8 ms·

Wow. What a horrorshow. Humans operating lie detecting machines with personal interviews has yet to rise above the standard of 'Mostly used to bullshit and int

Wow. What a horrorshow. Humans operating lie detecting machines with personal interviews has yet to rise above the standard of 'Mostly used to bullshit and intimidate suspects', but these clowns think they can use facial recognition to detect lying? What a huge scam. I don't know what conman dreamt this up, but to convince multiple governments to go along with it he has to be good. Maybe it's time to resurrect the Canadian Fruit machine project and get some idiot in the EU government to finance it. Except instead of detecting 'gayness' it detects 'Terrorist thoughts'. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fruit_machine_(homosexuality_test) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fruit_machine_(homosexuality_t...

jstummbillig 7y ago
I am so confused. There seems to be a blatantly obvious method to find out how well this machine works, no anecdotes or trust required: You get a decent amount of test subjects to dry run it in a controlled environment. Has this not been done? If not, why? Or am I wrong in believing it's that simple?
- function_seven 7y ago
  To the extent they work at all, lie detectors only do so if the person telling the lie has a real reason to lie. Skin in the game, high stakes, and real harm if their deception is uncovered. Having a controlled environment to test this is really hard. You can't just have someone say, "My mother is 35" when their mother is really 53. That's a silly lie, and can be told with the same level of calmness as the truth. So how do you design an experiment with "real" liars (telling non-trivial lies), while knowing which participants are lying or not?
  - floatboth 7y ago
    False positives are more concerning here than false negatives. It should be obvious to everyone that way way more people are "not calm" for reasons other than lying!
    - sib 7y ago
      That's an interesting point of view. If some hypothetical "bad guys" are trying to set off a series of tactical nuclear weapons, false negatives are actually pretty bad. (Yes, I actually am a small-l libertarian and have a strong aversion to overbearing and stupidly-designed government programs, which this one certainly seems to be.)
      - XorNot 7y ago
        I mean if you have access to tactical nukes though, why are you even bothering to get on a plane in Europe?
    - function_seven 7y ago
      Yeah. My "to the extent..." preamble represents my feeling on polygraphs and lie detectors in general. The entire situation of being strapped into a machine and asked invasive questions is going to be nervous-making. And depending on which questions are asked, and how they're asked, the examiner can easily contaminate the exam and extract a false positive.
  - mos_basik 7y ago
    Maybe you could induce something similar by providing the liar with strong incentives / stress. Something like this: >We're going to hook you up to a state-of-the-art polygraph. We know you've heard that polygraphs are snake oil, but we think we've made a breakthrough on this one, which is why we're running this test. Answer truthfully to all questions except the five on this shortlist. For any of listed questions, you may choose to lie. If you tell one undetected lie, you get $5. For each additional undetected lie, your payoff is multiplied by 1.9. If any of your lies is detected, you get no money and you get shocked. The intensity of the shock has a similar exponential relationship with the number of lies you told. If shocking volunteers doesn't get past the ethics committee, then maybe you start off the volunteers with a baseline payout of $50 or so and allow the payoff to both grow and decrease exponentially. The goal being that on that fifth lie, they're really on the edge, knowing that they could either make a lot of money or get {shocked,nothing}.
    - itronitron 7y ago
      how about this -> we are going to tell you how to defeat the polygraph, which is easy because it is actually mostly BS, and we will pay you $100K if you successfully deceive the polygraph when the examiner asks you if you have been told how to defeat the test. Then tell the polygrapher that everyone will lie on that question so they should flag all responses as lies. Then everyone's results can be evaluated by another polygrapher to determine who was lying 'well', with no payout needed.
  - cwkoss 7y ago
    You let participants know that they'll receive money for every lie they "get away with" making them feel loss-aversion. This has been used in psychological studies, but it's effectiveness is proportional to cost of doing the study, so it is expensive to get large datasets.
    - WalterBright 7y ago
      Lying to get away with $10 is a lot different from lying to get away with murder.
      - Reelin 7y ago
        If the machine could catch people lying for $10 (or $50, or ...) in a double blind study, that would set a quantifiable lower bound for its effectiveness.
      - rasz 7y ago
        1 How do you know. 2 Not for a psychopath.
        chaorace 7y ago
        I have to disagree. A psychopath will value their freedom more than $10 and will be inclined to react differently.
- harry8 7y ago
  Where are you finding terrorist who think they are getting away with concealing it?
- jbob2000 7y ago
  The purpose of these machines isn’t to actually work as intended. These machines are here for plausible deniability: “we pulled you aside because the machine said so, not because you’re Muslim”.
