14 ms·

From your perspective you died. From the copies perspective you are continuous.

Loughla 7y ago
This will devolve into a 'what is consciousness' debate, but honestly does it matter? To your consciousness, there is no gap, just the novel experience of watching someone who looks an awful lot like you die. If the consciousness is copied perfectly from a to b, is there a difference in it at that point?
- sidewndr46 7y ago
  If you watch the show "Altered Carbon", I kind of felt like there was an unspoken idea that all of the characters are in fact deceased many times over. The capability of replicating the exact consciousness of any of them exists of course.
  - Razengan 7y ago
    This is also a core theme of the awesome game SOMA: https://www.gog.com/game/soma https://www.gog.com/game/soma
- mellosouls 7y ago
  It matters particularly depending on whether you are a or b after the transition point. To your consciousness, there is no gap, just the novel experience of watching someone who looks an awful lot like you die. This could be rephrased as: To your consciousness, there is no gap, just the novel experience of dying as someone who looks an awful lot like you watches.
  - Loughla 7y ago
    That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the whole shabang up until the second one is made and the first dies, does it even matter that it's not the original? I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. But you still exist. Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive.
    - kaibee 7y ago
      > That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the whole shabang up until the second one is made and the first dies, does it even matter that it's not the original? Externally, no. But it matters to me, the original. > I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. Yes, for the copy, it is as if they are the original. > The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. What if the copy is made non-destructively? > But you still exist. A version of you still exists. > Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive. The causal chain of events matters. If a copy of your consciousness is made, it can be done without you ever knowing about it.
    - scarejunba 7y ago
      There is no “your consciousness” as an identity across the two copies. So you fork a process and you kill one of the processes. That process experiences death. Likewise one copy experiences death. Does it matter? Depending on your objectives. If it’s to achieve some sort of world domination through pseudo-immortality, probably not, since your copy will execute faithfully as you. But your perception, the body unit you’re in, will most definitely see an end. It won’t ‘jump’ into the other medium. This you will die. That you will live.
    - mellosouls 7y ago
      crossposted / post-posted with several others :) There is a transition point - at least for b. a gets to the transition point and dies. b "awakes" with a's memories. So: you are a ... > [transition] ... you are ? How do you know you (formerly a) become b at that point? Certainly from b's perspective that is the case - but from former a's perspective? Which do you "switch to"? Death or b? You need to consider 3 perspectives: a then after the transition: b (live a) c (dead a) If you don't want to consider dead a, then consider this: what if the experiment went wrong? a isn't killed in the process, but a copy of their consciousness is loaded into b. Same situation as before, but both a and b think they are former a. Which are you (formerly a) in that circumstance? Why? I would argue a has a strong case to be considered the correct version - which means you die in the first case.
- JoshTriplett 7y ago
  Which consciousness? Once copied, you have two, one of them still dying.
- 6gvONxR4sf7o 7y ago
  Future you (or "you") won't give a shit. Present you may or may not have cause to worry. A simple thought experiment: We somehow copy me, but leave the original alive after reviving the copy. Then we kill the original. As the original, I'm gonna be unhappy about that. The exact time you kill me doesn't change that, so killing me then copying me then reviving the copy at the very least isn't a trivially unobjectionable process. As to whether it's actually unobjectionable, that's probably way above our paygrades philosophically. There's a great star trek episode where Riker gets duplicated in the transporter, leading to years of jokes (and philosophical debates) that the transporter doesn't send you anywhere, it just copies you and kills the original. Real fun to think about.
  - Loughla 7y ago
    Vaguely connected to this conversation now, the Daystrom Institute subreddit is one of my most favorite things that exists.
  - AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y ago
    Except they went out of their way in that episode to explain that transporters absolutely do not work that way and this was a very strange occurrence that they could only guess at the cause of.
    - vermilingua 7y ago
      Well they would say that, otherwise, who would transport? ;)
- J5892 7y ago
  This is only true if you're looking at it from an external point of view. From the individual's point of view, which is the only one that matters from their perspective, they are dead. Their consciousness no longer exists.
  - Loughla 7y ago
    That's the thing. If you exist as one consciousness, then they copy the other while the first dies, the second is, essentially, the same consciousness. Therefore, you are still alive. I feel like this has been discussed somewhere already in history.
    - Falling3 7y ago
      It's definitely been discussed for a while. Recent takes on it include a really interesting Outer Limits episode and the recent Netflix show Living with Yourself. This is easy to say if you're not the one dying. If you know a perfect clone of your current self is going to live from this point forward, are you still comfortable with being killed?
      - UnFleshedOne 7y ago
        Presumably you knew that before you stepped into the teleporter, so decision to partially die is in both copies of you. This all assumes a destructive copy process -- if a non-destructive teleporter is possible, you don't need to destroy remaining copy, but all kinds of legal issues arise. Maybe you'd want to have one copy destroyed to avoid paying double for lunch.
      - XorNot 7y ago
        Most of it depends on the idea as to whether you think you experience death. For example: general anesthesia is something I think most people having these conversations should experience (which is to say, generally a lot of people don't). Because it's very different to sleep. Waking up from GA, it's as though no time has passed at all - you were one place, suddenly you're another. In the case where a person is duplicated exactly, sometime during that period of GA - what's the difference? It takes a special pleading that somehow, someone would know the difference. While under general anesthesia it's worth considering that people can and do actually die. And unless something metaphysical happens at that point, then the reality is they never know. They went under, expected to wake up, and just don't.
- wonderwonder 7y ago
  What if one of you does not die? If there are now 2 perfect copies, are both of them you? Or as there are now 2, is neither of them you?
- skissane 7y ago
  The answers to this question depend on what positions one takes in the philosophy of mind. Find the correct philosophy of mind, and you will find the correct answer to this question (well, unless something like Derek Parfit's position is correct, in which case the correct answer is that there is no correct answer.)
neals 7y ago
I honestly think this is only "scary" the first time. After that, you will have the experience of "dying and being resurrected" and since everything went fine that last time, the next time is less of a concern.
- zepto 7y ago
  After that the copies will be deluded into thinking they survived death while in fact they died.
  - Symmetry 7y ago
    Hah, maybe. And maybe we die every night when we go to sleep and are only deluding ourselves into thinking we're the same person who went to sleep. But ultimately "dead" is a matter for us living beings to define, the universe itself has no notion of elan vital that discriminates between the living and the dead.
    - zepto 7y ago
      A useful thought experiment is to consider a machine that first duplicates a person and then drops the original into a meat grinder. The duplicate that steps out would be identical to the original and have no memory of having been ground. Would you step into such a machine, safe in the knowledge that from the point of view of the universe and all other living beings, you would emerge unharmed?
      - neals 7y ago
        Netflix: "Living with yourself"
      - Symmetry 7y ago
        Well, there'd be two consciousnesses produced both of which I'd think of as me, pre-duplication. And one would die in horrible pain. I'd really rather not die in horrible pain even if there was still a me around afterward, though you could probably offer a large enough inducement that I'd take it. Of course, there exist inducements that would get me to consent to the meat grinder without duplication
lonelappde 7y ago
There is no perspective from which you die. That's what dying means. You can't experience being dead.

