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The Trouble with Many Worlds
- spindle 7y agoAs someone who's read a lot of work on the philosophy of quantum mechanics, I want to say that this piece is VERY well written. (And I wasn't the person who posted it to HN.)
- lisper 7y agoThank you! (I'm the author and the poster.)
- je_bailey 7y agoMy apologies if I get this wrong. Is this stating that the many possibilities are all coexisting and that our brain is acting as a filter to provide a view of possibilities that we define as ourselves?
- lisper 7y agoThat depends on what you mean by "this". If by "this" you mean MWI (the Multiple Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics) then: > Is this stating that the many possibilities are all coexisting Yes. > and that our brain is acting as a filter to provide a view of possibilities that we define as ourselves? No, your brain is not "acting as a filter". There are multiple "your brains" all "coexisting" in multiple universes (which MWI-ers call "the multiverse"), none of which can ever communicate with each other.
- millstone 7y agoArmchair physicist here, and yet: > The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining, non-probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory. Well this seems crazy! We can drop the Born rule axiom, because you (a game theorist) will make the same decisions whether the universe is deterministic or probabilistic? The difference is crucial, right? A PRNG requires hidden state: exfiltrate the state and predict all future results. But there is no room in the wavefunction + Schrödinger equation for such state: you either augment it (Bohmian mechanics) or accept the essential probabilistic nature. Probabilistic predictions cannot be obtained from deterministic axioms, just like PRNGs cannot produce true randomness. How does Deutsch resolve this?
- danbmil99 7y agoThere is no way to prove that a supposedly random source of information is not effectively a PRNG. Similarly, the Born rule must apply unless and until we learn that there is some deterministic process that QM reduces to, and even then, unless we know how the PRNG was 'seeded', we must progress _as if_ the process was in fact random. The deep point here is, arguably, randomness is in the eye of the observer.
- millstone 7y agoI'm not sure what you mean by "effectively" a PRNG, but the big objection here is the EPR paradox. A true RNG can be stateless, but a PRNG necessarily requires state. So where is that state? It's not in the wavefunction, so we must introduce new axioms: non-local variables, or super-determinism, etc. Yuck! The MWI program is eliminating the objectionable "part two" of QM: probabilistic measurements and wavefunction collapse. But it's no progress if the replacements are even worse!
- vincent-toups 7y ago"non-local variables, or super-determinism, etc. Yuck!" All of these things are less philosophically objectionable to me than the idea that all outcomes (in some sense) "occur" or that the true substance of the universe is an inaccessible, linearly evolving, quantum mechanical wave function. I mean seriously - the latter is an enormous enlargement and modification of our ontology. Non-locality and super-determinism are actually much less objectionable. Indeed, before quantum mechanics, we were essentially _certain_ that determinism would win the day. And we only need to jettison one of them, of which non-locality seems the most plausible. In that view, spacetime emerges from some underlying non-local dynamics. This isn't particularly hard to imagine (see a Smolin paper called "Nonlocal beables" or something like that).
- joycian 7y agoThanks for calling out how the Canon interpretations of QM do not not actually save us from much of the problems that are objected to in other interpretations. Sometimes I feel like everyone just repeats what they heard as a student. Smolin's work looks interesting, thanks for the recommendation.
- defterGoose 7y agoThe whole "waves of differentiation" idea is quite an interesting one and certainly seems to me to be an almost physical description of philosophical concepts like free will and determinism. Perhaps these waves themselves interfering are what gives rise to what we consider consciousness, since what we experience subjectively is changing at every moment. Maybe the only reason we are able to "think" at all and remain "coherent" and "self-subjective" in our own brains is that these waves create images of the past on all their neighboring matter that have a continuous time-evolution. There certainly (to my mind at least) seems to be an element of randomness to thought that feels quicker and less coherent than could be easily explained even by a large-ish number of neurons with a comparable but larger number of interconnections. I dunno, it seems a little overly-philosophical but surely there are meaningful connections to be made between physical reality and the transience of subjective experience.
