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I find the social aspect of this interesting. Us "smart tech people" have been pushing https everywhere for a few years now as a way of protecting internet pri
by jedberg 7y ago
I find the social aspect of this interesting. Us "smart tech people" have been pushing https everywhere for a few years now as a way of protecting internet privacy "for the masses".
And now the government found a very simple non-technical workaround. Send a message to everyone requiring a government root CA with an easy install, or their internet won't work.
Now "us techies" have to find a new technical solution to a very social problem.
It never ends. :(
- baq 7y agoTechnology enables policies both good and not so good. This is just another example of that.
- mars4rp 7y agowhat good?
- phkahler 7y agoThe goal here is to validate that one is communicating with whom they think they are. That's as pure a technical goal as you can get. Oddly this is still an unsolved problem on the internet. BTW any solution to this problem will be attacked or shot down by governments and companies around the world.
- cpeterso 7y agoBut we are in a better place than before. Without HTTPS everywhere and governments needing to ask people to install new root certs, we would not have learned about this Kazakhstan MITM issue.
- btown 7y agoYep - without HTTPS everywhere, governments would have been silently able to snoop on Internet traffic without anyone knowing.
- a3n 7y agoSarcasm? Not sure. But all a government has to do is embed within the endpoint, post-decryption. "Or else."
- giancarlostoro 7y agoIt is a valid point, it becomes much more obvious that you're snooping if you're trying to MITM. If you weren't snooping, you wouldn't bother trying.
- StreamBright 7y agoNot only that but they can happily MITM HTTPS as well. Not all the HTTPS sites use certificate pinning or HSTS.
- TeMPOraL 7y agoIt's a tough problem because certificate pinning kills a lot of legitimate use patterns; it's not something I'd like to see being the default everywhere.
- StreamBright 7y agoYes but this is how many companies protect their HTTPS traffic (including one financial institution I work for).
- cpach 7y agoWhat root cert would they us for that?
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- yjqcy 7y agoThe government of my country has at least one certificate that's trusted by Mozilla (and I guess Chrome and Windows too) by default.
- jedberg 7y agoOh I agree 100%. It just makes me sad that governments keep trying to spy and we have to keep coming up with new technology to make that harder.
- rapind 7y agoIt's not a technology problem, it's a social one. If a society values it's privacy enough then it will change. The real issue is how abstract the consequences of loss of privacy are. It requires people to actually think beyond "I've got nothing to hide". No worries though. Greedy corporations and governments are greedy and they'll keep pushing the limits of societie's tolerance until it blows up in their face.
- unityByFreedom 7y ago> It's not a technology problem, it's a social one. It's both, everyone can contribute to the solution or the problem.
- missingrib 7y agoGovernments are way scarier though. I can decide not to use Google, people in third world countries need the internet.
- syn0byte 7y agoNo. we just feel better because it just sounds so obviously reasonable doesn't it? Kazakhstan's low-tech approach is just that, low-tech and low-effort. They could have used tons of vectors besides simply saying "install this cert." A tiny shred of effort would have been to package an "updater" that did the install without explicitly saying that's what it was for. Or better yet: Kazakhstan is committed to a greener more ecologically friendly future! All tax documentation will go paperless! Just use the provided USB Key to access your documents in electronic format! A small morsel of effort would be to force it on OS vendors through regulation/licensing/threats/money for localized copies. A good deal of effort would hijack CRLs, pinnings, et al while demanding/sneaking the private keys of the CAs. Public Key Infrastructure is fucking pointless when the infrastructure is precisely what you can't trust.
- cpach 7y agoHow would they sneak the private keys from e.g. Digicert/Geotrust/ISRG?
- mdhardeman 7y agoAnd there would be no point in doing so anyway. Chrome, etc., require that certificates which descend from publicly trusted roots have their certificates published in certificate transparency logs. Someone would quickly notice bogus certs being issued and the associated root would get blacklisted.