This will devolve into a 'what is consciousness' debate, but honestly does it matter? To your consciousness, there is no gap, just the novel experience of watching someone who looks an awful lot like you die. If the consciousness is copied perfectly from a to b, is there a difference in it at that point?

sidewndr46 7y ago
If you watch the show "Altered Carbon", I kind of felt like there was an unspoken idea that all of the characters are in fact deceased many times over. The capability of replicating the exact consciousness of any of them exists of course.
- Razengan 7y ago
  This is also a core theme of the awesome game SOMA: https://www.gog.com/game/soma https://www.gog.com/game/soma
mellosouls 7y ago
It matters particularly depending on whether you are a or b after the transition point. To your consciousness, there is no gap, just the novel experience of watching someone who looks an awful lot like you die. This could be rephrased as: To your consciousness, there is no gap, just the novel experience of dying as someone who looks an awful lot like you watches.
- Loughla 7y ago
  That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the whole shabang up until the second one is made and the first dies, does it even matter that it's not the original? I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. But you still exist. Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive.
  - kaibee 7y ago
    > That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the whole shabang up until the second one is made and the first dies, does it even matter that it's not the original? Externally, no. But it matters to me, the original. > I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. Yes, for the copy, it is as if they are the original. > The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. What if the copy is made non-destructively? > But you still exist. A version of you still exists. > Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive. The causal chain of events matters. If a copy of your consciousness is made, it can be done without you ever knowing about it.
  - scarejunba 7y ago
    There is no “your consciousness” as an identity across the two copies. So you fork a process and you kill one of the processes. That process experiences death. Likewise one copy experiences death. Does it matter? Depending on your objectives. If it’s to achieve some sort of world domination through pseudo-immortality, probably not, since your copy will execute faithfully as you. But your perception, the body unit you’re in, will most definitely see an end. It won’t ‘jump’ into the other medium. This you will die. That you will live.
  - mellosouls 7y ago
    crossposted / post-posted with several others :) There is a transition point - at least for b. a gets to the transition point and dies. b "awakes" with a's memories. So: you are a ... > [transition] ... you are ? How do you know you (formerly a) become b at that point? Certainly from b's perspective that is the case - but from former a's perspective? Which do you "switch to"? Death or b? You need to consider 3 perspectives: a then after the transition: b (live a) c (dead a) If you don't want to consider dead a, then consider this: what if the experiment went wrong? a isn't killed in the process, but a copy of their consciousness is loaded into b. Same situation as before, but both a and b think they are former a. Which are you (formerly a) in that circumstance? Why? I would argue a has a strong case to be considered the correct version - which means you die in the first case.
JoshTriplett 7y ago
Which consciousness? Once copied, you have two, one of them still dying.
6gvONxR4sf7o 7y ago
Future you (or "you") won't give a shit. Present you may or may not have cause to worry. A simple thought experiment: We somehow copy me, but leave the original alive after reviving the copy. Then we kill the original. As the original, I'm gonna be unhappy about that. The exact time you kill me doesn't change that, so killing me then copying me then reviving the copy at the very least isn't a trivially unobjectionable process. As to whether it's actually unobjectionable, that's probably way above our paygrades philosophically. There's a great star trek episode where Riker gets duplicated in the transporter, leading to years of jokes (and philosophical debates) that the transporter doesn't send you anywhere, it just copies you and kills the original. Real fun to think about.
- Loughla 7y ago
  Vaguely connected to this conversation now, the Daystrom Institute subreddit is one of my most favorite things that exists.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y ago
  Except they went out of their way in that episode to explain that transporters absolutely do not work that way and this was a very strange occurrence that they could only guess at the cause of.
  - vermilingua 7y ago
    Well they would say that, otherwise, who would transport? ;)
J5892 7y ago
This is only true if you're looking at it from an external point of view. From the individual's point of view, which is the only one that matters from their perspective, they are dead. Their consciousness no longer exists.
- Loughla 7y ago
  That's the thing. If you exist as one consciousness, then they copy the other while the first dies, the second is, essentially, the same consciousness. Therefore, you are still alive. I feel like this has been discussed somewhere already in history.
  - Falling3 7y ago
    It's definitely been discussed for a while. Recent takes on it include a really interesting Outer Limits episode and the recent Netflix show Living with Yourself. This is easy to say if you're not the one dying. If you know a perfect clone of your current self is going to live from this point forward, are you still comfortable with being killed?
    - UnFleshedOne 7y ago
      Presumably you knew that before you stepped into the teleporter, so decision to partially die is in both copies of you. This all assumes a destructive copy process -- if a non-destructive teleporter is possible, you don't need to destroy remaining copy, but all kinds of legal issues arise. Maybe you'd want to have one copy destroyed to avoid paying double for lunch.
    - XorNot 7y ago
      Most of it depends on the idea as to whether you think you experience death. For example: general anesthesia is something I think most people having these conversations should experience (which is to say, generally a lot of people don't). Because it's very different to sleep. Waking up from GA, it's as though no time has passed at all - you were one place, suddenly you're another. In the case where a person is duplicated exactly, sometime during that period of GA - what's the difference? It takes a special pleading that somehow, someone would know the difference. While under general anesthesia it's worth considering that people can and do actually die. And unless something metaphysical happens at that point, then the reality is they never know. They went under, expected to wake up, and just don't.
wonderwonder 7y ago
What if one of you does not die? If there are now 2 perfect copies, are both of them you? Or as there are now 2, is neither of them you?
skissane 7y ago
The answers to this question depend on what positions one takes in the philosophy of mind. Find the correct philosophy of mind, and you will find the correct answer to this question (well, unless something like Derek Parfit's position is correct, in which case the correct answer is that there is no correct answer.)

neals 7y ago

I honestly think this is only "scary" the first time. After that, you will have the experience of "dying and being resurrected" and since everything went fine that last time, the next time is less of a concern.

zepto 7y ago
After that the copies will be deluded into thinking they survived death while in fact they died.
- Symmetry 7y ago
  Hah, maybe. And maybe we die every night when we go to sleep and are only deluding ourselves into thinking we're the same person who went to sleep. But ultimately "dead" is a matter for us living beings to define, the universe itself has no notion of elan vital that discriminates between the living and the dead.
  - zepto 7y ago
    A useful thought experiment is to consider a machine that first duplicates a person and then drops the original into a meat grinder. The duplicate that steps out would be identical to the original and have no memory of having been ground. Would you step into such a machine, safe in the knowledge that from the point of view of the universe and all other living beings, you would emerge unharmed?
    - neals 7y ago
      Netflix: "Living with yourself"
    - Symmetry 7y ago
      Well, there'd be two consciousnesses produced both of which I'd think of as me, pre-duplication. And one would die in horrible pain. I'd really rather not die in horrible pain even if there was still a me around afterward, though you could probably offer a large enough inducement that I'd take it. Of course, there exist inducements that would get me to consent to the meat grinder without duplication

lonelappde 7y ago

There is no perspective from which you die. That's what dying means. You can't experience being dead.