- vkaku 7y agoI love the post. As time passed, I've come to think of our Universe differently. When I was out of school and Physics was cool: The Universe existed, created me, I observe, things change. When I am older and all the things are being unravelled: I existed, I begin to observe, The Universe around me changes. I am not on drugs, it's how I approach our world today.
- ThePhysicist 7y agoI find this article rather hand-wavy. I mean, we have a very good understanding of the measurement process in quantum mechanics through experiments performed e.g. by Haroche's and Siddiqi's groups, which demonstrate that quantum measurements are continuous, deterministic processes. Irreversibility and the transition of a quantum state to a "classical" state can be explained very well using entanglement and decoherence, which originate from the coupling of the measured system with a very large, external quantum system. With this approach, no magical wave-function collapse or breaking of time reversal symmetry is required to explain the observed collapse of quantum oscillations after measurement. The interpretations of quantum mechanics that rely on wave-function collapse need to provide a plausible mechanism for how the irreversibility within the measurement process comes about, as a collapsed wave function is no longer time-reversible (i.e. if we would flip the sign of the Hamiltonian we would not be able to go back to a previous state as the wave function was irreversibly changed during the measurement) and I haven't seen any physically plausible attempt at this so far. So personally I still favor the many-worlds hypothesis, if only because it doesn't require invoking a so-far unknown process that destroys reversibility during quantum evolution.
- fsh 7y agoWhat do you mean by measurements being deterministic? In Haroche's cavity-QED experiments the outcome of each individual measurement is fundamentally random and cannot be predicted. Quantum mechanics (regardless of which interpretation one choses) only gives a probability distribution for the outcome of many measurements.
- ThePhysicist 7y agoQuantum measurements are not discontinuous, instantaneous processes but rather determined by the continous evolution of the joint Hamiltonian comprising the system being measured and the measurement system. You can perform partial measurements of a quantum state and even exert feedback on the quantum system to keep it at a given state (so-called quantum feedback). The outcome of a given measurement is only random because we are part of the measurement system and become entangled with it, which in combination with decoherence - due to the near-infinite number of degrees of freedom in the measurement system - leads to our experience of "quantum jumps". All of this can be explained with the Schrödinger equation alone, without the need to invoke the principle of wave-function collapse. I don't like theories that require such a wave-function collapse mechanism in order to get rid off all the extra "worlds" because they would require a physically plausible mechanism that governs this collapse and the breaking of time-reversal symmetry that it creates. It is also hard to think about a scaling mechanism that would govern the wave-function collapse: If we imagine that we will one day be able to build large quantum computers with many millions or even billions of quantum bits we will be able to couple e.g. a single qubit to the computer and perform a pseudo-random (but entirely deterministic) range of operations on the other qubits. Should we assume that at some point the wavefunction of the single qubit that is coupled to the many other qubits will collapse? In that case we should not be able to reverse the qubit to its initial state by reversing all operations performed on the other qubits. At which scale should this happen then? If we could eventually scale up the quantum computer to comprise a near infinite amount of qubits in such a way that it's able to run a simulation of a toy universe with a conscious observer in it, would that be enough to induce wave-function collapse (even if we can still reverse the deterministic gate sequence at any time)? In such a case, for each qubit state there would also be a version of the observer, each seeing a different "collapsed" wave-function of the qubit. However, we could still reverse the gate sequence of the computer at some point and bring it back to its original state, uncollapsing the wavefunction of the qubit in the process. Now, we would of course also reverse the state of the observer(s) to their/its initial one. The question is, can we restore the state of the single qubit to an uncollapsed quantum state while keeping the state of the observers untouched? And if we could do it, what would it mean for the observer(s), will we collapse their wave function in the process? Given infinitely precise control over our quantum computer we should actually be able to do it since the evolution of the quantum system is still deterministic. The more interesting question is if this reversal of the single qubit state will automatically lead to a collapse of the two observer(s) back to a single one as well (here I'm not sure but this should be calculable). In any case the conscious observer in our quantum computer would have no way (as far as I can think of) to determine whether it lives in a many-worlds quantum universe or one where wave functions collapse. We, on the other hand, would know that its a many-worlds quantum universe because we just execute a reversible, deterministic gate-sequence on the computer. Sorry for rambling, my point is that it's a very metaphysical and (mostly) irrelevant question for most physicists, and it's unlikely that we will really come up with a way of deciding this question as we are part of the system that we are trying to investigate. Answering the questions for a quantum world that we simulate in a powerful computer might be possible, but it won't tell us much about our own universe. I personally just prefer the many-worlds hypothesis since it seems more elegant and simple and does not require coming up with a new mechanism for destroying time-reversal symmetric in quantum mechanics.
