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I always wonder what is keeping the world away from WW3. I guess that nuclear weapons make it too frightening to start any large conflict if it can involve mush

by jokoon 7y ago

I always wonder what is keeping the world away from WW3. I guess that nuclear weapons make it too frightening to start any large conflict if it can involve mushroom clouds. I don't think leaders would really retaliate a nuclear attack, since it always is preferable to de-escalate a nuclear conflict than to escalate it. Mutual assured destruction is something nobody is interested in.

pjc50 7y ago
Cold war doctrine was the other way around; it was assumed that once the other side's missiles launched, you were already dead, and the only way to prevent that launch was as strong a commitment to retaliation as possible. Hence the UK deploying its nuclear deterrent at sea, since the UK is small enough that Soviet ICBMs had enough coverage to destroy all military installations on the island several times over. Along with most of the population. Mutual assured destruction may be the only thing limiting the Kashmir conflict, for example. The definitive film on this is of course Dr Strangelove.
- azernik 7y ago
  GP stated: > I don't think leaders would really retaliate a nuclear attack This is actually a fairly reasonable assumption, and is a major headache for deterrence - credible threats are hard to make. Cold War policy was designed around discrediting the assumption, but only because it is such a reasonable one. Once the missiles are flying, there is no rational reason to retaliate; and states have an incentive to exaggerate their willingness to retaliate. This is the whole motivation of a branch of deterrence theory called "signaling", whose main study is the way that actors can commit themselves to escalation in a way that is costly to back down from, in order to make an opponent think you're not bluffing. See also madman theory. This was one reason for the switch from the "massive response" of the Eisenhower years to the "flexible response" of the Kennedy years; it strained credulity that anyone would actually go through with massive response in reaction to minor conflicts. In related policy, the USAF may crack down on nuclear missile crews who are unwilling to fire in the case of a nuclear war, but they're even more paranoid about crews publicly saying they wouldn't pull the trigger.
  - xoa 7y ago
    >Once the missiles are flying, there is no rational reason to retaliate I've seen this written a lot, but I find it confusing. There certainly seem to be a number of rational reasons to retaliate, even if one wishes to engage in a bit of definition play and claim that simple revenge isn't rational (though in game theory successful strategies must include some degree of retaliation alongside forgiveness). But on a purely practical basis, one issue is that in reality it appears the most likely outcome of nuclear war isn't "the total extinction of humanity" as so many stories go. Yes many people will die, but there will be lots and lots of survivors as well. They will then have to continue on and rebuild, and hopefully (at least to members of the previous culture in power) that rebuilding will involve some level of the better parts of the old culture. Ie., after nuking a lot of Americans might hope that while a New America would undoubtedly be quite different in some respects and make some new choices that would be better, it'd still have liberty and much of the bill of rights and such remain as ideals. But however unlikely that is, it would be even harder/impossible if a hostile nuclear power remained completely undamaged, as the last unattacked nation left standing would de facto become the world superpower or even fully conquer everything left. If every hostile is reduced down equivalently in contrast than at least the survivors are on a more even starting point, it won't be whatever can be scrounged together facing a fully operational military industrial complex. In summary: anyone who'd choose to fire a ton of nukes at you in a first strike (*differing from first use) isn't someone you want to trust to take care of you afterwards. It's rationally arguable that making sure they're left in a recovery state too increases your survivors' chances.
    - gambiting 7y ago
      >> It's rationally arguable that making sure they're left in a recovery state too increases your survivors' chances. But if you are in position to launch the counterattack(say sitting in a missile silo with your hand on the launch button), then once the missiles are on their way to you, you are dead. It might take them 30-60 minutes to actually get there, but you are dead anyway. Absolutely nothing you can do at that point will change that. Retaliating will not improve your current situation. And yes, it might improve the chances of the survivors, but at the same time, you know that if you press that button millions of people will die. I think I'd just leave it at that point.
- Steve44 7y ago
