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US Senate report on Equifax breach [pdf]
- odomojuli 7y agoThe specificity of the chapter titles seem almost comical as if generated by a Markov Chain but unfortunately they are real and terrifying in their negligence.
- mushufasa 7y agoThat these titles are full sentences is brilliant. The writers know most senators, staffers, and media never read the actual reports.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- notinversed 7y agoThis report is brutal, it goes into great detail about the technical incompetence in many areas. Yet Equifax is doing better than ever. No new laws, no reform, nobody goes to jail. All the rich people get to keep their money. Thoughts and prayers.
- ilrwbwrkhv 7y agoamen brother
- coldcode 7y agoReports like these without action or repercussions may as well be printed directly to a trash can.
- 2stepsfromfree 7y agogood enough for government work
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- m-p-3 7y agoMy financial institution was the subject of an internal security breach (rogue employee who managed to get his hands on millions of customers private information like social insurance number, DOB, etc) and what do we get offered to protect from identify theft? A five year subscription to Equifax..
- ryanmarsh 7y agoWell that’s one way to earn new customers.
- kalenx 7y agoOut of curiosity (not trying to be snarky here, I really want to know), what should be offered by Desjardins? I mean, no amount of money can prevent identity theft and I do not see hundreds of ways to reduce the risks -- especially ways that do not involve Equifax or Transunion... Realistically, apart from the obvious "this shouldn't have happened in the first place", what more could they be doing?
- Nextgrid 7y agoActual money? Paid for by the executives in the form of fines, bankrupting the company if necessary.
- kalenx 7y agoExcept in this case it is not a company but a credit union. Bankruptcy just means loosing everything for its _members_. Also, sure "here's one million $". Two weeks after this money is gone because someone stole your identity and empty your account. This is the kind of thing that money simply cannot solve.
- Nextgrid 7y ago> Two weeks after this money is gone because someone stole your identity and empty your account Do people actually lose large amounts of money due to ID theft? I've always considered ID theft to be the lenders being defrauded, and while it is a huge hassle to get sorted, the real person isn't legally liable for the debt fraudulently obtained in his name. Also, if you think money is a bad idea, what else do you propose? I'd rather take money with the chance of losing it rather than no money and "credit monitoring" which doesn't actually prevent ID theft, only alerts you after it's already too late. If anything, the money idea actually makes sense as insurance for future losses due to potential ID theft.
- exabrial 7y agoThe real problem with fines and class action lawsuits is the money just goes to the federal government or the litigating law firm who takes a 50% cut. We as the people affected might see a $5 check. Unfortunately I don't think new laws would help anything, as evidenced in the past.
- paulddraper 7y ago> fines and class action lawsuits But they discourage similar behavior in the future, no?
- lisper 7y agoNot really. The shareholders are the ones who ultimately take the hit, not management. So unless there's a shareholder revolt, or the board starts firing people or clawing back compensation, the people who actually make the decisions feel no negative consequences at all.
- dabei 7y agoThere is always consequence. You only see the dramatic ones from outside.
- lisper 7y agoReally? Can you show me even a single example of a senior executive having their lifestyle meaningfully impacted? Having to downgrade to the next smaller size of private jet doesn't really count.
- deftnerd 7y agoWhat if management was fined through increased income taxes in some way? If structured right, it would prevent a 5 million personal fine to a CEO being made up with a 5 million company bonus.
- rectang 7y ago
- briandear 7y agoHow is this about “rich people?” It seems turning this into a class warfare issue is a folly. “Rich” people had their data compromised too. Rich people are also affected by credit data issues — probably more significantly than poor people. Stealing the identity of people with few assets is a lot less profitable than stealing the identity of rich people. As far as Equifax shareholders — presumably the rich people to whom you are referring, the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board has significant Equifax holdings; by crushing Equifax shareholders, you aren’t just affecting the so-called rich, but the health of pension funds which typically support the non-rich (rich people don’t rely on pensions for retirement as much.) I certainly want companies like Equifax held accountable when they break the law, but lamenting that shareholders haven’t lost money is to fundamentally misunderstand the financial system. The solution is to slowly ratchet up the unprofitably of Equifax when they do wrong so that it makes the sector less attractive over time. Simply crushing the company with a multi-billion fine would collapse the stock all at once, destroying significant percentages of pension funds which hurts the very people for whom you ostensibly feel sympathy. In short, naïve, knee-jerk reactions are dangerous for markets and can cause widespread harm. The right answer is to tighten regulations around this industry so that risk gets priced into the stock which makes it less profitable over time which gives institutional investors time to reallocate with minimal shock to those who can least afford such shocks.
