack vector is adversaries ready to deep freeze your laptop, perhaps you should do your computing in a more secure location :)
- alasdair_ 7y agoIt's pretty common for law enforcement to quickly freeze RAM when busting hackers. I've definitely read of cases where suspects encryption keys were pulled from RAM using exactly this method. The killcord would have been useful for Ross Ulbricht (Silk Road) who was busted by the FBI after using his laptop in public - they grabbed it while he had it unlocked and didn't have time to put it in suspend.
- ryanlol 7y ago> It's pretty common for law enforcement to quickly freeze RAM when busting hackers I’d really love a citation on this, especially since “quickly” seems to imply that they’d do this out in the field.
- tgsovlerkhgsel 7y agoIf you can't prevent the device from powering down, you have less than a minute to freeze the RAM before the contents become useless. This can be done with a can of cold spray. No idea how long you have to power it back on afterwards, tens of minutes to a couple of hours probably. That said, the proper "kill switch" operation would be to explicitly wipe the key from memory before powering off (if you want to power off instead of just locking).
- catalogia 7y ago> you have less than a minute to freeze the RAM before the contents become useless. This can be done with a can of cold spray. I wonder what their approach to a laptop with poor serviceability would be. I think it would take me more than a minute to get physical access to the ram of some modern computers.
- Buge 7y agoI've always heard that cold boot attacks like that require the ram to be frozen before the computer turns off (or the ram is removed).
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y agoIn reality, RAM doesn't so much instantly lose its contents on power off anyway, the freezing just slows it down. IIRC there are cases of recovering significant portions of RAM a half hour or more after poweroff even without freezing.
- Buge 7y agoYou're right, I think an attack could be possible on some computers if the agents act very quickly. I don't think 30 minutes would be possible though, judging from what is said and shown in the original cold boot video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDaicPIgn9U https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDaicPIgn9U
- amelius 7y agoI'd like to see a post demonstrating this attack.
- wongarsu 7y agoFor getting encryption keys from RAM after shutdown there's this video mentioned by another commentor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDaicPIgn9U https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDaicPIgn9U For using reflections, there's this paper implementing reading screen content from various things like reading glasses, a can of coke or even the user's eye (including a discussion of limitations): http://gauss.ececs.uc.edu/Courses/c6055/extra/reflections.pdf http://gauss.ececs.uc.edu/Courses/c6055/extra/reflections.pd... Right now I can't find something on reading keyboard vibrations with lasers, but here's one doing it acoustically and one doing it via acclerometer of a phone on the table: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/23322/keyboard-sniffing-through-audio-recorded-typing-patterns https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/23322/keyboard-... https://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/papers/general/traynor-ccs11.pdf https://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/papers/general/traynor-cc...
- shakna 7y ago> Right now I can't find something on reading keyboard vibrations with lasers, but here's one doing it acoustically and one doing it via acclerometer of a phone on the table: And here's how to get the acoustics with a chip packet, or glass of water or pot plant: https://news.mit.edu/2014/algorithm-recovers-speech-from-vibrations-0804 https://news.mit.edu/2014/algorithm-recovers-speech-from-vib... I'm not sure if that's high fidelity enough to match to a keyboard, but I'm sure that if MIT can do it, someone else can do it better.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- ryanlol 7y agoIn practice such attacks tend to only be performed in forensics labs after running hardware has been seized.
- nwallin 7y agoI would expect the unmount of an encrypted filesystem to secure delete the encryption key from memory. My understanding of the memory freezing attacks is that you don't unmount it, you just kill the power by removing the battery. With this method, you would still be able to freeze the RAM, reboot the computer, dump the RAM, and disassemble the kernel memory, and discover where the disk encryption key was stored: in that location, you'd find all zeroes.
- londons_explore 7y agoMy preferred method is a custom kernel build that does a few extra obfuscation steps before or after encryption on each data block. While you might find my key in ram, good luck decompiling my kernel module based on a bitrotted ramdump. Simply not storing the key contiguously unless there is an actual IO operation going in is a good start - scatter it around the heap so a simple search won't find it.
- crashbunny 7y agoI agree with your comment, I'm not disagreeing with you. Just offering a story I thought was interesting on a recovery technique that works in theory. I read an article many years ago (I don't have a link but if you're interested google might find it) before ssd's were mainstream. They took a hdd and did one pass of overwriting it with /dev/zero. Then they contacted some data recovery companies, told them they accidentally blanked the hdd with one pass, and ask for a quote to retrieve the data. None of them had any interest in giving a quote or trying to recover the data even though in theory it could be recovered with a microscope or however they do it. As you said, there are a 1000 more mundane ways that would be cheaper and more reliable than deep freeze.