  - droithomme 7y ago
    Or the computer said he was lying about not being a terrorist, so we went to arrest him but he was not cooperative and violently resisted, which of course is what a terrorist would do, and thus we had no choice but to shoot and kill him. In self defense of course and to protect the public. This is OK because the computer determined he was a terrorist and computers don't make mistakes.
- mcherm 7y ago
  > Has this not been done? No, this has not been done. > If not, why? Because it would fail. > Or am I wrong in believing it's that simple? Nope... it's that simple. But let's be honest here: we SHOULD use this approach for ALL of these kinds of assessment, yet we don't. Even in the US, we use things like fingerprint matching, handwriting analysis, drug testing laboratories, DNA analysis, dog sniffs for drugs and so forth in legal cases yet we don't perform independent blinded tests of the accuracy of these tools.
  - sli 7y ago
    Don't forget hair analysis. And out of all of those, the only one that actually works is DNA analysis and even that fails from time to time due to how easily samples can be contaminated.
    - ergothus 7y ago
      My understanding is that DNA is basically unique, but the patterns use for conventional DNA analysis are not. While they may be statistically close enough to unique to trust over the whole population, there have been different issues when you start scoping things to different racial groups or areas with smaller gene pools (not dangerously small, just smaller). Because actually sequencing and comparing someones entire DNA would be prohibitively expensive if done for every case, they just look for a set of markers and assume that a large enough collection is close enough without accounting for distribution patterns of those markers AMONG THE SAMPLE POPULATION. (e.g. you don't have to look hard in small towns or in populations of the same heritage to notice a lot of physical characteristics that are quite common in that sub-population while being pretty distinct in the human population at large, the same is true for these markers.) . Since crimes often involve suspects from the same location and/or racial profile, a rule that is pretty reliable for the earth is not so reliable for this town/community/group of suspects. So the science is a problem even before you get to human error. The odds of a false match take hits of multiple orders of magnitude. Note: I'm not qualified to speak on the topic, but I've followed the topic with interest at a layman level for a while - be glad to hear from someone who IS qualified to speak on it to shed more light on why I'm right/wrong.
- Analemma_ 7y ago
  > Has this not been done? If not, why? I'm no libertarian, but I will concede that this is a perfect example of libertarian griping about government spending: it's not getting done because no one has any incentive for it to get done. Does the manufacturer have any incentive to honestly test the machine? Hell no, then no one would buy it. Does the government have any incentive to honestly test the machine? No, because airport/customs security is security theater and their goal is convincing voters that "something is being done". (Voters might have an incentive to honestly test the machine, but it's more-or-less impossible for this preference to affect policy, unless huge numbers of people become single-issue voters about security device testing. Which isn't likely.) Do the operators have any incentive to honestly test the machine? No, because if a terrorist slips through the machine and then blows up a plane, none of the blame comes back to the individual officer who ran the test. Without any incentive for the machine to work, it's no surprise that it doesn't.
- Iv 7y ago
  Questions asked by the EU parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624_EN.html http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624... Answer: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624-ASW_EN.html http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624... Apparently it has been tested, has been shown to have statistically significant result. As of November 2018 it was not used nor planned to be used on enforcing any border control, but was tested at three borders in real conditions. Even a good system would have false positives. In itself, that does not invalidate the whole system, even if I think the whole premise of this project is very shaky.
  - roenxi 7y ago
    Being statistically significant is nowhere near a high enough bar for this sort of quackery. Statistical significance is gameable, doesn't carry information about type I and II errors and frankly just means there is at least 1 common case that the machine gets right. People shouldn't be given or denied opportunity because a magic machine likes them. This machine will be like a human - it will develop a bizarre set of biases and one of them will happen to be correlated with reality. It could be producing about as much evidence as someone guessing that Arabs are Muslim - grossly stupid, statistically significant results.
    - Iv 7y ago
      Honestly at 4.5m that's a marginal project that is unlikely to be used anywhere seriously. And the EU answers makes it clear it will never take decisions alone. You know, there has been a bit weird push by brexit promoters for "frictionless" borders relying on magic tech. I suspect the funding of this could come from there. Expect it to not go anywhere once the brexit mess is over
- nyolfen 7y ago