- freehunter 7y agoTwo cars break down at the same time. Two people try to buy a new car, a rich person and a poor person. The rich person's car loan is denied. They buy a cheaper car, or pay to fix their broken car. They fight the credit fraud and even if it takes years, they win. Three years later they buy the new car they wanted all along. The poor person is denied a car loan. It was already the cheapest car they could find, and they don't have the money to fix the old car. They can't take time off work to go to the bank to fight the fraud, but it doesn't matter because they've already been fired due to not having a way to get to work anymore. Before they can find a new job, they're evicted from their apartment for missing rent. Tell me again how rich people are more affected by identity theft.
- Hello71 7y ago
- sickcodebruh 7y agoThis is why the idea that we can trust the market to regulate itself is completely ridiculous.
- atian 7y agoThe market decided that data breaches are not worth anything.
- mostlysimilar 7y agoThe market has no other options.
- rolltiide 7y agoThe data is worth a lot But not a cost or negative consequence to the organization that the data came from
- nickpsecurity 7y agoThe revenue that Equifax makes selling it further corroborates your position.
- souterrain 7y agoThose whose data was compromised are not equal participants in said “market”.
- paulkon 7y agoThe financial markets are for businesses, not people.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- haberman 7y agoThe market relies on a sensible legal framework of ownership and liability. Society has to decide under what circumstances a person or business can be financially liable for their mistakes. The liability should match the real-world harm. Data breaches have significant real-world harm. Unfortunately Equifax got out of this without paying fines in several state at least. It was the regulators who failed us here, not the market: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-states-agreement/equifax-avoids-fines-in-deal-with-u-s-states-over-data-breach-idUSKBN1JN2YH https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-states-agreement/... Customer data should be like radioactive waste. Companies should know that if they have it, they have to take appropriate measures to secure it, and if they don't they will take a significant financial hit. The financial penalties should be significant enough that if a business doesn't feel sure they can invest into proper security, it makes more sense to just not keep the user data.
- CyberBank 7y agoI think this is a bit short sighted and shows a lack of knowledge of the industry and the subject. I know for a fact that almost every large institution of even the slightest quality is currently in full panic mode regarding their cyber posture. Look at JPMC, spending nearly 1 billion dollars a year on cyber. I know most of the other big financials are right there as well in terms of % of revenue. In the financial industry alone, there's a huge uptick in regulatory responsibility globally for asset, vulnerability, and threat management. The SWIFT (messaging system that all major banks communicate and send money on) auditors and regulators are requiring almost all of these issues be "solved" for or having a meaningful workflow within your respective organization. Guess what happens if you don't meet it? You have a serious finding against your institution and you will struggle to do business with any of the other more mature cyber organizations that rely on SWIFT. Worse yet, when large customers request the output of these audits and findings -- if you do not comply, they will move their money. I know several of the largest financials lost massive clients and revenue due to not complying with the cyber standards set forth by SWIFT. I know for a fact within the US the OCC (governing body for financial institutions regarding cyber) is coming down very hard on the cyber posture of a lot of the banks and is making them move faster, otherwise they face a long uphill battle to expand or make significant changes within the US.
- rectang 7y agoThe focus of this report on "cybersecurity" is misdirection. Applying security patches slightly faster is not a solution — so long as the data exists, it will leak. The real problem is that Equifax treats data which rightfully belongs to individuals as its own, and the solution is to give individuals control over their own data.
- g051051 7y agoIt's not "data which rightfully belongs to individuals". It's data that belongs to the institutions reporting to the CRAs. CRAs are data aggregators. Everything they have on you was either gathered from public records or was sent to them from an institution that you do business with. The real problem is that we use publicly available, non-secret data to establish identity. Instead, we need a secure, unique personal identification system, as well as tougher punishments for people that commit identity-based fraud and theft.
- rectang 7y ago> Everything they have on you was either gathered from public records or was sent to them from an institution that you do business with. That is precisely the data that rightfully belongs to individuals. It should be much, much harder for companies to collect it and sell it. "Data is a toxic asset." — Bruce Schneier Pretending that a "secure" system can be devised which will protect that data is irresponsible, because it is impossible. The data will leak eventually. When it does, under the current regime, the damage inflicted on individual victims is wildly disproportionate. Equifax is the analogue to a gross polluter dumping dioxin into a community's backyards. But getting damages proportionate to the harm out of Equifax is hopeless, because US laws do not acknowledge the toxicity of data. The US needs something like the GDPR in order to protect us from grotesquely harmful institutions like the CRAs. We are in the early days of the internet, akin to the early days of the industrial revolution — before the harm that toxic chemical pollution causes was recognized and regulated.
