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> How can you verify that the motherboard you sent out is the one you get back and it doesn't have extra hardware inside the case? It is certainly not by obscu
by mindslight 7y ago
> How can you verify that the motherboard you sent out is the one you get back and it doesn't have extra hardware inside the case?
It is certainly not by obscuring the contents and revisions of that motherboard, such that end users can only trust it as an opaque blob.
In software land, we're smitten with this assumption that security can be made absolute. While this is true for software (Curry-Howard), it is not true for anything else (eg it's easy to cut a car's brake lines). Real world safety depends on local control, post-facto enforcement, and a general lack of maliciousness. Whereas with software we're dealing with remote access and extreme scalability (eg remotely disable the brakes on all cars of a certain make/year for the lulz, untraceably).
Attempting to extend the software security paradigm (public key authoritarianism) onto hardware is completely wrong. Device security needs to be focused on mitigating software's own "winner take all" failure mode, rather than attempting to move even more eggs into one basket.
- pbhjpbhj 7y agoIf you cut a car brake line, as long as you're allowed to look under the hood/vehicle then you'll see the brake fluid, and see the reservoir is low.