  the point isn't detecting lies, the point is pressure to confess during interrogations. what matters is whether the person being interrogated thinks it works -- or even if they don't, to make lying more stressful.
ceejayoz 7y ago
Reminds me of this device: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADE_651 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADE_651 Tens of millions of dollars worth of dowsing rods.
ipsa 7y ago
The fruit machine was reincarnated for pedosexuals: a device attached to their genitals measures if they get sexual arousal from pictures of children. Those that do are not deemed ready for rehabilitation. Where most people yell scam or digital phrenology, I have a somewhat contrarian view: These systems do work. It is possible to tell, better than random guessing, if someone is gay or has a violent disposition, with just a single picture. Prisons for violent crimes see way more inmates that are bald, bearded, acned, square-jawed (signs of high testosterone). Replicated studies have shown that the profile pictures of gay men are significantly different from straight men, from subtle effects, such as more attention to grooming, to more physically noticable, like shape of the jaw being more rounded. I have no reason to disbelief that an automated system could check for tell-tale signs that someone is hiding something: needing a lot of time to answer basic questions, using their lead hand to cover their chin, looking not in the direction commonly associated with recall, but that of imagination, trembling voice, anxious eye twitches, etcetera. This is what flawed human border guards are already doing. Isreal has the most advanced airport security and trains European and American border guards to detect suspicious behavior. The TSA has over 3000 behavior detection agents. These are people with their own political and religious beliefs, prejudices, and variance -- and they can't be audited rigorously. We just never heard the accuracy, so we can't say if lie detectors can beat this (or can help as a human tool). But I bet they can. I was dissapointed that the actual video chat with the journalist and the digital border guard was not included in the investigative article. They argue that the system be interpretable, but give no full transparency themselves. I'd trust that she did not tell any lies, but I don't trust that they did not try to game/fool the system, as to have an actual article to write about. Anyway, using just one test subject is majorly flawed, and comes close to not understanding that science can't provide 100% accurate predictions, just probabilities. I feel it is a reasoning flaw to discard any automated system, by honing in on a single mistake.
- bauerd 7y ago
  Please do provide sources for all these claims
  - ipsa 7y ago
    Measuring sexual arousal: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penile_plethysmograph https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penile_plethysmograph & https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Place_for_Paedophiles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Place_for_Paedophiles Testosterone effects on face structure and violent crime: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/019188699400177T https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/019188... & https://www.healthline.com/health/low-testosterone/effects-on-body https://www.healthline.com/health/low-testosterone/effects-o... On deep nets having better gaydars than average human: https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fpspa0000098 https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fpspa0000098 & https://www.pnas.org/content/112/4/1036.full https://www.pnas.org/content/112/4/1036.full On AVATAR (the US version of the digital border guard: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/lie-detectors-with-artificial-intelligence-are-future-of-border-security.html https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/lie-detectors-with-artificia... & https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563218304485?via=ihub https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S074756321... On Isreal airport security and training EU and American border agents: https://www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/19886-detecting-anomalies-why-israeli-airport-security-works https://www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/19886-detecting-anom... & https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-israeli-airport-secu_b_4978149 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-israeli-airport-secu_b_4... On 100% accuracy being impossible: https://science.howstuffworks.com/nature/climate-weather/atmospheric/scientists-predict-weather.htm https://science.howstuffworks.com/nature/climate-weather/atm... & https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_free_lunch_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_free_lunch_theorem
romwell 7y ago
>Wow. What a horrorshow. You viddy, it was a very, very horrorshow machine, for it made all those vecks ittying across the border go bezoomny trying to figure out what litso to make to keep the machine like happy. It was, oh my brothers, on purpose, as to make these vecks to not want to try do that again. The bratchnies at the top must have loved it. [1] [1]https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:A_Clockwork_Orange https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:A_Clockwork_Orange
petre 7y ago
A waste of EU taxpayer money, that's for sure.