- g051051 7y ago> That is precisely the data that rightfully belongs to individuals. That is precisely what it's not. Your existence isn't a secret. Things like your address, phone number, and legal information are freely available from a variety of sources. When you do business with banks or other lending institutions, you are explicitly granting them the right to exchange your payment information with other institutions and CRAs. When you seek or attain employment, you are told if the company makes use of some service like The Work Number for previous employment and salary tracking. > Pretending that a "secure" system can be devised which will protect that data is irresponsible, because it is impossible. The data will leak eventually. This is sadly true. > grotesquely harmful institutions like the CRAs Without CRAs, how would companies judge your credit worthiness? Access to credit and loans would be much more difficult, and would be much more expensive, without them. Or some similar mechanism to share that sort of information. Again, the harm doesn't come from the CRAs. A CRA doesn't grant an identity thief access to your accounts, or open credit in your name. That's the banks, CC companies, utilities, etc. who will open accounts with insufficient proof of identity. It's not the data that's toxic, it's the misuse of it. Allowing accounts to be opened or accessed with easily searched or guessed information is where the real problem is.
- halter73 7y agoMost of the security higher-ups at Equifax interviewed for this report seem pretty humble. Most admitted they made some mistakes and oversights that allowed a publically accessible Apache Struts server containing so much private data to go unpatched for months leading to the massive breach. The "former Countermeasures Manager" appears to have learned nothing from the breach however. > The former Countermeasures Manager at Equifax served in an acting and then permanent capacity from 2016 to 2017. He believed Equifax suffered a cybersecurity breach because of a “sophisticated” and “highly motivated” adversary. He added that, “if asset management was a perfect silver bullet then perhaps this may not have happened.” He told Subcommittee staff that he does not think the Countermeasures team could have done anything differently in response to the March 2017 vulnerability. He was as surprised as anyone that Equifax suffered a breach because of the “combination of the sophistication of the attack and the talent at Equifax. We had rock stars at Equifax who were de facto pillars in the field.” The former Countermeasures Manager believes the response to the vulnerability was “not only defensible, but justifiable.”
- meddlepal 7y agoPosturing for his next management/executive gig.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- kjar 7y ago“Rockstars” OK?
- lawnchair_larry 7y agoOuch. I’m pretty comfortable asserting that Equifax most certainly did not have “pillars in the field” on staff. Not to say they were all incompetent, but that’s a Trump-level exaggeration. This former Equifax “countermeasures manager” is apparently woefully unqualified for any security job. Not because they were breached, but just because of how out of touch he is with every statement he makes.
- 2stepsfromfree 7y agohttps://i.imgur.com/sohWhy9.jpg https://i.imgur.com/sohWhy9.jpg
- canada_dry 7y agoThe report outlines what can best be described as a fly-by-the-seat-of-your-pants Info Security shit-show. It's mind boggling how these folks are responsible for the credit monitoring (i.e. financial security) of millions of people. I wouldn't trust them with my family's secret brisket recipe let alone anyone's personal financial data.
- JaRail 7y agoJust skimmed the table of contents. Looks like the vast majority of the report is investigating their patch policy. Okay. Fine. It was bad. But really, I think they missed the point. What I really wanted to see was some discussion about how vulnerable the entire US identity system is in the first place. The data is mostly valuable to hackers because there's an assumption that anyone with a birthday, social security number, etc is the person they claim to be. A verified twitter account shouldn't be more secure than the best the government can offer. Governments need to step up with an modern identity system. Having one secret social security number for life is ridiculous. Having to do financial transactions in-person at a bank so you can present your driver's license and sign with a pen is ridiculous. You shouldn't need to use a social security number directly. There should be a token system where you authorize companies to reference your data. Just like using twitter to sign into another service. You verify that you're actually the owner of that identity. The US needs to learn that social security numbers were never meant to be used as identifiers. It's awful. Just fix the real problem.
- u801e 7y ago> Having to do financial transactions in-person at a bank so you can present your driver's license and sign with a pen is ridiculous. If you replace the signature with a CSR along with the drivers license/passport, then the bank can then give the new account holder the certificate. Then the account holder can use it for future online transactions.
- greedy_buffer 7y agoWhile this may be a serious problem it doesn't actually seem relevant to this breach - if a CRA has an incident of this severity, most ID schemes are still going to end up with a pretty large leak of PII that can be traced back to the individuals involved.
- rando444 7y agoThe point your parent is making is that in the US this information can be used to impersonate people. In countries with modern identity solutions, this is not possible.