- Diggsey 7y agoThe many-worlds interpretation is a good way to reason about quantum mechanics (certainly better than giving some special status to the experimenter), but it's meaningless to ask whether those other worlds really exist or not, not just because it's un-falsifiable, but also because if one defines "existence" to include alternate worlds, then every possible state of the world exists. If everything exists, then it's no longer a useful property to talk about. One can replace many-worlds with an idea similar to relativity: you can only make statements about the universe from the perspective of a particle within that universe. Things entangled with that particle are "real", and one can make statements about them, things not entangled with that particle are not real. When dealing with composite observers like ourselves, it's possible for a particle to be entangled with only part of the observer. Since entanglement propagates quickly, this is only a temporary inconvenience, but there are certainly some metaphysical questions to answer about that interim state.
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- tim333 7y ago>it's meaningless to ask whether those other worlds really exist or not Dunno - if you think of something like the two slit experiment whether the worlds where the particle goes through slit one or where it goes through slit two exist or not seems to have experimental results as they produce an interference pattern. You can also ask about more complicated situations and whether the other worlds exist may not be meaningless if they have an effect on event probabilities in ours, if only a small one.
- Diggsey 7y agoIn the many worlds interpretation, as soon as a world has "split"/"the wave of differentiation has hit"/"particles have been entangled"/"whatever terminology you want to use" from the observer, it has zero impact on any future results, not just a small impact. Until that split happens, we're just talking about our own world. It's never possible to observe any evidence for more than one world, that follows from the way we define what a "world" is. Many-worlds does not try to explain why particles have a wave function, it only tries to explain the source of the apparent randomness in the way that wave function collapses, whilst removing the need for experimenters to be in some way "special" and immune from quantum effects.
- orbifold 7y agoSomething that never made sense to me is why people think of Quantum Mechanics (the non-relativistic classical one) as fundamental. While some of its principles certainly are, clearly QFT (quantum field theory) is fundamental. From the perspective of quantum field theory there really is no observer just different field that couple to each other. Something like a measurement can in principle be described by a complicated interaction of fields (think of shining light at a double slit). The big mistery is I would rather say why the path-integral formulation of QFT (of which the principle of least action is the classical limit) agrees so well with reality.
- krastanov 7y agoThere are a couple of reasons (you alluded to them when you said some of the principles of QM are indeed as fundamental as QFT): - My favorite one is that in terms of computational complexity, the QM and QFT are equivalent. A computational machine based on the rules of QM can simulate QFT efficiently. - How does QFT describe the following situation: you have a particle created at location x that then propagates and passes through a double slit setup where you might selectively close one of the slits at any time (i.e. you measure the particle's location). Any challenges of interpretation present in QM are still present in the QFT formalism (but mathematically, both do predict the evolution of the system correctly). - While my QFT experience is limited, I have the impression that the tools for dealing withixed states it has are less developed than the ones in QM. Given that due to the previous reasons QFT does not give much new insight to the topic of measurements, it is reasonable to stick to the simpler (but equivalent in our parameter regime) theory of QM and it's more sophisticated mixed-state toolkit.