jstummbillig 7y ago

I am so confused. There seems to be a blatantly obvious method to find out how well this machine works, no anecdotes or trust required: You get a decent amount of test subjects to dry run it in a controlled environment. Has this not been done? If not, why? Or am I wrong in believing it's that simple?

function_seven 7y ago
To the extent they work at all, lie detectors only do so if the person telling the lie has a real reason to lie. Skin in the game, high stakes, and real harm if their deception is uncovered. Having a controlled environment to test this is really hard. You can't just have someone say, "My mother is 35" when their mother is really 53. That's a silly lie, and can be told with the same level of calmness as the truth. So how do you design an experiment with "real" liars (telling non-trivial lies), while knowing which participants are lying or not?
- floatboth 7y ago
  False positives are more concerning here than false negatives. It should be obvious to everyone that way way more people are "not calm" for reasons other than lying!
  - sib 7y ago
    That's an interesting point of view. If some hypothetical "bad guys" are trying to set off a series of tactical nuclear weapons, false negatives are actually pretty bad. (Yes, I actually am a small-l libertarian and have a strong aversion to overbearing and stupidly-designed government programs, which this one certainly seems to be.)
    - XorNot 7y ago
      I mean if you have access to tactical nukes though, why are you even bothering to get on a plane in Europe?
  - function_seven 7y ago
    Yeah. My "to the extent..." preamble represents my feeling on polygraphs and lie detectors in general. The entire situation of being strapped into a machine and asked invasive questions is going to be nervous-making. And depending on which questions are asked, and how they're asked, the examiner can easily contaminate the exam and extract a false positive.
- mos_basik 7y ago
  Maybe you could induce something similar by providing the liar with strong incentives / stress. Something like this: >We're going to hook you up to a state-of-the-art polygraph. We know you've heard that polygraphs are snake oil, but we think we've made a breakthrough on this one, which is why we're running this test. Answer truthfully to all questions except the five on this shortlist. For any of listed questions, you may choose to lie. If you tell one undetected lie, you get $5. For each additional undetected lie, your payoff is multiplied by 1.9. If any of your lies is detected, you get no money and you get shocked. The intensity of the shock has a similar exponential relationship with the number of lies you told. If shocking volunteers doesn't get past the ethics committee, then maybe you start off the volunteers with a baseline payout of $50 or so and allow the payoff to both grow and decrease exponentially. The goal being that on that fifth lie, they're really on the edge, knowing that they could either make a lot of money or get {shocked,nothing}.
  - itronitron 7y ago
    how about this -> we are going to tell you how to defeat the polygraph, which is easy because it is actually mostly BS, and we will pay you $100K if you successfully deceive the polygraph when the examiner asks you if you have been told how to defeat the test. Then tell the polygrapher that everyone will lie on that question so they should flag all responses as lies. Then everyone's results can be evaluated by another polygrapher to determine who was lying 'well', with no payout needed.
- cwkoss 7y ago
  You let participants know that they'll receive money for every lie they "get away with" making them feel loss-aversion. This has been used in psychological studies, but it's effectiveness is proportional to cost of doing the study, so it is expensive to get large datasets.
  - WalterBright 7y ago
    Lying to get away with $10 is a lot different from lying to get away with murder.
    - Reelin 7y ago
      If the machine could catch people lying for $10 (or $50, or ...) in a double blind study, that would set a quantifiable lower bound for its effectiveness.
    - rasz 7y ago
      1 How do you know. 2 Not for a psychopath.
      - chaorace 7y ago
        I have to disagree. A psychopath will value their freedom more than $10 and will be inclined to react differently.
harry8 7y ago
Where are you finding terrorist who think they are getting away with concealing it?
jbob2000 7y ago
The purpose of these machines isn’t to actually work as intended. These machines are here for plausible deniability: “we pulled you aside because the machine said so, not because you’re Muslim”.
- droithomme 7y ago
  Or the computer said he was lying about not being a terrorist, so we went to arrest him but he was not cooperative and violently resisted, which of course is what a terrorist would do, and thus we had no choice but to shoot and kill him. In self defense of course and to protect the public. This is OK because the computer determined he was a terrorist and computers don't make mistakes.
mcherm 7y ago