  This is one of the reasons the "letter of last resort" the British submarines carry must remain secret. It’s the not knowing which helps keep the balance of peace. http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/36824917/trident-what-are-the-letters-of-last-resort http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/36824917/trident-what-...
  - willyt 7y ago
    I can't find a source for it, but I'm fairly sure at least two prime ministers have, in their later years, gone on record saying that their instructions were to paraphrase 'don't retaliate'. Edit: Also, Britains nuclear deterrent is quite often out of service for maintenance.
    - Steve44 7y ago
      I was under the impression we have a continuous patrol policy and there is always at least one submarine out on patrol.
- wsxcde 7y ago
  > Mutual assured destruction may be the only thing limiting the Kashmir conflict, for example. On the contrary, Kashmir militancy project was started by Pakistan in the late eighties after a botched attempt by the central government in India to rig an election in the state. This was well after the first Indian nuclear tests in 1974. Subsequently, India did another round of nuclear testing 1998 and that too resulted in an attempted stealth invasion of Kargil. So if anything, nuclear weapons have escalated the conflict not the other way around. Just to be clear, there were always separatist elements in Kashmir, just like there used to be some in Punjab and there still are in Balochistan. But with development and intra-country migration, it becomes hard to sustain a separatist movement and that's why all the other movements in India have all but petered out. It is likely this would've happened in Indian-controlled Kashmir too, given that the valley was largely peaceful after 1948 and until the 1990s. But a concatenation of unfortunate circumstances -- first the rigged election, then Pakistani arming of the separatists, the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets winding up which meant the ISI and their jihadi cousins-in-arms were looking for a new project, the Indian Army's human rights violations and introduction of AFSPA in the valley, harassment of and violence against Kashmiri Hindus which caused a mass exodus of pro-India elements from the valley, and the western policy of ignoring jihadi violence in Kashmir until 9/11/2001 because they were historically aligned with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia rather than India which was assumed to be in the Russian sphere of influence --- resulted in the conflict blowing up to where it is now. You'll notice that many of these contributing factors have disappeared and the situation is likely to get better in the next couple of decades.
wnkrshm 7y ago
But it would have happened. The Sovjet Union had developed an automated retaliatory system, named 'Perimeter'. In the case of an alarm, it would have given the government executive the option to flip a switch and activate the system. Or, if there was no signal from the executive anymore and nuclear explosions are detected, the system activates by itself. If the system detects actual nuclear explosions on its territory, the retaliatory strike would be executed. All this was mediated by command & control ICBMs (i.e. rockets without warheads but with detectors and comms) that the system would launch on warning and by switching the system on, the actual silos would respond to automated commands from these rockets. A system very hard to disable from outside. The craziest thing about this: The Sovjets didn't even advertise this system existed but it did. Perimeter is rumored to still be in operation, since Vladimir Putin likes to drop comments from time to time along the lines of 'we will never launch preemptively but retaliation will be swift and certain'. Edit: typo Edit2: So this system was created to automatically ensure retaliation even if the Sovjet union was effectively wiped out or if nobody wanted to make the decision to conduct a retaliatory strike while missiles are incoming but haven't hit yet.
- rdtsc 7y ago
  One of the purposes for Perimeter was to keep the hotheaded generals in check. That is, if the detection system has a glitch, they don’t rush to launch everything, but instead just turn on Perimeter. I also think it was a large enough system that Western intelligence probably knew about it, but couldn’t publicly acknowledge it, as it might expose the source of their knowledge.
  - blaser-waffle 7y ago
    It would absolutely in the Soviet's interest to make sure people know that the weapon exists -- it helps keep them alive! To paraphrase Dr. Strangelove, what's the point of the doomsday device if they don't know you have the doomsday device? I agree with your assessment that NATO intel probably knew of it, but kept quiet to avoid political drama and keep sources secret.
- Nasrudith 7y ago
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]
spodek 7y ago
> I guess that nuclear weapons make it too frightening to start any large conflict if it can involve mushroom clouds. You don't need nuclear weapons to want to avoid war.