- orbifold 7y ago- Regarding your first point, I'm pretty sure this is untrue without further qualifications (which I understand that you don't mention because this a forum and not a scientific setting). In any case any such mapping would most likely be NP hard (assuming your quantum computer has q-bits that can only interact according to some graph, I would expect this to reduce to a graph isomorphism problem). - You would deal with that by writing down a path integral (see for example Feynman's PhD thesis) (btw. particle creation is not possible in non-relativistic QM). The tricky thing is that of course "closing the slit" is a very tricky thing to model in a path integral, but the situations "slit closed" and "slit open" are rather straightforward. In any case even without any computation what is clear from the path integral perspective is that nothing mysterious is going on: You are supposed to sum over all possible histories of the particle passing through the slit and hitting the screen, weighted by e^iS. If there is some temporal variability in the position of the slit, this just results in a huge complication in the integral to be carried out (if you model closing the slit by a time dependent potential let's say). The path integral is fundamentally a very good way of thinking about this, because it generalises to much more complicated settings (gauge theory etc.), whereas there really is nothing fundamental about measuring, you just happen to drastically and in a temporally complicated way change the background your quantum fields are propagating in. - On the contrary, basically QFT is the only way to deal with mixed states in a principled way. For scattering you typically start out with the assumption that things are in pure states at t=-infty and t=+infty, but in between the whole point of introducing quantum fields is to keep track of how things are spatially (plus gauge degrees of freedom etc.) "mixed". To be more specific QM is just a D=1,0 QFT, with 1 time dimension and (zero-dimensional) points as spatial dimensions. A mixed state rho is nothing more than a general quantum field on these discrete points.
- xdarnold 7y agoYour objections seem to me to arise straightforwardly from a disconnect over the definition of "you". Taking DW's position, and your axiom of unique self, I can resolve the issue by saying something like: Knowing that you can never be certain which branch you will end up in, bet on the outcome that maximizes the liklihood that you will end up in a branch you favor. Your bet, of course, will follow the form of the Born rule.
- jeremyjh 7y agoPlease explain the disconnect. In MW, there are many future "you" (or "I"), all of which will exist. The fact that they do not share information with each other doesn't change the fact that they are all you (or I). There isn't a single branch you "end up" in, you are in all of them.
- xdarnold 7y agoYour choice of the future here is arbitrary - we could just as easily say that there are many past and present "you" in the multiverse. This assumes a definition closer to DD/DW's than the author's. The author seems to assert that his experience of self is incongruous with this definition of your identity. As a historical fact, "you've" always either chosen chocolate or vanilla, not both. The other branches aren't in fact you, any longer.
- drcode 7y agoWhat is the meaning of the phrase "which branch you will end up in" given that MWI implies that all branches exist?
- Taniwha 7y agoThis has got me thinking about MW and the speed of light .... a quantum event occurs here and the universes split, that split propagates out at the speed of light ... at roughly the 'same' time a quantum event happens at Alpha Centuri ... the universe splits there and that change propagates out at the speed of light .... 2 years later half way in between the splitting universes meet - what does that mean?
- xdarnold 7y ago"Splitting" does not propagate, or happen with any locality - it's the wave function of the entire universe doing the splitting, so there's nowhere for it to propagate!
- n4r9 7y agoIt makes sense to talk about the split propagating. A subsystem which is spatially located at a distance from the splitting event will not immediately become involved in the superposition, but may do once information about the event has traveled.
- xdarnold 7y agoWhen we talk about MWI as the asker is trying to more fully understand, we are explicitly not talking about subsystems. There's just the one big evolving state (of the universe).
