6 ms·

My understanding is that the pilots had only about 40 seconds time to solve the problem and were trained for one hour with an iPad (not on the MCAS, but the who

by JanSt 7y ago

My understanding is that the pilots had only about 40 seconds time to solve the problem and were trained for one hour with an iPad (not on the MCAS, but the whole 737 Max). I'm not sure whether this is a question of pilots' standards in the US vs around the world.

kayfox 7y ago
The general idea was that pilots would correctly recognize large amounts of undesired and uncommanded trim being runaway trim and perform the checklist to resolve that issue that they are expected to know by memory, since there is a need to execute it fast, without paging through the Quick Reference Handbook. This is not a checklist that was introduced with the 737 MAX, but one that has existed since the introduction of the 737 in 1969. I haven't gone and checked but IIRC a similar checklist exists for all Boeing jetliners and I would expect Airbus as well. In any system failure there is a chain of events that leads up to the ultimate failure, concentrating solely on Boeing's mistakes in these crashes overlooks all the other points at which they could have been averted: 1. In the Lion Air crash, there were some significant maintenance issues that lead up to the replacement for a failing AoA sensor with a used part older than the aircraft failing as well. 2. There were some significant failings in Crew Resource Management in the accident flights. 3. There appear to be issues in the pilots abilities to deal with unexpected situations. This is why simulator training exists, so that pilots can encounter unexpected issues and deal with them correctly. 4. The failure that lead to MCAS being activated also caused a whole ton of warnings to be activated, which may have been a situation Boeing was not expecting, and therefore did not put into the minimum baseline training they create. 5. The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. 6. Boeing's designs reflect a US-centric expectation of pilots. In the US we expect pilots flying airliners to have spent at least 1500 hours flying before they can even sit in the co-pilot seat. In other parts of the world I have heard numbers as low as 240 hours, so pilot testing will need to reflect this going forward.
- ClumsyPilot 7y ago
  > 5. 5. The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. I like your approach: Pilot's failures caused the crash, and Boeing made an honest mistake. And you seem to think it would have been fine flying in the US. You do realise plane crashes and industrial accidents do happen in the US? A safe system assumes they are operated by humans who are not infallible, and should not go up in flames from minor issues. Otherwise we must conclude Chernobyl reactor was a perfectly fine design.
  - kayfox 7y ago
    So... I said the design was bad and your saying I'm not harsh enough in that? Are we trying to solve engineering problems by getting emotional about them or something?
    - erikpukinskis 7y ago
      This conversation isn’t really about solving engineering problems it’s about whether Boeing’s posture on the matter is in line with Engineering ethics. Many people believe there was one or more ethics breaches here. Your position seems to be that it was a combination of innocent engineering mistakes and substandard behavior by the pilots.
    - jtx22 7y ago
      Good analysis!
    - computerex 7y ago
      Out of the six points you mentioned, you blamed everyone, blaming the pilots twice, and merely mentioned this against Boeing: > The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. Do you have a personal stake in Boeing or something? Because you appear very biased indeed. There were several ethical breaches that resulted in these tragic catastrophes.

by JanSt 7y ago

kayfox 7y ago

The general idea was that pilots would correctly recognize large amounts of undesired and uncommanded trim being runaway trim and perform the checklist to resolve that issue that they are expected to know by memory, since there is a need to execute it fast, without paging through the Quick Reference Handbook. This is not a checklist that was introduced with the 737 MAX, but one that has existed since the introduction of the 737 in 1969. I haven't gone and checked but IIRC a similar checklist exists for all Boeing jetliners and I would expect Airbus as well. In any system failure there is a chain of events that leads up to the ultimate failure, concentrating solely on Boeing's mistakes in these crashes overlooks all the other points at which they could have been averted: 1. In the Lion Air crash, there were some significant maintenance issues that lead up to the replacement for a failing AoA sensor with a used part older than the aircraft failing as well. 2. There were some significant failings in Crew Resource Management in the accident flights. 3. There appear to be issues in the pilots abilities to deal with unexpected situations. This is why simulator training exists, so that pilots can encounter unexpected issues and deal with them correctly. 4. The failure that lead to MCAS being activated also caused a whole ton of warnings to be activated, which may have been a situation Boeing was not expecting, and therefore did not put into the minimum baseline training they create. 5. The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. 6. Boeing's designs reflect a US-centric expectation of pilots. In the US we expect pilots flying airliners to have spent at least 1500 hours flying before they can even sit in the co-pilot seat. In other parts of the world I have heard numbers as low as 240 hours, so pilot testing will need to reflect this going forward.

ClumsyPilot 7y ago
> 5. 5. The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. I like your approach: Pilot's failures caused the crash, and Boeing made an honest mistake. And you seem to think it would have been fine flying in the US. You do realise plane crashes and industrial accidents do happen in the US? A safe system assumes they are operated by humans who are not infallible, and should not go up in flames from minor issues. Otherwise we must conclude Chernobyl reactor was a perfectly fine design.
- kayfox 7y ago
  So... I said the design was bad and your saying I'm not harsh enough in that? Are we trying to solve engineering problems by getting emotional about them or something?
  - erikpukinskis 7y ago
    This conversation isn’t really about solving engineering problems it’s about whether Boeing’s posture on the matter is in line with Engineering ethics. Many people believe there was one or more ethics breaches here. Your position seems to be that it was a combination of innocent engineering mistakes and substandard behavior by the pilots.
  - jtx22 7y ago
    Good analysis!
  - computerex 7y ago
    Out of the six points you mentioned, you blamed everyone, blaming the pilots twice, and merely mentioned this against Boeing: > The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. Do you have a personal stake in Boeing or something? Because you appear very biased indeed. There were several ethical breaches that resulted in these tragic catastrophes.