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it’s not just pr reasons. they tried to hot patch this airplane design with software, and now they are hot patching that fix. it seems it is a fundamentally fla

it’s not just pr reasons. they tried to hot patch this airplane design with software, and now they are hot patching that fix. it seems it is a fundamentally flawed design that they tried to hide and get away with rather than doing the right thing. i know i don’t want to fly on a 737 max ever, and this whole ordeal with boeing and the faa has made me less confident in the airline industry as a whole. your parenthetical still shows some finger pointing towards “poor” countries’ pilots and ignores the number of crashes and reports for as young as this plane is and the numbers in use.

skellera 7y ago
Pilots are highly trained. They go through many hours of simulated flights. After an incident like this, any pilots still flying a MAX will be drilled on this specific failure. If you start to see pilots refuse to fly it, that’s when you should worry. Aviation adapts to problems and it always has. Southwest installed additional gear on their planes to help prevent this when the first plane crashed. It’s not far fetched that companies in countries with lesser regulations might skip out on training or plane enhancements that would lessen the chances of this problem.
- hirowan 7y ago
  > After an incident like this ... Clearly, that didn't happen, or a second MAX wouldn't have crashed under very similar circumstances. > Southwest installed additional gear on their planes to help prevent this when the first plane crashed. Southwest ordered the MAX with an AoA indicator; it wasn't retrofitted. > ... to help prevent this ... It's questionable whether the AoA indicator would've made a difference. However, an AoA disagree alert that is standard in the previous 737 gen was "accidentally" made part of the AoA indicator extra feature set on the MAX, and the AoA disagree just _might_ have made a difference. [1] > It’s not far fetched that companies in countries with lesser regulations might skip out on training or plane enhancements that would lessen the chances of this problem. An AoA indicator is not mandatory anywhere in the world. [1] https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/05/06/boeing-angle-of-attack-disagree-alert/ https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/05/06/boeing-angle-of-att...
- codedokode 7y ago
  I doubt that. Pilots get used to flying on an autopilot and often make mistakes when they have to control everything manually. Recent example is a crash of SSJ100 in Moscow where the pilots failed to land the plane manually when the computer turned off. If you make controls more complicated, pilots will make more mistakes in critical situation.
skybrian 7y ago
The fix taking a while to get right is not evidence for "fundamentally flawed". You have a strange idea about how to assess risk. It's like faults are somehow contagious.
- jschwartzi 7y ago
  The notion that you can fix an aerodynamic stability problem in software by making a software program mimic the flight characteristics of an older plane is fundamentally flawed. And the notion that we can just patch the system later if it turns out you did it wrong is dangerous. You're betting with human lives that this time you've got it right.
  - TomVDB 7y ago
    Why is it fundamentally flawed? There’s no question that Boeing’s implementation had major issues, but there is IMO a higher burden of argument(?) to declare that a fundamental inevitability. This could simply be a case of Boeing incompetent/reckless/...
- Aeolun 7y ago
  > It’s like faults are somehow contagious. They are. If 737 MAX was rushed to market and this is the first issue we become aware of, how many more are hidden? If Boeing makes a habit of rushing planes to market without certification, how many more ticking time-bombs are flying around?

skellera 7y ago

Pilots are highly trained. They go through many hours of simulated flights. After an incident like this, any pilots still flying a MAX will be drilled on this specific failure. If you start to see pilots refuse to fly it, that’s when you should worry. Aviation adapts to problems and it always has. Southwest installed additional gear on their planes to help prevent this when the first plane crashed. It’s not far fetched that companies in countries with lesser regulations might skip out on training or plane enhancements that would lessen the chances of this problem.

hirowan 7y ago
> After an incident like this ... Clearly, that didn't happen, or a second MAX wouldn't have crashed under very similar circumstances. > Southwest installed additional gear on their planes to help prevent this when the first plane crashed. Southwest ordered the MAX with an AoA indicator; it wasn't retrofitted. > ... to help prevent this ... It's questionable whether the AoA indicator would've made a difference. However, an AoA disagree alert that is standard in the previous 737 gen was "accidentally" made part of the AoA indicator extra feature set on the MAX, and the AoA disagree just _might_ have made a difference. [1] > It’s not far fetched that companies in countries with lesser regulations might skip out on training or plane enhancements that would lessen the chances of this problem. An AoA indicator is not mandatory anywhere in the world. [1] https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/05/06/boeing-angle-of-attack-disagree-alert/ https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/05/06/boeing-angle-of-att...
codedokode 7y ago
I doubt that. Pilots get used to flying on an autopilot and often make mistakes when they have to control everything manually. Recent example is a crash of SSJ100 in Moscow where the pilots failed to land the plane manually when the computer turned off. If you make controls more complicated, pilots will make more mistakes in critical situation.

skybrian 7y ago

The fix taking a while to get right is not evidence for "fundamentally flawed". You have a strange idea about how to assess risk. It's like faults are somehow contagious.

jschwartzi 7y ago
The notion that you can fix an aerodynamic stability problem in software by making a software program mimic the flight characteristics of an older plane is fundamentally flawed. And the notion that we can just patch the system later if it turns out you did it wrong is dangerous. You're betting with human lives that this time you've got it right.
- TomVDB 7y ago
  Why is it fundamentally flawed? There’s no question that Boeing’s implementation had major issues, but there is IMO a higher burden of argument(?) to declare that a fundamental inevitability. This could simply be a case of Boeing incompetent/reckless/...
Aeolun 7y ago
> It’s like faults are somehow contagious. They are. If 737 MAX was rushed to market and this is the first issue we become aware of, how many more are hidden? If Boeing makes a habit of rushing planes to market without certification, how many more ticking time-bombs are flying around?