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That first crash is a good example of multiple minor problems joining together to create a disaster. 1. "they didn't even get as far as switching off the stab

by burfog 7y ago

That first crash is a good example of multiple minor problems joining together to create a disaster. 1. "they didn't even get as far as switching off the stab trim" means they were incompetent. 2. MCAS, obviously, was a bad design 3. there was a physical issue with the sensor, possibly due to a bird strike Fix any one of those, and the flight wouldn't have crashed.

pbhjpbhj 7y ago
>means they were incompetent // I thought a central part of this was that there was according to Boeing no need to train on this particular aircraft because it was so close operationally to the 737NG. But that in fact the correct response in the particular situation is vastly different. So yes, kinda "incompetence" but more "ignorant due to Boeing's assertions that training wasn't needed"; ie the blame should not primarily rest on the pilots.(?) I'm ignorant on the details, but this sort of article seems convincing: > It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present. > How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere; neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with the 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week. > (https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/ https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for...) //

by burfog 7y ago

pbhjpbhj 7y ago

>means they were incompetent // I thought a central part of this was that there was according to Boeing no need to train on this particular aircraft because it was so close operationally to the 737NG. But that in fact the correct response in the particular situation is vastly different. So yes, kinda "incompetence" but more "ignorant due to Boeing's assertions that training wasn't needed"; ie the blame should not primarily rest on the pilots.(?) I'm ignorant on the details, but this sort of article seems convincing: > It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present. > How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere; neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with the 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week. > (https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/ https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for...) //