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> I find the argument that it's impossible to make this configurable because malware could then circumvent it very weak. If we're talking about that level of in
by Vinnl 8y ago
> I find the argument that it's impossible to make this configurable because malware could then circumvent it very weak. If we're talking about that level of interference, anyone with access to the Firefox executable could in theory replace it, and given the open source nature of the Firefox codebase this wouldn't be particularly difficult technically for anyone willing to go to such lengths in the first place.
As mentioned in GGP's quote, Firefox was specifically modified by popular software by Fortune 500 companies and laptop companies, which feel safe enough to modify user preferences, but not to replace the Firefox executable. This does specifically fix that real-world attack vector.
> In any case, even if the argument about hard-coding protection into the executable did stand up to scrutiny, there are alternatives possible instead of retrospectively disabling addons with no possible workaround. Perhaps most obviously, you could show a warning message and require explicit user approval at startup before activating the addon, for example, as is already done with various other useful features that are also potentially open to abuse.
I think that would be categorised as an option "that these greyware apps [could] change and plausibly claim they were acting on behalf of the user’s “choice” not to opt-out of the light grey checkbox on page 43 of their EULA".
> As things stand, far from protecting our privacy and security from malicious addons, the current system in fact deactivated all of our privacy- and security-protecting addons, without warning, right in the middle of browsing sessions.
That this happened was a risk, and they're taking active measures in the future. The other was a certainty, and this risk was the active measure they were taking against it.
- pbhjpbhj 8y agoIn reality the issue of Fortune 500 companies attacking users and hacking their computers should be addressed legally too. Are Mozilla currently helping any organisations to sue these companies? Is there more detailed evidence provided on this somewhere? Like which companies and exactly what they did?
- Vinnl 8y agoI don't know about that, sorry, but the wording does seem to imply to me that the legality of changing configuration options was covered by a EULA or something, and replacing the executable would not be.
- Silhouette 8y agoI think that would be categorised as an option "that these greyware apps [could] change and plausibly claim they were acting on behalf of the user’s “choice” not to opt-out of the light grey checkbox on page 43 of their EULA". Sorry, but I don't really see how. We've been using click-to-play safeguards on embedded content for years, and they have proved highly effective at stopping abusive or outright malicious content in Flash, Java applets, etc. Why couldn't a similar safeguard be used to isolate untrusted addons but still give users the option to override and run them in the current session if they really do want to? I don't see why such a mechanism would be more vulnerable than any other hard-coded browser behaviour, including refusing to run those addons at all. If you made the behaviour configurable via a persistent setting then obviously that could be subject to external modification, but you don't have to do that here. That this happened was a risk, and they're taking active measures in the future. The other was a certainty, and this risk was the active measure they were taking against it. I respectfully disagree with this stance. That malicious sites are actively compromising user privacy is also not a risk, it is a certainty. That addons to block unwanted content have stopped malware from exploiting browser vulnerabilities and infecting user systems is also not a risk, it is a certainty. It would take substantial evidence to convince me that the risk from greyware apps was really greater than the risk of privacy and security invasions across the entire Web.
- Vinnl 8y ago> Sorry, but I don't really see how. We've been using click-to-play safeguards on embedded content for years, and they have proved highly effective at stopping abusive or outright malicious content in Flash, Java applets, etc. But other software on the user's computer wasn't trying to work around those safeguards. That's the main attack vector, as I understand it. > That malicious sites are actively compromising user privacy is also not a risk, it is a certainty. Absolutely, and as far as I'm aware that's also something that Mozilla's actively taking measures against. > That addons to block unwanted content have stopped malware from exploiting browser vulnerabilities and infecting user systems is also not a risk, it is a certainty. Sure, in hindsight it is, but I wouldn't have predicted a week ago that it was about to happen, and as far as Mozilla is able to predict future occurrences they are taking measures against it as well.