12 ms·

How can such a theory be falsified?

by yters 7y ago

taneq 7y ago
Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).
- tcgv 7y ago
  True random number generation can't be done by a deterministic computer, and it appears that human brains can, although not conclusive yet, and the precise mechanism is unclear: - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090
  - yters 7y ago
    Turing machines don't have to be deterministic. You can have non deterministic Turing machines, and probabilistic Turing machines.
    - deleted 7y ago
      [deleted]
    - marcosdumay 7y ago
      Turing machines, without qualifiers, usually means deterministic ones. Extending it for probabilistic is quite ok, but non deterministic ones are a completely different beast.
  - criddell 7y ago
    Why are you limiting it to deterministic computers? There are electronic circuits that can provide genuine random numbers.
    - tcgv 7y ago
      From the linked article's context: > 3. The classical computational theory of mind > The label classical computational theory of mind (which we will abbreviate as CCTM) is now fairly standard. > Turing computation is deterministic: total computational state determines subsequent computational state.
  - naasking 7y ago
    "True random number" is a set of statistical tests, which means they can be deterministically fooled. Humans have a lot more inputs than your typical computer, so it's not surprising that their outputs can seem random.
  - taneq 7y ago
    I thought humans were pretty widely considered to be terrible random number generators. We tend to produce sequences that are too uniform, not streaky enough, and contain patterns. The first related article linked from your link was "Humans cannot consciously generate random numbers sequences: Polemic study." (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17888582 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17888582)
- antonvs 7y ago
  > So far we don't know of any such thing That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.
  - taneq 7y ago
    The definition of "a conscious experience" is so vague and circular that I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. Either way we certainly don't have any indication that it is impossible in principle for a Turing machine to perform the same kind of calculation that gives rise to conscious experience in humans, or that this calculation would for some (supernatural?) reason not have the same outcome if performed by something other than a human brain.
    - TuringTest 7y ago
      > I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners make the polite assumption that it's also true for other similar beings.
      - yters 7y ago
        Why is it polite to assume non concious entities are conscious?
        TuringTest 7y ago
        How do you know they are non-conscious? If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck... For example, I'm assuming you're conscious, because you posted a reply that was on-topic and coherent with the conversation above it.
- yters 7y ago
  If there is nothing that is uncomputable, then doesn't that mean the hypothesis is unfalsifiable?
  - claudiawerner 7y ago
    It's worth noting that the theory that a falsifiable hypothesis constitutes scientific investigation (as proposed by Popper) isn't really the gold standard of the philosophy of science any more - especially since Popper's formulation is known to be pretty shoddy.
    - yters 7y ago
      That sounds like a recipe for making up stuff and calling it 'science'.
      - claudiawerner 7y ago
        Not at all, just that the pure theory of falsificationism as specified by Popper both excludes valid science, and includes pseudoscience (for instance, astrology is falsifiable). Thus, falsifiablity is not both necessary and sufficient[0]. [0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/
        taneq 7y ago
        The core tenet of science is testing of hypotheses. Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. Astrology itself is not scientific but, if you use a version of it that's falsifiable, you absolutely can do a valid scientific study on it by making astrological predictions and then testing to see whether they come true. I think it's pretty widely agreed that we've already done this and the (valid scientific) result was negative.
        claudiawerner 7y ago
        >Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. This is beside the point. The point of contention is whether or not falsifiability is what makes science what it is, or should be. Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. Bad science, such as astrology, does often propose falsifiable hypotheses. Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific (useful to remember that Popper counted Darwinian evolution as non-science). Falsifiability isn't enough for something to be science; it's not necessary and sufficient - because otherwise astrology is science, and exploratory research, popular in many scientific fields, isn't science. The fact that astrology's claims have been falsified does not discount it as science, since a great number of genuine scientific papers also successfully falsify their hypotheses - finding a null result is an example of falsifying a hypothesis.
- finghin 7y ago
  Restricting brain activity to computation it becomes more difficult to find exceptions to the argument. I think this is because computation is fundamentally quite alien to human minds, insofar as it is not an elementary, inescapable mental state. Many philosophers of mind (though not all, particularly not those who adhere to reductive physicalism and eliminative materialism) would characterise phenomenal consciousness and intentionality as these unavoidable mental properties. It is worth mentioning that there are at least good reasons to reject nearly all of these theories (including physicalist and material thesis). Many aspects of each theories turn out to imply highly unintuitive effects. But I would recommend you read for yourself, since the mind-body problem is immense and very interesting at every step. The SEP articles on both of these[1][2] are quite good. Elsewhere in this thread some have pointed out that the ontological assumptions of philosophers fade away as we approach the mind in our inquiry. This is at least partly because the mind stretches our understanding of knowledge and matter themselves, and to an even greater degree, our intuitions thereof. [1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ [2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; see especially §4.