- olliej 7y agoThis is why certificate transparency is required now - it means that we no longer need to trust the CAs to tell us when they’ve issued an unconstrained intermediate or cross signed a root. Previously it was essentially luck that led to CA malfeasance being detected. Especially in the post-finally-ending Symantec world the CAs understand that issuing any such cert is likely to very quickly end their business in most other countries. I feel the real problem kz is going to have is that they have now demonstrated that they will abuse having a root cert, so there is no way any root stores will let them in in future. I imagine they’d even have difficulty getting any of the other roots to issue certs for them (managed sub-ca I think? I forget terminology)
- tcd 7y agoWe need new measures to not allow these certificates to be installed unless they're verified, or at least the OS shows a massive giant warning "DO NOT DO THIS unless you accept this cert gives $identity access to all your data". Seems a very solvable problem.
- AWildC182 7y agoCorporations also do this so they can scan traffic for data exfil.
- smallbigfish 7y agoIs that a new word I should know?
- jcranmer 7y agoIt's a shortened version of "exfiltration"
- yusyusyus 7y agoWhich is, tbqh, a useless solution. Oh wow, now an attacker just has to include some obfuscated javascript encryption lib. Bam. Exfil detection completely bypassed.
- vbezhenar 7y agoFor example corporations might want to make sure that worker is not sending e-mails with confidential data from its gmail. Sophisticated thief surely will circumvent that kind of protection, but a lot of thieves are stupid, so simple measures actually work.
- bsder 7y agoTrue, but Joe Dipseedoodle doesn't accidentally send out an HR report because he was logged into his personal email account. Too much security is willing to give up on the 95% because they can't get the 100%.
- strictfp 7y agoThis is why I'm always advocating for political engagement for fighting these kind of issues. It's not exactly hard for a government to ban or forbid circumventing their monitoring. It does take time, but they're about to catch up.
- dmix 7y agoIt’s far harder if you have a major tech industry to push back and the whole massive security risk this exposes big corporations to. Which is something Kazakhstan must not have much of. This is also terrible for foreign investment and attracting business. It also makes foreign intelligence’s job easier.
- turk73 7y agoToo bad EPIC is caught up with stupid issues relating to whether the census can ask if illegal invaders are citizens or not?
- unilynx 7y agoYou’ve got their priorities mixed up. Staying in power is more important than foreign investment if you’re an authoritarian government. What’s the point of growing the economic pie if you’re not in a position to profit from it ? Now if you’re a politician in a democracy, you know it may be all over in about 8 years, so it’s more your interest to cosy up to the companies
- dmix 7y agoIt’s rare for a politician to only work 4yrs at the policy making level. Most of them are career politicians these days or retired wealthy people, not people with regular jobs giving politics a shot. Yet they all seem to be wealthy in the US, even after years of public service, regardless of their overt stance on business politically. Which is something the big firms can always rely on.
- tzakrajs 7y agoMaybe this sort of interruption is manageable when half of your 18 million people are rural and the economy isn't heavily dependent on internet traffic. Try doing this in a more urban populated country and you will see a much different outcome.
- vbezhenar 7y agoYou just start small, from small cities, so rest of people have enough time to prepare.
- LoSboccacc 7y agoto be fair some of us told from the beginning that making all user used to trust the green check would have caused this sort of trust fatigue to the point the majority would have stopped bothering with the actual certificate content and trust chain, and you can search my history highlighting this very issue in relation to let's encrypt, it was a social issue from the very beginning and I got downvoted heavily and repeatedly because apparently "techies" can't be bothered with exceptions and failure modes once a catch all solution is found but the warning signs were all there i.e. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17298747#17304077 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17298747#17304077
- minitech 7y agoWe don’t want users to trust the green check, because it never meant you could trust a site. We do want users to distrust plaintext, because it means the café you’re visiting can steal your password. I don’t see how this is a good criticism of the push for HTTPS everywhere (which appears to be the context here).