> Has this not been done? No, this has not been done. > If not, why? Because it would fail. > Or am I wrong in believing it's that simple? Nope... it's that simple. But let's be honest here: we SHOULD use this approach for ALL of these kinds of assessment, yet we don't. Even in the US, we use things like fingerprint matching, handwriting analysis, drug testing laboratories, DNA analysis, dog sniffs for drugs and so forth in legal cases yet we don't perform independent blinded tests of the accuracy of these tools.
- sli 7y ago
  Don't forget hair analysis. And out of all of those, the only one that actually works is DNA analysis and even that fails from time to time due to how easily samples can be contaminated.
  - ergothus 7y ago
    My understanding is that DNA is basically unique, but the patterns use for conventional DNA analysis are not. While they may be statistically close enough to unique to trust over the whole population, there have been different issues when you start scoping things to different racial groups or areas with smaller gene pools (not dangerously small, just smaller). Because actually sequencing and comparing someones entire DNA would be prohibitively expensive if done for every case, they just look for a set of markers and assume that a large enough collection is close enough without accounting for distribution patterns of those markers AMONG THE SAMPLE POPULATION. (e.g. you don't have to look hard in small towns or in populations of the same heritage to notice a lot of physical characteristics that are quite common in that sub-population while being pretty distinct in the human population at large, the same is true for these markers.) . Since crimes often involve suspects from the same location and/or racial profile, a rule that is pretty reliable for the earth is not so reliable for this town/community/group of suspects. So the science is a problem even before you get to human error. The odds of a false match take hits of multiple orders of magnitude. Note: I'm not qualified to speak on the topic, but I've followed the topic with interest at a layman level for a while - be glad to hear from someone who IS qualified to speak on it to shed more light on why I'm right/wrong.
Analemma_ 7y ago
> Has this not been done? If not, why? I'm no libertarian, but I will concede that this is a perfect example of libertarian griping about government spending: it's not getting done because no one has any incentive for it to get done. Does the manufacturer have any incentive to honestly test the machine? Hell no, then no one would buy it. Does the government have any incentive to honestly test the machine? No, because airport/customs security is security theater and their goal is convincing voters that "something is being done". (Voters might have an incentive to honestly test the machine, but it's more-or-less impossible for this preference to affect policy, unless huge numbers of people become single-issue voters about security device testing. Which isn't likely.) Do the operators have any incentive to honestly test the machine? No, because if a terrorist slips through the machine and then blows up a plane, none of the blame comes back to the individual officer who ran the test. Without any incentive for the machine to work, it's no surprise that it doesn't.
Iv 7y ago
Questions asked by the EU parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624_EN.html http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624... Answer: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624-ASW_EN.html http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005624... Apparently it has been tested, has been shown to have statistically significant result. As of November 2018 it was not used nor planned to be used on enforcing any border control, but was tested at three borders in real conditions. Even a good system would have false positives. In itself, that does not invalidate the whole system, even if I think the whole premise of this project is very shaky.
- roenxi 7y ago
  Being statistically significant is nowhere near a high enough bar for this sort of quackery. Statistical significance is gameable, doesn't carry information about type I and II errors and frankly just means there is at least 1 common case that the machine gets right. People shouldn't be given or denied opportunity because a magic machine likes them. This machine will be like a human - it will develop a bizarre set of biases and one of them will happen to be correlated with reality. It could be producing about as much evidence as someone guessing that Arabs are Muslim - grossly stupid, statistically significant results.
  - Iv 7y ago
    Honestly at 4.5m that's a marginal project that is unlikely to be used anywhere seriously. And the EU answers makes it clear it will never take decisions alone. You know, there has been a bit weird push by brexit promoters for "frictionless" borders relying on magic tech. I suspect the funding of this could come from there. Expect it to not go anywhere once the brexit mess is over
nyolfen 7y ago
the point isn't detecting lies, the point is pressure to confess during interrogations. what matters is whether the person being interrogated thinks it works -- or even if they don't, to make lying more stressful.