- wyldfire 7y ago> While Equifax’s Countermeasures team is responsible for writing, testing, and installing signatures and rules ... With so many articles talking about Equifax's incompetence, I guess I'm a little surprised that they even have a Countermeasures team. > ... his office was using two different versions of Struts and that neither was among the versions listed as vulnerable in the alert. He requested confirmation that his conclusion was accurate and noted that the business impact could be quite heavy if he was incorrect. Sadly, the business impact ultimately seems much less significant than you might imagine. > The senior manager that the developer ultimately reported to did receive the alert but did not forward it to the developer or anyone else on the developer’s team. As a result, this developer did not receive the GTVM alert about the Apache Struts vulnerability. I wonder if individual devs could/should subscribe to these CVEs? Is that possible? Not that this dev should have, but that you might want not want to rely on your company's bureaucracy to figure out important stuff like this.
- catacombs 7y agoWhat a scathing report. What's even more horrifying by Equifax's complete incompetence before, during and after the data breach is the fact the company is still making money, no one lost his or her job and no one went to jail. I hope this report will spur Congress to hold Equifax executives accountable.
- txcwpalpha 7y ago> no one lost his or her job Eh? Both the CSO and CIO lost their jobs over this. They "retired", but that's simply a nice way of saying they were fired. > no one went to jail I struggle to see why anyone in this situation should be in jail. They did nothing illegal. At worst, as this report shows, they were woefully incompetent. If there was a person who had maliciously caused deficiencies in their security or knowingly disobeyed relevant regulations, that might be worthy of jailtime. But the moment we start putting people in jail just because they're bad at their jobs... we'd have to imprison half of the country. This is actually a huge issue with the security industry right now. It is very difficult to find qualified people to fill CISO roles because the general consensus is that their company will be hacked (either from a 0-day or from a long-lasting, hard-to-kill vulnerability that has been present since long before the new CISO arrived), and the CISO will be blamed. As it is, most qualified security practitioners would much rather choose a consulting position where they don't have to worry about being blamed. Now imagine how worse that situation would be if you started threatening every CISO who got hacked not just with being fired and publicly shamed, but with jailtime, too.
- rectang 7y agoIt should be hard to fill CISO roles because most companies collect an excess of toxic PII data. Over time, perhaps more companies will learn how to avoid aggregating such data, and gravitate towards business models with smaller liability exposure.
- txcwpalpha 7y agoPII or not, companies are still going to be hacked. PII isn't even amongst the most valuable types of data that attackers are after, nor is it the most damaging type of data for a company to lose. It should be hard to fill CISO roles because companies should have high standards and should be looking for the best of the best to fill those roles. But that's not what I'm talking about. There is a decent sized pool of qualified security practitioners that could be CISOs, but none of them want to be because the current way things work is that they will inevitably get fired and shamed for something that they had little control over. That's not good for them, and it's not good for us, because you know what's worse than a company having a lot of insecure PII? A company that has a lot of insecure PII that also doesn't have a CISO.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- brianpgordon 7y ago> Website owners install Secure Sockets Layer (“SSL”) certificates to protect and encrypt online interactions with their servers. If an SSL certificate expires, transactions are no longer protected. As part of an IT management effort unrelated to the Apache Struts vulnerability, Equifax installed dozens of new SSL certificates on the night of July 29, 2017, to replace certificates that had expired. This included a new certificate for the expired SSL certificate for its online dispute portal. The SSL certificate needed to be up-to-date to properly monitor the online dispute portal, but had expired eight months earlier in November 2016. Almost immediately after updating the SSL certificate, company employees observed suspicious internet traffic Obviously "if an SSL certificate expires, transactions are no longer protected" is just wrong, so what were they trying to say here? Maybe Equifax's internal monitoring tools were refusing to connect to the target host because of the expired cert?
- colek42 7y agoFrom my understanding the monitoring client would refuse to connect due to the expired cert.
- gist 7y agoI think says it all about how worthless (in a corrective sense) this report and investigation was: From "Recommendations (1)": > Congress should pass legislation that establishes a national uniform standard requiring private entities that collect and store PII to take reasonable and appropriate steps to prevent cyberattacks and data breaches. So there you have it. 'Reasonable and appropriate'. There is such a large amount of room to wiggle in a statement like that it is laughable (with a complex subject like this).
- txcwpalpha 7y agoI too would love to see the federal government take a much stronger role in developing strong and effective security standards, but you also have to realize that the congressional subcommittee that created this report specifically has the job of investigating situations like this, and is not intended to be a body that prescribes in-depth solutions. It should be a separate body, one with real security expertise, that does that.