- LoSboccacc 7y agobecause cafe can just ask people 'install this extension to navigate' and non-tech users being users will fall for it most of the time, because state actor can do even worse, and once we trained the users that non green check is dangerous they won't have the knowledge to distinguish between "insecure with no check" and "maybe secure with check but I've to control every time the details", people will shortcut that part, until some researcher finds our for them and even then it's not guaranteed that the message will reach everyone
- XMPPwocky 7y agoExactly - this is why we don't want to train people that non-TLS traffic is insecure, but rather keep them from encountering it, ever, ideally. TLS must be the default- a baseline- and deviating from that baseline must be at least as hard as getting a user to install a malicious extension. Ever SSHed into a server and been told by your SSH client that, oh, by the way, the server is using the NULL cipher with no authentication, and network attackers can mess with your session arbitrarily? Probably not. That's what using plaintext HTTP should feel like.
- cmroanirgo 7y agoWill oscp stapling be able to be used to detect "something fishy" going on, because in that case the root ca wouldn't actually match. Do browsers compare the oscp root with the root of the current chain? Actually, if it's mitm it's "all bets are off" isn't it, because the KZ government can filter that it out the proxied response? Still, if oscp can assist at all, it's probably worth it that the browsers check for mismatch (if they don't already) Edit: typos
- vbezhenar 7y agoBrowsers always trust manually installed CA roots, because that scenario is used by many corporations to monitor their traffic. OCSP, HPKP, etc won't help.
- ralphm 7y agoFor mobile apps, though, you can bootstrap HPKP with a key built into the app. I worked on an app doing this, and it would certainly fail to connect in this scenario.
- vbezhenar 7y agoA lot of internal enterprise networks use MITM, so your app won't work there as well. It might be a good thing or not, depending on your use-case.
- ralphm 7y agoYeah, I considered this a feature. As mentioned elsewhere in these comments, we should have a way to limit the scope of corporate certs.
- jcrites 7y agoOne solution is to use Name Constraints. The organizational certificate authority could be issued with Name Constraints limiting its power to a certain domain name only, e.g. *.example.com, using Permitted Subtree. If I was setting up an organizational CA for internal websites (not MITM), I would consider using Name Constraints to limit the certificate's scope and potential for abuse or compromise.
- dmitrygr 7y agoSteganography. With a good key and enough stuffing, it is undetectable
- darrenf 7y agoDo you mean steganography? Stenography is writing in shorthand (or typing on a stenotype, like court reporters do).
- dmitrygr 7y agoautocorrect strikes again :)
- mdhardeman 7y agoIf they're scrutinizing you closely, I would not trust my life to it. If the hash of the cat gifs you're exchanging is different from others, eventually there's going to be too much or too little entropy in those pixels and they'll make a strong statistical case against you.
- ignoramous 7y ago> Now "us techies" have to find a new technical solution to a very social problem. Cert pinning does mitigate it for apps, doesn't it? The end-user doesn't need to really worry abt rouge root CAs, if my understanding is right. Traditional VPNs, P2P VPNs, Tor as a Proxy (decentralised net? dat/i2p/freenet/ipfs) could solve it generally across various use-cases, of which, VPNs are already mainstream.
- Bluecobra 7y agoNot necessarily. We have rolled out SSL inspection at my company and have to exclude certain apps (e.g. Dropbox, Google Drive) or else they won't work. The FW just blocks the connection and the user gets a SSL/TLS error.
- CobrastanJorji 7y agoSure, but then instead of the government saying "hey, run this thing or else your app won't work," they can only say "your app doesn't work now." Spying on you is still prevented.
- z3t4 7y agoI dont think pinning will work with for example letsencrypt. You can pin many certs but if you loose them all you are screwed. If you check your root cers you will likely find one from every major ISP in your country.
- tialaramex 7y agoYou would usually pin an intermediate, so for Let's Encrypt that would be Let's Encrypt Authority X3 (it might also make sense to pin Let's Encrypt Authority X4 as a backup) And er, no, the overlap between operators of public Certificate Authorities and national ISPs is very small. There are only 57 root CAs trusted by Mozilla.
