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This guy is all about how much of a threat the expansion of Chinese hardware is but doesn't say a word about the same being true for American hardware. Chinese
by jeroenhd 7y ago
This guy is all about how much of a threat the expansion of Chinese hardware is but doesn't say a word about the same being true for American hardware. Chinese networking hardware may contain backdoors, American hardware has been confirmed to contain backdoors over and over again.
Re: the iPhone: when any country has the golden keys, every country has the golden keys. How hard is it to. Get that through your head. The moment the US demands golden keys, China is going to demand their own set of golden keys, followed by Saudi Arabia and any other foreign adversary. These keys are going to be used the same way the US is going to use them (spy on allies and enemies) as well as for seeking out minorities and problematic citizens.
As a foreigner, if something doesn't cross the US Senate of all bodies because of ethics or surveillance problems, that's really saying something. These are the people that brought us laws like the PATRIOT ACT and the CLOUD act, systematically expanding the reach of US law enforcement across borders. The EU, supposedly an ally, had to negotiate a quick, likely invalid or quickly overturned bandage treaty to make it legal to even just store personal data on US company servers. Is this what the US wants to become? A risk to their own allies?
Forcing weak encryption is not defence, it's offence. It's hard to believe that people like these aren't jealous of the spying network China has set up.
- modeless 7y agoChina already got golden keys for Chinese iPhones. Apple handed them iCloud.
- NieDzejkob 7y agoI'm not saying you're wrong, but I haven't been able to find a source for this - only mentions of a new datacenter in China. A citation would be nice.
- trevyn 7y agohttps://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351
- coldtea 7y agoWell, China issues aside, that should be the case in every country -- such services should be local, governed by local laws, and not giving a free-pass to foreign countries/governments (foreign as to the users of the service) to enforce their laws/surveillance. E.g. I would like the EU iCloud to be hosted in EU.
- JoshTriplett 7y ago> that should be the case in every country -- such services should be local, governed by local laws So a cloud service that's available worldwide should store and process data locally in every country (or perhaps even every sub-jurisdiction of every country) just so that that jurisdiction can serve warrants to it and others cannot? Or worse, people in multiple countries should have to use different services and hope those services interoperate with each other, just so that they can "shop local"? The Internet does not and should not work that way. If we're going to go to the trouble of building interoperable, federated services, it should be to put them in the control of individual users, not in the control of governments.
- coldtea 7y ago>So a cloud service that's available worldwide should store and process data locally in every country (or perhaps even every sub-jurisdiction of every country) just so that that jurisdiction can serve warrants to it and others cannot? Simply put, yes. You are maybe concerned with the technical issues / problems to the service provider. I'm more concerned with the decentralization, surveillance, and data sovereignty. >Or worse, people in multiple countries should have to use different services and hope those services interoperate with each other, just so that they can "shop local"? Yes. In fact, this decentralized nature, and resilience, was an early vision about the internet itself, and not just some hippie dream, even in its army-research origins... And of course all the way to ideas such as XMPP, Diaspora, and so on. Nobody dreamed a Facebook silo somewhere gathering all the world's data... >The Internet does not and should not work that way. That it does not, it's obvious. That it should not, less so. (And of course, if one's county is the one doing the data-gathering/policing of data for the rest of the world, it's "naturally" all A-OK to them that it is so). >If we're going to go to the trouble of building interoperable, federated services, it should be to put them in the control of individual users, not in the control of governments. Notice how I didn't propose putting them "in control of governments". They already are in control of at least one government (the one of the country of Facebook, Google, MS, Apple, Twitter, etc). So what I proposed is already de-centralized: putting each users data under democratic control in the places where they themselves are (and vote, have rights, etc), as opposed to a central place, where they don't vote, don't have any right or resource as foreigners and are "fair game" to the whims of both the service-origin government and the service company. If they're going to go to control of individual users, even better. But stopping the control of a single foreign government is already a good first step. (Exceptions could be made for non-democratic countries -- no reason to give control of a service's local data to a dictatorship).
- GhettoMaestro 7y agoThat is technically incorrect. As I understand it, the iPhones are generic (global), but the iCloud service is what the Chinese authorities have full snooping rights to. Apple doesn't cut a custom firmware with special/additional golden keys or anything of that nature, as I understand it, for anyone. The iPhone in this case is safe, assuming you don't use iCloud, in China.
- modeless 7y ago> assuming you don't use iCloud But most people use iCloud, right? Apple forbids you from using competing full phone cloud backup services. The built in backup software continuously sends iCloud copies of most user data on the phone.
- __david__ 7y agoAs far as I understand, they send an encrypted binary blob of the data on your phone, and the keys stay local. That’s much different.
- modeless 7y agoThis is not correct. Apple's page explaining their iCloud encryption states that they use end-to-end encryption only for a few specific types of data, and only if you enable two factor authentication. iMessage in particular explicitly sends its encryption keys to iCloud (so that iCloud can unlock your messages if you lose your device, but of course this means iCloud can unlock your messages for any other reason without your knowledge). https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
- jjeaff 7y agoBackdoors have been revealed a few times in US products, but US companies have learned their lesson and appear to be pushing back. 9/11 is almost a decade in the past and the Snowden revelations embarrassed several companies. Things like warrant canaries are pretty common and companies like Apple have been publicly fighting government attempts to access Apple devices in court. One thing the US has going for it is that unlike some countries, is that companies are more scared of their customers than the government.
- jeroenhd 7y agoEvery three or four months Cisco or Juniper get caught having introduced a new backdoor. Hardcoded admin passwords, full system access backdoors following a specific port knocking sequence, you name it. Sure, some companies have started pushing back but the companies that produce critical network infrastructure can't be trusted.
- Hikikomori 7y agoBackdoors or just shitty developers and security practices? What port knocking backdoor?
- dspillett 7y ago> 9/11 is almost a decade in the past I assume you mean two decades? (unless I'm missing the point and you are referring to some specific fall-out from that event that had particular significance at a point ten years after?)
- SeanMacConMara 7y agoA warrant canary is utterly useless as a defense. Any secret legal order to alter IT systems (the specific threat model it is most often suggested for) can logically also include an order to maintain a fake warrant canary.
- JoshTriplett 7y agoPart of the theory of a warrant canary is that compelled speech (and in particular a compelled lie) may be easier to challenge than suppressed speech. While that isn't definitive, there's some jurisprudence to back that theory. If you have a warrant canary, you should be prepared to challenge any such order in court and use that as the defense.
- solstice 7y agoHis whole point is to not weaken encryption but to strengthen it, despite the likely social costs that will incur. Have you read the conclusion of the article?
- afpx 7y agoI would be excited to read about how we can rethink encryption to enable a stateless society.