5 ms·
Unfortunate that there's no commentary on performance impact. It's symmetric encryption on a few kB, so probably fast, but I'd like to have numbers.
by yjftsjthsd-h 7y ago
Unfortunate that there's no commentary on performance impact. It's symmetric encryption on a few kB, so probably fast, but I'd like to have numbers.
- simias 7y agoIf I understand correctly it's effectively a one-time constant cost when setting up an encrypted connection, so it should be negligible unless you have a use case for setting up many extremely short-lived connections.
- mehrdadn 7y agoSSH has multiplexing [1] specifically to speed up multiple connections... would be interesting to know whether it incurs the overheads once vs. on every connection. [1] https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/OpenSSH/Cookbook/Multiplexing https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/OpenSSH/Cookbook/Multiplexing
- LinuxBender 7y agoJust keep in mind that multiplexing makes phishing risks significantly higher. ssh wont log multiplexed auth and phished connections are auth free, up to 9 more sessions by default.
- mehrdadn 7y agoFar more important than that what I want to know is whether I should even care, e.g. is there any evidence of Spectre being used in the wild or not.
- bigato 7y agoA vulnerability that has been shown to work should not be patched in the software more widely used around the world to connect all kinds of linux/unix servers and even other systems? They should wait for it to start getting exploited "in the wild"? I'm just glad that the security of my systems does not depend on people with this kind of attitude.
- mehrdadn 7y agoWhere did I say it shouldn't be patched? I just said this is information I think a user would care to know along with the patch.
- bigato 7y agoYou said you shouldn't care if it was not found in the wild, this is just wrong
- mehrdadn 7y agoYou don't even know my requirements or how I use my computers. How do are you so confident it's "just wrong"?
- bigato 7y agoIf you want to know wheter it was found "in the wild" and think that this is a relevant factor in deciding if you should care, that is information enough about your usage to be confident it is wrong.
- mehrdadn 7y agoIt's most definitely not, but I don't get the impression you're open to seeing things as nonbinary.
- pixl97 7y agoAh yes, I too love the panicked rush of trying to force application vendors to patch once we we discover something is being exploited in the wild. Remember defense is depth is a valid strategy.
- mehrdadn 7y agoWhat I was trying to say was I think library users care to know how urgent it is. If this is being used in the wild then application vendors might need to provide out-of-band patches somehow, and end users should rush to get those patches. If OTOH this is known to be extremely hard to pull off and not known to be used, then it'd be nice for users to know that just the same. Nowhere was I trying to suggest they should avoid providing the patch altogether or something.
- bigato 7y agoThat's not how security works. If it can potentially lead to a software like openssh leaking secrets, it is of the highest urgency, period. It doesn't matter if it is thought to be hard to exploit and it doesn't matter if it was already found "in the wild".
- joombaga 7y agoOkay, but if 1 of my 3 highest urgency vulnerabilities is known to have been exploited in the wild, and is easy to exploit, then I may want to focus on that one over the other 2.
- bigato 7y agoAlright, I should have said it is "critical" instead
- mehrdadn 7y ago> That's not how security works. If it can potentially lead to a software like openssh leaking secrets, it is of the highest urgency, period. It doesn't matter if it thought to be hard to exploit and it doesn't matter if it was already found "in the wild". Really? This isn't how security works? Yeah, I guess I forgot security is a 100% binary thing. That's why you never read actual security bulletins advising you when vulnerabilities are actively being exploited in the wild. It's insane to think that should matter or raise the urgency of a patch. [1] [2] [1] https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/06/18/Mozilla-Releases-Security-Updates-Firefox-and-Firefox-ESR https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/06/18/Moz... [2] https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2019-18/ https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2019-1...
- jnordwick 7y agoNone. There hasn't even been a real world demo where given normal conditions: a running sshd and other programs where a running browser script exfiltrates a key with meltdown. Spectre probably isn't possible either and that is the easy one. The load store buffer attack seems completely impossible. Even the POC had to essentially write a program specially to be exploited. The attacks are very interesting and neat, but I think things like this and other techniques effectively remove any last chance.
- bigato 7y agoDon't underestimate what hackers with enough motivation can achieve. Specially when the stakes are so high and the geopolitical power coming from a software vulnerability can be significant.
- ryanlol 7y agoIf you need high performance why are you using OpenSSH?
- castis 7y agoThe point is that we'd like to know that its not heavily degrading to the existing purpose. No one said anything about high performance.
- tremon 7y agoWhat part of the existing purpose is performance-critical?
- castis 7y agoI dont understand the purpose of this question. The existing purpose is that it works at all?
- ryanlol 7y agoI’m really not convinced that this is a realistic concern. And anyway, what you’re posing certainly isn’t a performance concern, but a “does the software work” concern.
- castis 7y ago"I’m really not convinced". Ok great thanks, neither is anyone else, which is why we'd like numbers.
- FDSGSG 7y agoWhy do you think that this specific change would make ssh not "work at all" as opposed to the hundreds of other changes that happen? Do you even pay close attention to those changes? I for sure don't. Why are you concerned about this in the first place? Obviously there's always a general concern about any changes, but what makes this specific change a big deal to you?
- dangerface 7y agoIt's not mentioned because it's irrelevant. There is no security / performance trade off for a secure program. It's secure or its not.
- archgoon 7y ago> It's secure or its not. Then there is no concept of "improves" security. Either it is now secure or it is not. Do they have proof that there are now no side channel attacks that can be made on their software? EDIT: sigh This comment is not arguing that they need a proof for their change. It is arguing that you can improve security without making something completely secure, which undermines the idea that code is 'either secure or it is not'.
- simias 7y agoThere are a lot of knee-jerking in this thread. I don't think anybody is arguing that this is a bad patch, but if it does have a notable performance impact (which it probably does not) it's still worth knowing. If only to be able to answer questions like "why do our backups suddenly take 10% more time to complete? Do we have a problem with our network infrastructure?" It's not about tradeoffs, it's about understanding what's going on and anticipating potential problems. By your logic we shouldn't have to discuss the performance regressions on CPUs who implement spectre/meltdown mitigations because "it's irrelevant". Obviously these patches are necessary but the performance impact is very relevant for many users.
- archgoon 7y agoBy the parent's logic, there's no concept of improving security, because if there remains attacks, then it is still not secure. You can't take a position of "it's either secure or it isn't."
- yjftsjthsd-h 7y agoI don't think that makes sense. For starters, threat model is everything. To grab an obvious example here, speculative execution attacks are only a concern if an attacker can cause execution of code on your physical host. A secure program facing the network will be secure even if it fails to defend against CPU side channels. Further, reducing to a binary de facto means that literally everything is "insecure", the end. (I defy you to show me a piece of software that never has had any vulnerabilities and never will, since of course undiscovered bugs still make the system insecure)
- blattimwind 7y ago> Unfortunate that there's no commentary on performance impact. It's symmetric encryption on a few kB, so probably fast, but I'd like to have numbers. TFA comments on the performance impact. It's only about the handshake, i.e. irrelevant.
- Dylan16807 7y agoSaying it's about the handshake is not a comment on performance impact, and doesn't need a patronizing "TFA". Especially when the article just talks about 'signatures', in a way that doesn't make it obvious exactly when this key is being used. This code is probably not adding more than a millisecond, but it's not at all true that handshake speed is irrelevant. If you rewrote the RSA code in a slow secure way, going from 100ms to 5s on a slow chip, that would have very real effects.