- dsl 7y ago> Cert pinning does mitigate it for apps, doesn't it? Applications where the developer has pinned to their own certificate will stop this attack. Chrome and Firefox will ignore pinning for locally installed CAs. This is a very common use case in the enterprise where, for example, a bank has audit requirements to decrypt and store all workstation traffic.
- cesarb 7y agoOne of our ("tech people") main failures was that, while we made a heavy push for server authentication, we didn't make a similarly strong push for client authentication. With client certificates, MITM like that is not possible, unless the server also trusts the MITM CA to authenticate its clients (and uses a CA for the client certificates in the first place, instead of a direct mapping between users and their certificates).
- skela224 7y agoHow would the client certificates be distributed to users in Kazakhstan?
- u801e 7y agoYou could send them to the email address you used to register the account. Then install it in your browser's or OS' certificate store.
- haimez 7y agoEmail is similarly unencrypted by default and can be blocked if encrypted and being used as an active circumvention vector. Yes, mail servers outside the jurisdiction could work until https access to gmail is also blocked- but that’s not outside the realm of possibility (see: China) and also begs the question: how do you get to your secure gmail web interface if you need to receive a secure email before your first login?
- zrm 7y agoUsing CAs to authenticate clients is subject to the same attack. They block communication from any client that won't disclose its private key to the MITM box or use it to encrypt/sign whatever the MITM requires it to. You can't have security if you have a MITM that says "compromise your endpoint or we block you" and you concede to that. The only real solutions are either political or making the encrypted traffic look like some permitted traffic. (Or using a different network.)
- Florin_Andrei 7y ago> It never ends. Yeah. Fangs vs shells. Microbes vs white cells. It's just the way this universe works. The struggle is eternal. Probably built into the root parameters of the Big Bang, if you could somehow trace it that far back in time and causality (which you probably can't, I dunno).
- wedn3sday 7y agoIf this struggle ever ended, we would just find another struggle, its in our nature.
- pcwalton 7y agoI'm less pessimistic. The practical result of this is likely just going to be more business for the cottage industry of Great Firewall VPNs, which already compete with one another in traffic obfuscation against an adversary far more sophisticated than the government of Kazakhstan. Thankfully, this is currently a case in which the incentives of the market happen to align well with the goals of defeating censorship.
- mdhardeman 7y agoThe way that a real authoritarian government entity would handle that is... An agency is tasked with doing random sample captures of randomly selected target internet connections. Inventory all the types of traffic being exchanged. Flag anything that isn't obvious plaintext or already being MiTM'ed for analysis follow up. Implement new blocking rules or interception implementation for each flow that isn't already being intercepted.
- mdhardeman 7y agoIn essence, what happens is they implement a "if we can't see it, you can't see it" policy.
- zrm 7y ago> Flag anything that isn't obvious plaintext or already being MiTM'ed for analysis follow up. The failure being that the long tail of uncategorized data would be large. Do you have a good reference for what game state updates look like for every game on the internet? What about custom IoT device protocols? Every type of DRM used for media streaming? Document attachments of spreadsheets or database images containing arbitrary numeric data? How do you distinguish data like that, which outside of some headers may be indistinguishable from random numbers, from someone using the same format or protocol for encoding arbitrary encrypted data?
- mdhardeman 7y agoThey don't need to. In an authoritarian state, you just start blocking and breaking things. Everything you don't understand, you block. And then you make the user explain it to you and then if it's a use case you care about, you do the work to either decide it doesn't have any danger of carrying traffic you care about or build an intercept scheme for it.
- mtgx 7y agoI was certain I read a few years ago that Google would mandate that all OEMs would be forced to use a single unified certificate list, which I thought at the time was a way to pre-empt this sort of thing. But I can't find any new info about that anywhere. I only found an article about how to add new certificates on new Android versions in 2019, so I guess you can still change them. I wonder if Google changed its mind about this once Sundar Pichai took over and then gave Project Dragonfly the greenlight.