by jokoon 7y ago

pjc50 7y ago

Cold war doctrine was the other way around; it was assumed that once the other side's missiles launched, you were already dead, and the only way to prevent that launch was as strong a commitment to retaliation as possible. Hence the UK deploying its nuclear deterrent at sea, since the UK is small enough that Soviet ICBMs had enough coverage to destroy all military installations on the island several times over. Along with most of the population. Mutual assured destruction may be the only thing limiting the Kashmir conflict, for example. The definitive film on this is of course Dr Strangelove.

azernik 7y ago
GP stated: > I don't think leaders would really retaliate a nuclear attack This is actually a fairly reasonable assumption, and is a major headache for deterrence - credible threats are hard to make. Cold War policy was designed around discrediting the assumption, but only because it is such a reasonable one. Once the missiles are flying, there is no rational reason to retaliate; and states have an incentive to exaggerate their willingness to retaliate. This is the whole motivation of a branch of deterrence theory called "signaling", whose main study is the way that actors can commit themselves to escalation in a way that is costly to back down from, in order to make an opponent think you're not bluffing. See also madman theory. This was one reason for the switch from the "massive response" of the Eisenhower years to the "flexible response" of the Kennedy years; it strained credulity that anyone would actually go through with massive response in reaction to minor conflicts. In related policy, the USAF may crack down on nuclear missile crews who are unwilling to fire in the case of a nuclear war, but they're even more paranoid about crews publicly saying they wouldn't pull the trigger.
- xoa 7y ago
  >Once the missiles are flying, there is no rational reason to retaliate I've seen this written a lot, but I find it confusing. There certainly seem to be a number of rational reasons to retaliate, even if one wishes to engage in a bit of definition play and claim that simple revenge isn't rational (though in game theory successful strategies must include some degree of retaliation alongside forgiveness). But on a purely practical basis, one issue is that in reality it appears the most likely outcome of nuclear war isn't "the total extinction of humanity" as so many stories go. Yes many people will die, but there will be lots and lots of survivors as well. They will then have to continue on and rebuild, and hopefully (at least to members of the previous culture in power) that rebuilding will involve some level of the better parts of the old culture. Ie., after nuking a lot of Americans might hope that while a New America would undoubtedly be quite different in some respects and make some new choices that would be better, it'd still have liberty and much of the bill of rights and such remain as ideals. But however unlikely that is, it would be even harder/impossible if a hostile nuclear power remained completely undamaged, as the last unattacked nation left standing would de facto become the world superpower or even fully conquer everything left. If every hostile is reduced down equivalently in contrast than at least the survivors are on a more even starting point, it won't be whatever can be scrounged together facing a fully operational military industrial complex. In summary: anyone who'd choose to fire a ton of nukes at you in a first strike (*differing from first use) isn't someone you want to trust to take care of you afterwards. It's rationally arguable that making sure they're left in a recovery state too increases your survivors' chances.
  - gambiting 7y ago
    >> It's rationally arguable that making sure they're left in a recovery state too increases your survivors' chances. But if you are in position to launch the counterattack(say sitting in a missile silo with your hand on the launch button), then once the missiles are on their way to you, you are dead. It might take them 30-60 minutes to actually get there, but you are dead anyway. Absolutely nothing you can do at that point will change that. Retaliating will not improve your current situation. And yes, it might improve the chances of the survivors, but at the same time, you know that if you press that button millions of people will die. I think I'd just leave it at that point.
Steve44 7y ago
This is one of the reasons the "letter of last resort" the British submarines carry must remain secret. It’s the not knowing which helps keep the balance of peace. http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/36824917/trident-what-are-the-letters-of-last-resort http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/36824917/trident-what-...
- willyt 7y ago
  I can't find a source for it, but I'm fairly sure at least two prime ministers have, in their later years, gone on record saying that their instructions were to paraphrase 'don't retaliate'. Edit: Also, Britains nuclear deterrent is quite often out of service for maintenance.
  - Steve44 7y ago
    I was under the impression we have a continuous patrol policy and there is always at least one submarine out on patrol.
wsxcde 7y ago
> Mutual assured destruction may be the only thing limiting the Kashmir conflict, for example. On the contrary, Kashmir militancy project was started by Pakistan in the late eighties after a botched attempt by the central government in India to rig an election in the state. This was well after the first Indian nuclear tests in 1974. Subsequently, India did another round of nuclear testing 1998 and that too resulted in an attempted stealth invasion of Kargil. So if anything, nuclear weapons have escalated the conflict not the other way around. Just to be clear, there were always separatist elements in Kashmir, just like there used to be some in Punjab and there still are in Balochistan. But with development and intra-country migration, it becomes hard to sustain a separatist movement and that's why all the other movements in India have all but petered out. It is likely this would've happened in Indian-controlled Kashmir too, given that the valley was largely peaceful after 1948 and until the 1990s. But a concatenation of unfortunate circumstances -- first the rigged election, then Pakistani arming of the separatists, the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets winding up which meant the ISI and their jihadi cousins-in-arms were looking for a new project, the Indian Army's human rights violations and introduction of AFSPA in the valley, harassment of and violence against Kashmiri Hindus which caused a mass exodus of pro-India elements from the valley, and the western policy of ignoring jihadi violence in Kashmir until 9/11/2001 because they were historically aligned with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia rather than India which was assumed to be in the Russian sphere of influence --- resulted in the conflict blowing up to where it is now. You'll notice that many of these contributing factors have disappeared and the situation is likely to get better in the next couple of decades.

wnkrshm 7y ago

But it would have happened. The Sovjet Union had developed an automated retaliatory system, named 'Perimeter'. In the case of an alarm, it would have given the government executive the option to flip a switch and activate the system. Or, if there was no signal from the executive anymore and nuclear explosions are detected, the system activates by itself. If the system detects actual nuclear explosions on its territory, the retaliatory strike would be executed. All this was mediated by command & control ICBMs (i.e. rockets without warheads but with detectors and comms) that the system would launch on warning and by switching the system on, the actual silos would respond to automated commands from these rockets. A system very hard to disable from outside. The craziest thing about this: The Sovjets didn't even advertise this system existed but it did. Perimeter is rumored to still be in operation, since Vladimir Putin likes to drop comments from time to time along the lines of 'we will never launch preemptively but retaliation will be swift and certain'. Edit: typo Edit2: So this system was created to automatically ensure retaliation even if the Sovjet union was effectively wiped out or if nobody wanted to make the decision to conduct a retaliatory strike while missiles are incoming but haven't hit yet.

rdtsc 7y ago
One of the purposes for Perimeter was to keep the hotheaded generals in check. That is, if the detection system has a glitch, they don’t rush to launch everything, but instead just turn on Perimeter. I also think it was a large enough system that Western intelligence probably knew about it, but couldn’t publicly acknowledge it, as it might expose the source of their knowledge.
- blaser-waffle 7y ago
  It would absolutely in the Soviet's interest to make sure people know that the weapon exists -- it helps keep them alive! To paraphrase Dr. Strangelove, what's the point of the doomsday device if they don't know you have the doomsday device? I agree with your assessment that NATO intel probably knew of it, but kept quiet to avoid political drama and keep sources secret.
Nasrudith 7y ago

deleted 7y ago

[deleted]

spodek 7y ago

> I guess that nuclear weapons make it too frightening to start any large conflict if it can involve mushroom clouds. You don't need nuclear weapons to want to avoid war.