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Agreed! Your comment reminds me a lot of this 1998 article about the ValuJet crash in Flordia https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/03/the-lessons-o
by dahart 7y ago
Agreed! Your comment reminds me a lot of this 1998 article about the ValuJet crash in Flordia https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/03/the-lessons-of-valujet-592/306534/ https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/03/the-les...
Specifically it's the argument in the article that large disasters often have multiple causes. "Perrow says, Murphy's Law is wrong—what can go wrong usually goes right. But then one day a few of the bad little choices come together, and circumstances take an airplane down. Who, then, is really to blame?"
In large disasters, sometimes several not very likely simultaneous failures happen at the same time.
"The ValuJet accident is different. I would argue that it represents the third and most elusive kind of disaster, a "system accident," which may lie beyond the reach of conventional solution, and which a small group of thinkers, inspired by the Yale sociologist Charles Perrow, has been exploring elsewhere—for example, in power generation, chemical manufacturing, nuclear-weapons control, and space flight. Perrow has coined the more loaded term "normal accident" for such disasters, because he believes that they are normal for our time. His point is that these accidents are science's illegitimate children, bastards born of the confusion that lies within the complex organizations with which we manage our dangerous technologies. Perrow is not an expert on commercial flying, but his thinking applies to it nonetheless. In this case the organization includes not only ValuJet, the archetype of new-style airlines, but also the contractors that serve it and the government entities that, despite economic deregulation, are expected to oversee it."
- brianpan 7y agoNot just large disasters, every failure in engineering large or small. That's why we use tools like 5 Why's in a root cause analysis. Anyone who's thinking about safety is thinking about redundancies. So every observed failure is likely a confluence of many failures.
- joe_the_user 7y agoSpecifically it's the argument in the article that large disasters often have multiple causes. "Perrow says, Murphy's Law is wrong—what can go wrong usually goes right. But then one day a few of the bad little choices come together, and circumstances take an airplane down. Who, then, is really to blame?" But that's exactly what's disingenuous about the GP's claim. Many disasters do indeed involve a sequence of mistakes of different sorts but that's not really the case here. The situation with 737 max was one terribly system and the pilot's complete inability to stop this - inability that could have been anticipated and which was the product of the original bad design. "His point is that these accidents are science's illegitimate children, bastards born of the confusion that lies within the complex organizations with which we manage our dangerous technologies." This kind of disaster certainly can happen but the situation with the 737 Max was Boeing pushing an old design far beyond it's limits because of the threat of losing market share and regulators allowing this.
- mlyle 7y ago> The situation with 737 max was one terribly system and the pilot's complete inability to stop this - inability that could have been anticipated and which was the product of the original bad design. You accuse me of being disingenuous and immediately follow it with a false claim. This is untrue. Stabilator trim can be turned off. Indeed, before Lion Air 610 the previous flight had experienced the problem and had dealt with it correctly. Also, re-trimming using the trim switch disables MCAS for some number of seconds. In the case of ET302, they turned the system off, but allowed the aircraft to overspeed and were, as a result, unable to retrim manually. Still, they had a positive rate of climb. It is only when they turned it back on in violation of training/checklist and inexplicably did not use it to retrim nose up that they were doomed. > This kind of disaster certainly can happen but the situation with the 737 Max was Boeing pushing an old design far beyond it's limits because of the threat of losing market share and regulators allowing this. I strongly disagree. I think it's a badly engineered system but things like this are part of the normal design refinement that happens when planes are stretched and iterated upon. The 737 has bad handling on pitch during departure; bigger, more powerful 737's have it worse, and it makes sense to fix this.
- joe_the_user 7y agoI believe my position is that of the strong consensus of the long debates that have gone on in detail here and in numerous mainstream and technical publications. I can't summarize all the arguments there and I won't try but the conclusion has been Boeing is to blame (period). In this day and age, I'm suspicious and annoyed even small effort to improperly spread blame when that spreading serves powerful interests.
- mlyle 7y agoBasically all of aviation safety is about the spreading of blame and plugging up holes. Either approach is wrong: just pointing to the pilot and saying "hah-hah error" without considering what led to the error is what aviation did for decades. "Crash less!" we said to pilots, and were surprised when things didn't improve much. But you can't ignore crew performance, either. The crews that crashed did not do great. But if a system is regularly putting crews to the test in a way that requires high levels of personal performance to survive, that's a bigger problem. And MCAS is more easily improved than the rest: we can more easily reduce the frequency and severity of that "testing" than we can improve all flight crews. But we shouldn't ignore the problems in crew decision-making, and the related training choices (e.g. not requiring crews to demonstrate handling of runaway trim in some jurisdictions).
- dmitrygr 7y agoThis is called the "Swiss cheese model of accident causation" and it is commonly used to discuss airplane accidents. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model