- pencilo 7y agoYou're thinking of https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/07/changes-to-trusted-certificate.html https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/07/changes-to...
- lostmsu 7y agoThe solution to that problem was invented and reinvented hundreds of years ago. It is called gunpowder.
- mdhardeman 7y agoThis is both uncomfortable and correct.
- gdy 7y agoRussian revolution says hello.
- stefan_ 7y agoExcept I look at the linked mailing list and you already get "us techies" arguing "uh yeah but uhm this isn't so different from the corporate CA intercept thing right so let's not blacklist it uhm". What the fuck.
- syn0byte 7y ago"So do we make our flagship product useless for the entire country or not?" - The real question
- bcoates 7y agoYes? This isn't that complicated. You break it, and when competitive browser X refuses to do so, you sell the idea that browser X is compromised for all users everywhere (not just in Kazakhstan) Stop thinking about the country with literally less than 1% of world internet users and start thinking of the reputational damage a less than charitable presentation of your collaboration with a totalitarian state against your users would do to the other 99%+ of your market.
- mdhardeman 7y agoThat's fair, but the country doing this will just fork an open-source browser and make it their official browser.
- bcoates 7y agoSure. "don't use Kazakhfox, it's malware, we've submitted definitions to the AV databases" isn't a hard sell for your 99%+ audience. Malware forks of open source projects (and closed-source software!) are not a new problem.
- mdhardeman 7y agoExcept they are a new problem when the use of them is mandated by a nation-state.
- tomjen3 7y agoA first suggestion is to ban the cert in chrome/firefox and then keep banning certs as they issue them.
- azernik 7y agoIt protects privacy for the masses in the countries where most techies live, which is what most of us were paying attention to. In places like Kazakhstan and China it's a harder problem, and HTTPS is necessary but not sufficient to solve it.
- miguelmota 7y agoUnfortunately governments like that will continue to do low effort workarounds as long as they have police and military forces to respond to those who don't conform.
- marcosdumay 7y agoIt only becomes a social problem after the society gets the tools to know that the government is messing with their communications. HTTPS is that tool. It is a social problem now, it was a technical problem problem just recently.
- wnevets 7y ago>Send a message to everyone requiring a government root CA with an easy install, or their internet won't work. but atleast we know
- jopsen 7y agoBefore we celebrate defeat, let's just acknowledge that these practices are not taking place in the US, EU, etc. And compromising HTTPS in places with a functional judicial system (and human rights) would probably be blocked by an end-less series of law suites.
- capdeck 7y agoEverything can be justified by national security. You can't try and block something with "an end-less series of law suites" if the defending party doesn't even need to provide any kind of proof. "Why are we MTiMing HTTPS? This is un-constitutional! -- Because internet is a threat to national security which in turn has higher priority than your rights, Citizen!. Everything else is classified and will be discussed in a closed court." Take a wild guess what that court is going to decide...
- Tepix 7y agoAren't some US providers (Comcast, Verizon?) injecting nasty tracking/advertising into HTTP pages? That's extremely worrying as well and it appears politics so far are unwilling to make it illegal. There needs to be more protest and more competition so consumers can vote with their wallets.
- mr_toad 7y ago> Send a message to everyone requiring a government root CA with an easy install, or their internet won't work. They’re training their entire population to install things that they get in unsolicited emails that purport to be from a legitimate source. What could go wrong?
- reeves23423 7y agoIt already exists https://www.torproject.org https://www.torproject.org .
- peterwwillis 7y agoThe solution is to warn users that their security+privacy is compromised, and let them make their own informed choice. Techies don't often see that their own wishes shouldn't trump those of individuals (but maybe we're getting into politics now) Another technical solution would have been to allow security without privacy. If the purpose of the government actions is just to monitor content, you can enable that without disabling security. The HTTP protocol could be modified to transmit checksums signed by a cert, so that a client can verify that content has not been modified, but that content can be (optionally) not encrypted, but still no content-injecting attacks can take place. But privacy advocates don't like it, so the result is either you have total security + privacy (such as it is), or none at all.