How can such a theory be falsified?

by yters 7y ago

How can such a theory be falsified?

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

tcgv 7y ago
True random number generation can't be done by a deterministic computer, and it appears that human brains can, although not conclusive yet, and the precise mechanism is unclear: - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090
- yters 7y ago
  Turing machines don't have to be deterministic. You can have non deterministic Turing machines, and probabilistic Turing machines.
  - deleted 7y ago
    [deleted]
  - marcosdumay 7y ago
    Turing machines, without qualifiers, usually means deterministic ones. Extending it for probabilistic is quite ok, but non deterministic ones are a completely different beast.
- criddell 7y ago
  Why are you limiting it to deterministic computers? There are electronic circuits that can provide genuine random numbers.
  - tcgv 7y ago
    From the linked article's context: > 3. The classical computational theory of mind > The label classical computational theory of mind (which we will abbreviate as CCTM) is now fairly standard. > Turing computation is deterministic: total computational state determines subsequent computational state.
- naasking 7y ago
  "True random number" is a set of statistical tests, which means they can be deterministically fooled. Humans have a lot more inputs than your typical computer, so it's not surprising that their outputs can seem random.
- taneq 7y ago
  I thought humans were pretty widely considered to be terrible random number generators. We tend to produce sequences that are too uniform, not streaky enough, and contain patterns. The first related article linked from your link was "Humans cannot consciously generate random numbers sequences: Polemic study." (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17888582 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17888582)
antonvs 7y ago
> So far we don't know of any such thing That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.
- taneq 7y ago
  The definition of "a conscious experience" is so vague and circular that I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. Either way we certainly don't have any indication that it is impossible in principle for a Turing machine to perform the same kind of calculation that gives rise to conscious experience in humans, or that this calculation would for some (supernatural?) reason not have the same outcome if performed by something other than a human brain.
  - TuringTest 7y ago
    > I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners make the polite assumption that it's also true for other similar beings.
    - yters 7y ago
      Why is it polite to assume non concious entities are conscious?
      - TuringTest 7y ago
        How do you know they are non-conscious? If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck... For example, I'm assuming you're conscious, because you posted a reply that was on-topic and coherent with the conversation above it.
yters 7y ago
If there is nothing that is uncomputable, then doesn't that mean the hypothesis is unfalsifiable?
- claudiawerner 7y ago
  It's worth noting that the theory that a falsifiable hypothesis constitutes scientific investigation (as proposed by Popper) isn't really the gold standard of the philosophy of science any more - especially since Popper's formulation is known to be pretty shoddy.
  - yters 7y ago
    That sounds like a recipe for making up stuff and calling it 'science'.
    - claudiawerner 7y ago
      Not at all, just that the pure theory of falsificationism as specified by Popper both excludes valid science, and includes pseudoscience (for instance, astrology is falsifiable). Thus, falsifiablity is not both necessary and sufficient[0]. [0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/
      - taneq 7y ago
        The core tenet of science is testing of hypotheses. Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. Astrology itself is not scientific but, if you use a version of it that's falsifiable, you absolutely can do a valid scientific study on it by making astrological predictions and then testing to see whether they come true. I think it's pretty widely agreed that we've already done this and the (valid scientific) result was negative.
        claudiawerner 7y ago
        >Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. This is beside the point. The point of contention is whether or not falsifiability is what makes science what it is, or should be. Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. Bad science, such as astrology, does often propose falsifiable hypotheses. Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific (useful to remember that Popper counted Darwinian evolution as non-science). Falsifiability isn't enough for something to be science; it's not necessary and sufficient - because otherwise astrology is science, and exploratory research, popular in many scientific fields, isn't science. The fact that astrology's claims have been falsified does not discount it as science, since a great number of genuine scientific papers also successfully falsify their hypotheses - finding a null result is an example of falsifying a hypothesis.
finghin 7y ago
Restricting brain activity to computation it becomes more difficult to find exceptions to the argument. I think this is because computation is fundamentally quite alien to human minds, insofar as it is not an elementary, inescapable mental state. Many philosophers of mind (though not all, particularly not those who adhere to reductive physicalism and eliminative materialism) would characterise phenomenal consciousness and intentionality as these unavoidable mental properties. It is worth mentioning that there are at least good reasons to reject nearly all of these theories (including physicalist and material thesis). Many aspects of each theories turn out to imply highly unintuitive effects. But I would recommend you read for yourself, since the mind-body problem is immense and very interesting at every step. The SEP articles on both of these[1][2] are quite good. Elsewhere in this thread some have pointed out that the ontological assumptions of philosophers fade away as we approach the mind in our inquiry. This is at least partly because the mind stretches our understanding of knowledge and matter themselves, and to an even greater degree, our intuitions thereof. [1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ [2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; see especially §4.