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“Right now there are no mandatory federal cybersecurity standards for elections...” And that's a good thing. Each state/county/city can implement the election

by mikece 7y ago

“Right now there are no mandatory federal cybersecurity standards for elections...” And that's a good thing. Each state/county/city can implement the election however they want which makes it practically impossible to rig the vote. If we all used the same system/procedures/process then hacking the election could scale much more easily as the same tricks that works in Manhattan would work in Montana.

howard941 7y ago
It's not a good thing when the state has ineffective processes that rely on the vendor's assurances if it has any standards at all. If the feds were imposing a preemptive monoculture that'd be bad. But that's not at issue.
tlb 7y ago
In fact they all use voting machines from the same few vendors and mostly running Windows, so there are plenty of common vulnerabilities. Also, in the US, hacking a single large state can swing a federal election.
kadoban 7y ago
That would only makes sense to me if rigging only one state was near useless. It's very much not. If you rig say, Florida, there's a fairly high chance of deciding the election.
- parvenu74 7y ago
  I don't think the machines matter as long as the vote can be replayed/recounted without ambiguity. An idea: https://medium.com/@dotnetmike/touch-screen-voting-should-be-illegal-59295dbabc27 https://medium.com/@dotnetmike/touch-screen-voting-should-be...
  - swader999 7y ago
    It needs a paper record, this needs to be the source of truth.
    - daveguy 7y ago
      Not just a paper record. A hand marked paper record. If it doesn't go through a computer first it can't be altered. There are several states that do it this way. It's a "Scantron" style ballot. Fill in the vote, run it through a tally machine and save the ballot. The tally machines could be messed with, but if there is evidence of tampering with the tally there is always the authentic original ballot.
      - swader999 7y ago
        Yes!
    - pmoriarty 7y ago
      If you've got a paper record, just use that instead of the machines. Machines just add more opportunities for fraud.
  - bediger4000 7y ago
    That's traditionally been the problem with voting machines: a "recount" just re-read some tally. Combine this with voting machine companies being opaque, not recognizing obvious flaws and their executives promising to deliver states to particular candidates (https://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0828-08.htm https://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0828-08.htm), and you begin to feel that all the suspicion is justified.
  - ska 7y ago
    > as long as the vote can be replayed/recounted without ambiguity. Isn't this the core problem with most electronic voting as currently implemented in the US? I mean, that no such guarantee exists?
jbob2000 7y ago
You don’t need to corrupt all of the voting processes though, you only need to do it in a few key states. Funnily enough, the states you’d need to do it in would be the poorer ones who’d have no ability to discern a good voting solution from a bad one. The real solution is to use paper. There’s no way to fuck with a paper ballot system other than to go to every polling station and fuck with their counts - an expensive and highly visible attack.
yongjik 7y ago
That's almost like saying that if there isn't a company-wide security policy, every department will implement security whatever way they want, making company-wide data breach impossible.
onemoresoop 7y ago
Perhaps votefrauding swing states would be an easier target, much easier than targeting all states..
gbrown 7y ago
This gets repeated a lot, but it directly contradicts another bit of common wisdom: security by obscurity isn't. Not only are we vulnerable to a few key districts tipping elections, nation state actors should find it absolutely trivial to build a comprehensive program targeting the full spectrum of voting machines used in practice.
thatfrenchguy 7y ago
Or you can design a system that’s the same for everyone because it actually works. Like, you know, observable paper ballots.
- daveguy 7y ago
  Hand marked is better than just observable. Takes the machine out of the equation except for the tally and the tally could be confirmed with multiple machines. There should still be minimum security standards required. Air gapped counting machines with hand marked ballots is a good start.
drak0n1c 7y ago
The federated security you describe holds as long as the Electoral College holds. If elections are decided by popular vote, just one or two hacked/corrupt county-administrated systems could decide national elections.
- evv 7y ago
  This statement confuses me. What one or two counties contain the majority of the US population? If elections moved to a popular vote, it would be much harder to rig the election because you'd need to manipulate the whole country, rather than a few key states.
  - drak0n1c 7y ago
    The popular vote difference between candidates sometimes comes within 0-2 million votes. LA County has 10 million people, and there are over 40 other counties that have more than 1 million people. If elections are decided by popular vote, then just LA County alone, or a combination of the others, could artificially add or flip enough votes to overcome that 0-2 million vote difference. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_most_populous_counties_in_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_most_populous_coun...
    - evv 7y ago
      Would it really be so bad for people in LA County to have as much of a vote as the rest of the country? If we switched to a popular vote, I bet the number of voters would shoot way up, which is undoubtedly a good thing!
  - tropo 7y ago
    We already have a problem with counties reporting more registered voters than should be possible, and a problem with poll workers who vote on behalf of missing voters after the polls officially close. Currently the damage is limited to flipping one state. If we used a popular vote, a malicious county could supply an extra 50 million votes. Just one corrupt county could change the election results, even when the results would not have been close, and there is nothing that could be done about it after the election day.
gpvos 7y ago
To some extent, yes. But you can still have centrally-imposed rules that improve security for specific voting methods.
donarb 7y ago
The US Election Assistance Commission develops testing and certification standards for voting equipment. They also certify 3rd party laboratories that certify equipment. States are not required to use the recommendations but some states have passed laws that only certified equipment be used. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/system-certification-process-s/ https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/system-certification-pr...