ceejayoz 7y ago

Reminds me of this device: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADE_651 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADE_651 Tens of millions of dollars worth of dowsing rods.

ipsa 7y ago

The fruit machine was reincarnated for pedosexuals: a device attached to their genitals measures if they get sexual arousal from pictures of children. Those that do are not deemed ready for rehabilitation. Where most people yell scam or digital phrenology, I have a somewhat contrarian view: These systems do work. It is possible to tell, better than random guessing, if someone is gay or has a violent disposition, with just a single picture. Prisons for violent crimes see way more inmates that are bald, bearded, acned, square-jawed (signs of high testosterone). Replicated studies have shown that the profile pictures of gay men are significantly different from straight men, from subtle effects, such as more attention to grooming, to more physically noticable, like shape of the jaw being more rounded. I have no reason to disbelief that an automated system could check for tell-tale signs that someone is hiding something: needing a lot of time to answer basic questions, using their lead hand to cover their chin, looking not in the direction commonly associated with recall, but that of imagination, trembling voice, anxious eye twitches, etcetera. This is what flawed human border guards are already doing. Isreal has the most advanced airport security and trains European and American border guards to detect suspicious behavior. The TSA has over 3000 behavior detection agents. These are people with their own political and religious beliefs, prejudices, and variance -- and they can't be audited rigorously. We just never heard the accuracy, so we can't say if lie detectors can beat this (or can help as a human tool). But I bet they can. I was dissapointed that the actual video chat with the journalist and the digital border guard was not included in the investigative article. They argue that the system be interpretable, but give no full transparency themselves. I'd trust that she did not tell any lies, but I don't trust that they did not try to game/fool the system, as to have an actual article to write about. Anyway, using just one test subject is majorly flawed, and comes close to not understanding that science can't provide 100% accurate predictions, just probabilities. I feel it is a reasoning flaw to discard any automated system, by honing in on a single mistake.

bauerd 7y ago
Please do provide sources for all these claims
- ipsa 7y ago
  Measuring sexual arousal: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penile_plethysmograph https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penile_plethysmograph & https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Place_for_Paedophiles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Place_for_Paedophiles Testosterone effects on face structure and violent crime: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/019188699400177T https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/019188... & https://www.healthline.com/health/low-testosterone/effects-on-body https://www.healthline.com/health/low-testosterone/effects-o... On deep nets having better gaydars than average human: https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fpspa0000098 https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fpspa0000098 & https://www.pnas.org/content/112/4/1036.full https://www.pnas.org/content/112/4/1036.full On AVATAR (the US version of the digital border guard: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/lie-detectors-with-artificial-intelligence-are-future-of-border-security.html https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/lie-detectors-with-artificia... & https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563218304485?via=ihub https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S074756321... On Isreal airport security and training EU and American border agents: https://www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/19886-detecting-anomalies-why-israeli-airport-security-works https://www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/19886-detecting-anom... & https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-israeli-airport-secu_b_4978149 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-israeli-airport-secu_b_4... On 100% accuracy being impossible: https://science.howstuffworks.com/nature/climate-weather/atmospheric/scientists-predict-weather.htm https://science.howstuffworks.com/nature/climate-weather/atm... & https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_free_lunch_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_free_lunch_theorem

romwell 7y ago

>Wow. What a horrorshow. You viddy, it was a very, very horrorshow machine, for it made all those vecks ittying across the border go bezoomny trying to figure out what litso to make to keep the machine like happy. It was, oh my brothers, on purpose, as to make these vecks to not want to try do that again. The bratchnies at the top must have loved it. [1] [1]https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:A_Clockwork_Orange https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:A_Clockwork_Orange

petre 7y ago

A waste of EU taxpayer money, that's for sure.