- n4r9 7y agoThat's true, but that global state of the universe can be written in terms of its reduced states on spatial subsystems. From this perspective we can talk meaningfully about propagating superpositions. For example, take a toy example in one dimension with three spatial subsystems A, B and C representing disjoint intervals arranged in order. Immediately after a splitting event the combined wavefunction over all subsytems might be: (psi_1 + psi_2)_A x phi_b x rho_C (ignoring normalisation for convenience) then after a certain amount of time it becomes (psi_1 x phi_1 + psi_2 x phi_2)_AB x rho_C and then eventually (psi_1 x phi_1 x rho_1 + psi_2 x phi_2 x rho_2)_ABC . Now, all of that is certainly happening within the realm of some joint superstate, but it still makes sense to talk about how fast the split propagates, surely?
- mdemare 7y agoMy rule of thumb with regard to objections to Many Worlds is that if the article discusses consciousness, or brains, in any way, it’s not about Many Worlds, but about consciousness, or brains, and I will stop reading it at once.
- EForEndeavour 7y agoYour comment enticed me to actually read the first few paragraphs of the article, skim the rest, and ctrl+f for "conscious" and "brain". In my humble opinion, your rule has raised a false positive here. The post is extremely well written and sourced, weaving a story straight from highly technical research papers. I'd suggest judging this article by itself, not a string-matching filter. Besides, isn't discussion of brains and consciousness perfectly relevant in the context of QM, given the requirement for rigorous definitions of observation, observers, etc.?
- Igelau 7y agoSure. Relevant insofar as pointing out that brains and consciousness aren't required for a quantum measurement to take place.
- mdemare 7y agoFollowing your suggestion, I’ve read it now in its entirety and I’m considering adding “subjective experience” to my axiom, but that might be too aggressive.
- lisper 7y agoIt is the nature of subjective experience that is the source of all the trouble with interpreting QM. If you ignore subjective experience, there is no problem at all: the universe is quantum, and that's all there is to it. But most people want to know why, if the universe is quantum, does it present such a convincing illusion of being classical.
- empath75 7y agoI suspect that a lot of physics on the edges of our understanding is as much about consciousness as it is about reality.
- mannykannot 7y agoThe idea of branch-counting seems untenable when we consider irrational probabilities (which they are, of course, overwhelmingly likely to be),though I think it would be begging the question to say, on that basis alone, that branch-counting is the wrong way to look at it. I think the example used to motivate branch indifference would be more persuasive if it used irrational probabilities.
- chr1 7y agoWe do not have any experimental reason to believe that "irrational probabilities" have any physical meaning. There is no method to measure them even indirectly, so a theory that operates only with natural numbers is quite plausible.
- mannykannot 7y agoThat's an interesting point. I did wonder, after posting the above comment, whether frequentists, at least, are ipso facto committed to all probabilities being rational, on account of their insistence that they are only meaningful in the context of repeated trials? (FWIW, I lean towards the frequentist viewpoint, insofar as I have a coherent position on the issue.) But then, what are we to make of physical formulae in which complex, transcendental and other non-rational numbers appear? Are they 'just' tractable approximate models of physical reality? I guess the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, at least, could be fairly characterized as such.
- chr1 7y agoAs far as i can understand all our measurements would be the same if all equations using real numbers were replaced by equations with finite precision (containing several hundred digits). The only experiment that could be different is quantum computer, because quantum fourier transform on n qubits requires at least n binary digits of precision on probabilities too. This is why some people think quantum computers won't work.
- lisper 7y ago> it would be begging the question to say, on that basis alone, that branch-counting is the wrong way to look at it. Exactly right. > I think the example used to motivate branch indifference would be more persuasive if it used irrational probabilities. What matters actually is not the probabilities but the branch weights/amplitudes (because you have to square those to get the probabilities). And those are irrational if the probabilities are 2/3-1/3.