- sjy 7y agoIt's not sufficient to put a bill to a vote, of course, but it's not worthless. Other recommendations could have been "prosecute Equifax executives for breaking existing laws," or "do nothing, because federal regulation won't solve this problem." The US has been making important legal decisions (about the constitutionality of bills, or the guilt of people who kill in self-defence, for example) on the basis of a reasonableness standard for centuries.
- fpgaminer 7y agoRelatedly I discovered that a credit freeze with Equifax means exactly nothing. Apparently all it takes to lift a freeze with them is your name, address, SSN, and phone number. They do not ask for the pin that was setup. They don't do any other verification. That's all you need. At least, that was the case when I did a temporary lift the other day. Imagine my horror when I sat there, pin in hand ready to punch it in, only to be presented with the successful lift screen already... > He believed Equifax suffered a cybersecurity breach because of a “sophisticated” and “highly motivated” adversary. Given my experience above, I very much doubt there was any sophistication required. You can probably go to Equifax's admin page and just punch in the name of the CEO, telephone and address for Equifax's HQ, and be on your merry way.
- g051051 7y agoThis is the best, least biased write-up of the breach that I've seen. It's still fairly damning, but the upshot is that it took a very serious second attack team to actually capitalize on the flaws that were present: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-29/the-equifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-29/the-equif...
- x0x0 7y agoOr it's a pile of nonsense from a company desperate to deflect blame. How could poor poor Equifax defend itself against foreign governments? The reality is Equifax are lazy stupid idiots who * couldn't patch well known holes in infra for months (note that a 2 engineer startup could do better by eg running rails and checking bundler-audit on every deploy); * disabled their IDP because they didn't keep a cert up-to-date; * didn't notice their disabled IDP FOR 10 MONTHS because lazy stupid incompetent; * strongly appear to have no internal access controls, so regular app users in the db could exfiltrate the entire DB without creating any internal alerts In contrast to the self-serving nonsense in the Bloomberg article, there was nothing sophisticated here. These people couldn't get the most basic things right, all part of the most very basic security posture: patch known holes. Regularly verify such patching. Run an IDP. Verify the IDP is running. Have controls around odd behavior or bulk queries for the DB users running on your front-end boxes.
- tekkk 7y agoFrom my short experience at monolithic corporations I can only sense the level of corporate bullshit that has and still is going on in that place (Equifax). It seems that when that incompetency reaches hazardous levels this is the end result. I have been thinking about why and how such systems could be mended and what I thought was, that when the majority of the system (Equifax managers, other employees) act as immovable inertia to any positive change by either obstructing or dismissing it, there should be a system in place that allows single actors to hit the so-called emergency button. But to have that kind of system in place, it requires at least one person at the top to have competency which seems to be a quite unlikely requirement. It always fascinates me that in many organizations I have been and read about, the regular employees often knew about the problems they have had and knew that something should have been done about it. I guess it's just that apathy that gets you when your superiors don't seem to care when you complain, hence causing a downwards spiral and morale deprivation.
- ExDeveloper 7y agoWhy are corporations like Equifax even permitted to exist in their current form, and collect data on individuals with whom they have no direct business relationship without their informed consent? These breaches will continue until we learn that data is more dangerous to retain than nuclear waste.
- exabrial 7y agoProbably start by having someone with a STEM degree be the chief security officer, not a music education degree.
- leesalminen 7y agoThe best developer I’ve ever met had a music degree. Performance clarinet, at that.
- manquer 7y agoWhile degrees are not required for doing a good job It is also likely you would not go to a doctor without one, A organization is interested in accountability degrees provide that validation to some extent. A degree does not mean anyone is fully qualified for a job just as not having a degree does not mean he cannot do it. The damning part in Equifax is that CISO did not have any prior experience in this domain (likely your friend has worked as developer before)
- NOTTHE1 7y agoWhy is this allowed to happen? Aren't we more advanced? Don't we want to care for one another?
- mgleason_3 7y ago"...AND SUFFERED A DEVASTATING DATA BREACH" Even the title fails to acknowledge that WE suffered from their breach. They took our most personal financial information without our permission, made money from it and completely failed to protect it. These A-#&@# should have gone to jail. The fact that people can say something as stupid as "they did nothing illegal" and possibly be correct is exactly why we need privacy laws.
- tuke 7y agoWeird how the report itself doesn't have a date.
- doggydogs94 7y agoEvery time a Windows hater slams Microsoft, I like to remind them of this exploit. It will be years before a Windows vulnerability rivals the damage from the Equifax hack.