by mikece 7y ago

howard941 7y ago

It's not a good thing when the state has ineffective processes that rely on the vendor's assurances if it has any standards at all. If the feds were imposing a preemptive monoculture that'd be bad. But that's not at issue.

tlb 7y ago

In fact they all use voting machines from the same few vendors and mostly running Windows, so there are plenty of common vulnerabilities. Also, in the US, hacking a single large state can swing a federal election.

kadoban 7y ago

That would only makes sense to me if rigging only one state was near useless. It's very much not. If you rig say, Florida, there's a fairly high chance of deciding the election.

parvenu74 7y ago
I don't think the machines matter as long as the vote can be replayed/recounted without ambiguity. An idea: https://medium.com/@dotnetmike/touch-screen-voting-should-be-illegal-59295dbabc27 https://medium.com/@dotnetmike/touch-screen-voting-should-be...
- swader999 7y ago
  It needs a paper record, this needs to be the source of truth.
  - daveguy 7y ago
    Not just a paper record. A hand marked paper record. If it doesn't go through a computer first it can't be altered. There are several states that do it this way. It's a "Scantron" style ballot. Fill in the vote, run it through a tally machine and save the ballot. The tally machines could be messed with, but if there is evidence of tampering with the tally there is always the authentic original ballot.
    - swader999 7y ago
      Yes!
  - pmoriarty 7y ago
    If you've got a paper record, just use that instead of the machines. Machines just add more opportunities for fraud.
- bediger4000 7y ago
  That's traditionally been the problem with voting machines: a "recount" just re-read some tally. Combine this with voting machine companies being opaque, not recognizing obvious flaws and their executives promising to deliver states to particular candidates (https://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0828-08.htm https://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0828-08.htm), and you begin to feel that all the suspicion is justified.
- ska 7y ago
  > as long as the vote can be replayed/recounted without ambiguity. Isn't this the core problem with most electronic voting as currently implemented in the US? I mean, that no such guarantee exists?

jbob2000 7y ago

You don’t need to corrupt all of the voting processes though, you only need to do it in a few key states. Funnily enough, the states you’d need to do it in would be the poorer ones who’d have no ability to discern a good voting solution from a bad one. The real solution is to use paper. There’s no way to fuck with a paper ballot system other than to go to every polling station and fuck with their counts - an expensive and highly visible attack.

yongjik 7y ago

That's almost like saying that if there isn't a company-wide security policy, every department will implement security whatever way they want, making company-wide data breach impossible.

onemoresoop 7y ago

Perhaps votefrauding swing states would be an easier target, much easier than targeting all states..

gbrown 7y ago

This gets repeated a lot, but it directly contradicts another bit of common wisdom: security by obscurity isn't. Not only are we vulnerable to a few key districts tipping elections, nation state actors should find it absolutely trivial to build a comprehensive program targeting the full spectrum of voting machines used in practice.

thatfrenchguy 7y ago

Or you can design a system that’s the same for everyone because it actually works. Like, you know, observable paper ballots.

daveguy 7y ago
Hand marked is better than just observable. Takes the machine out of the equation except for the tally and the tally could be confirmed with multiple machines. There should still be minimum security standards required. Air gapped counting machines with hand marked ballots is a good start.

drak0n1c 7y ago

The federated security you describe holds as long as the Electoral College holds. If elections are decided by popular vote, just one or two hacked/corrupt county-administrated systems could decide national elections.

evv 7y ago
This statement confuses me. What one or two counties contain the majority of the US population? If elections moved to a popular vote, it would be much harder to rig the election because you'd need to manipulate the whole country, rather than a few key states.
- drak0n1c 7y ago
  The popular vote difference between candidates sometimes comes within 0-2 million votes. LA County has 10 million people, and there are over 40 other counties that have more than 1 million people. If elections are decided by popular vote, then just LA County alone, or a combination of the others, could artificially add or flip enough votes to overcome that 0-2 million vote difference. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_most_populous_counties_in_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_most_populous_coun...
  - evv 7y ago
    Would it really be so bad for people in LA County to have as much of a vote as the rest of the country? If we switched to a popular vote, I bet the number of voters would shoot way up, which is undoubtedly a good thing!
- tropo 7y ago
  We already have a problem with counties reporting more registered voters than should be possible, and a problem with poll workers who vote on behalf of missing voters after the polls officially close. Currently the damage is limited to flipping one state. If we used a popular vote, a malicious county could supply an extra 50 million votes. Just one corrupt county could change the election results, even when the results would not have been close, and there is nothing that could be done about it after the election day.

gpvos 7y ago

To some extent, yes. But you can still have centrally-imposed rules that improve security for specific voting methods.

donarb 7y ago

The US Election Assistance Commission develops testing and certification standards for voting equipment. They also certify 3rd party laboratories that certify equipment. States are not required to use the recommendations but some states have passed laws that only certified equipment be used. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/system-certification-process-s/ https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/system-certification-pr...