- leiroigh 7y agoIt appears that a similar issue crops up in the interpretation of classical mechanics. That is, suppose we have our laws of classical mechanics. Hence, we have a nice way of propagating states along time. Now we want to understand thermodynamics and the arrow of time. Maths tell us that, if we slice-and-dice microstates and macrostates in a certain way, then thermodynamics is correct. In a certain way means "any non-crazy way with respect to Liouville measure" and the entire thing only holds "for sufficiently chaotic/ergodic systems". We observe (empirically / subjectively) that thermodynamics holds, and we have an arrow of time. In order to explain this observation, we need an additional axiom: (A) The universe looks like it has Liouville-random but phantastically low-entropy initial state in the far past. Liouville-random means something like "absolutely continuous wrt Liouville-measure". We could split that into (A1) Thermodynamics makes sense. The universe cares about Liouville-measure. (A2) With respect to Liouville-measure, we have a low-entropy state at some point in time (hence we can define "past (noun): In the time-direction of the designated point in time with low entropy"). In the overwhelming majority of such universes (classic trajectories), observers see things that are compatible with both thermodynamics and an arrow of time (and there is a possibility for conscious overservers to evolve). Mathematically, there are many ways of measuring phase-space volume, in a way that is invariant under time-evolution. Assuming ergodicity/chaoticity/mixing, there is only a single such way that has bounded density function with respect to "ordinary n-dim volume" (SRB-measure), and all these converge to Liouville. But it would have been mathematically conceivable to take the same evolution equations, and use a different measure that is supported on weird subsets of low fractal dimension, and end up with different thermodynamics. Hence, we need an extra axiom to separate observed reality from mathematical possibility, and single out Liouville / ordinary volume. Nobody takes issue with accepting this axiom. So why do people have issues with accepting the Born rule as an axiom? It is clear that we must add axioms to the evolution equations to explain that we care about squared-amplitude and that we have an arrow of time. Sure, you can try to prove theorems showing that alternatives to the Born rule are crazy-weird, and make the axiom weaker ("if we care about anything at all, and the thing we care about is not batshit insane then the Born rule holds"). For example, MWI tries to replace copenhagen "if humans do experiments, use squared-amplitude" with axiom "the universe cares about squared-amplitudes in a non-crazy way" plus pseudo-theorem "human-scale experiments can be approximated by Born rule". Certainly more elegant, because the universe doesn't need to care about squishy emergent approximate concepts like "humans" anymore. But it is the same axiom in the end, modulo some plausible not-quite-proven maths for the pseudo-theorem. Not-quite-proven even in the classical case: Formally proving unique ergodicity / chaoticity / fast mixing is far beyond us for almost all non-trivial systems. Just like e.g. complexity theory (we don't even have a formal proof of P!=NP, so the name of the game is "mathematical plausibility" that is spot-checked by tiny little theorems).
- mlthoughts2018 7y agoI did not like this article. I think the author incorrectly has some idea that many worlds asserts the multiverse undertakes a real “splitting” activity when observing the outcome of an experiment. It does not. Rather all the different branches have always already existed all the time, and you merely observe what branch “you” are on. When you see the outcome of an experiment, it doesn’t mean “you branched” as if the branches wouldn’t have existed if you hadn’t done the experiment. It only means your brain got knowledge about which subset of all possible universes you happen to be in. The probabilities in quantum outcomes, like all probabilities, are about subjective degrees of belief, as in they are about the state of a mind and not objective attributes of nature.
- lisper 7y ago> all the different branches have always already existed all the time How many branches are there? The answer is: there's no way to know because what constitutes "a branch" is not well-defined. So saying that "all the different branches have always already existed all the time" is meaningless because the phrase "all the different branches" is meaningless. > The probabilities in quantum outcomes, like all probabilities, are about subjective degrees of belief No, they aren't. When you listen to a geiger counter, the number of clicks it produces is an objective fact, completely independent of any sentient being's beliefs. It is also random.
- mlthoughts2018 7y agoThere would have to be an uncountably infinite number, and the surface of branches would be smooth, likely differentiable, because many experiments can have outcome spaces of uncountably infinite cardinality. > “No, they aren't. When you listen to a geiger counter, the number of clicks it produces is an objective fact, completely independent of any sentient being's beliefs. It is also random.” You are simply incorrect about this. Did the Geiger counter click or did you hallucinate or did the counter misfire or did your friend replace it with a joke Geiger counter that always clicks or did a cosmic ray hit the circuitry at just the right moment etc. The probabilities around these things are about your subjective state of knowledge, always.
- tbabb 7y agoUsing decision theory to explain quantum mechanics seems like a huge mistake for a very simple reason: It confuses "ought" for "is". Decision theory makes statements about what one should do if one wants a certain outcome. As the author points out, what statements are we making about what we want? We are free to decide that dividing ourselves and dividing an outcome are not equivalent. But really the whole idea should look silly long before we come up with such a specific counterexample: the laws of physics have no dependency on the wants of human beings, in fact the wants of human beings are fully dependent on the workings of physics (humans being physical systems), so an explanation of physics in terms of statements about wants should appear absurdly circular. There does not need to be an agent optimizing outcomes in order for the predictions of quantum mechanics to be correct. There doesn't need to be agents at all, since the laws of physics worked just fine in the billions of years before there were people. This seems a bit like dressing up the problematic Copenhagen notion of a privileged "observer" in different clothes. I have never understood what is left to be explained in many worlds, and maybe someone with deeper understanding can explain it: what is the problem with simply saying that the squared amplitude gives the fraction of the wavefunction that has evolved from the initial state into the final state? What need is there to bring probability into the physics? If we are accepting the initial wavefunction state as a premise x, and we associate each configuration in the final state y with an experience we might have, then isn't asking the "probability" of experiencing y given x, in a Bayesian sort of way, naturally, emergently the same thing as asking the fraction of [the wavefunction that evolved from all the configurations associated with x] which is associated with y? What is missing and what is the dispute? Last, what is this talk of "splitting"? I thought it was true that the wavefunction is "incompressible", in that if some measurable that becomes more confined, there is always some other measurable that becomes correspondingly less confined? That is to say, if there is some axis in state space which splits (distinguishes) universes by narrowing possibilities, there must always be some other axis that merges (confuses) universes by widening possibilities? That is to say, if ever you know more about what universe you are in, you must know less (along some orthogonal axis) about what universe you came from? I.e. for every "branch" there is a "merge".
- bcgraham 7y agoAnyone else read Neal Stephenson’s Anathem? It drew heavily from Deutsch, so it’s not totally surprising, but this argument seems pretty close to “Did you read Anathem? Because Anathem.”
- beders 7y agoWhat has the human brain to do with anything? This whole thing is philosophical at best. Physics is real whether we observe it or not. I think we settled on that one. Using subjective experience in trying to explain physical systems is bonkers.
- fsh 7y agoOn the contrary, decades of experiments violating Bell's inequality have shown that the statement "Physics is real whether we observe it or not" can only be true if we abandon locality. Non-local interpretations of QM, such as Bohmian mechanics, are however incompatible with the Standard Model which is by far the most accurately tested theory in physics.
- joycian 7y agoRealism can be salvaged in a fully deterministic theory. Note however that empirical science in a deterministic world is a strange concept. Edit: However in my opinion empirical science in a nonlocal or nondeterministic world is equally strange, if you really think about it.
- kmm 7y agoThere is no incompatibility between orthodox quantum mechanics and Bohmian mechanics, the latter makes exactly the same predictions as the former. As does any other interpretation of quantum mechanics. That's why they're called interpretations, they're ways of ascribing an ontology to or making sense of the mathematical models that are known to work so well to make experimental predictions. They're not supposed to be competing theories. There is nothing inconsistent or inherently problematic about abandoning locality, quantum mechanics has some intrinsically non-local components anyway. It speaks in favor of Bohmian mechanics that it explicitly describes this non-locality and isolates it.
- fsh 7y agoThe point is that non-relativistic quantum mechanics and therefore also Bohmian mechanics are wrong. They cannot even describe hydrogen atoms correctly! Solving this issue required developing relativistic quantum field theories. So far nobody managed to create a convincing relativistic version of Bohmian mechnics.