7 ms·

I think part of the blame can be placed on the airlines. They willingly didn’t buy the Warning light

ulfw 7y ago
You’re right and wrong. It’s not about ‘they willingly didn’t buy the warning light’ but it was indeed American Airlines who pushed Boeing into making another shortcut warmed up 60 year old design plane with the 737max by asking for a quick lower cost plane. Lower cost that could only be achieved by lower kerosine sucking engines (which didn’t fit under the 737) and by ‘oh god forbid we do not want to train pilots’ type rating commonality. Let’s not forget that the whole “we only got training via an iPad lesson” is exactly what American et al wanted. They wanted to save money on simulator lessons / new typerating training.
phire 7y ago
The airlines thought they had the warning light. Boeing thought they had delivered the warning light all airlines as a default. It was only later that Boeing discovered they messed up and had made the warning light dependant on another feature which was optional. And then Boeing didn't tell airlines about the broken warning light until just a few months ago.
- jordache 7y ago
  what a cluster F of permissions management F Boeing
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]
mort96 7y ago
Hmm, I don't know. It seems reasonable for an airline to think that A) the standard plane is more than safe enough (as it should be), and that B) other airlines will have a competitive advantage if they don't opt for the warning light. We can certainly blame them for putting profits above safety by taking calculated risks, but I don't think we can expect companies to act otherwise, at least under current economic systems. Really, it's Boeing, and governmental oversight bodies, who were in the best position to know if the plane was dangerous without a warning light, and therefore to make sure all planes have a warning light.
simion314 7y ago
Really, if you buy a car with 6 airbags that are missing is your fault that you did not bought the model that included an extra airbag ? You were tricked to believe you were safe, Required safety features should not randomly be present if I don't buy extra packages. Edit What if they also forgot to enable other things, it is possible that this warning is one of a couple of things that got rushed and not properly tested.
kjar 7y ago
Making a safety feature costing a small fraction of the plane is straight up dumb and irresponsible- Boeing F’d up hard and are now in CYA mode
nraynaud 7y ago
Nope, they left out the angle of attack indicator which their pilots are not trained to use. They had no clue that they were leaving the disagree indicator with it and that this indicator was crucial for an MCAS that they didn’t know existed, and why doesn’t the MCAS handle the disagree correctly while the autopilot can?
- inferiorhuman 7y ago
  why doesn’t the MCAS handle the disagree correctly while the autopilot can? The autopilot systems cannot cope with AoA disagree, that's why MCAS came into play. The Ethiopian pilots (for some reason) kept trying to engage autopilot. Unfortunately for them MCAS is only needed when autopilot is disabled.
  - cmurf 7y ago
    It is correct to say the autopilot disconnects, and will not reconnect, when there's AoA disagreement. This is mentioned in the emergency Airworthiness Directive as one of the indicators for MCAS upset. It's not unusual to engage autopilot during climbout, I only see one explicit instance in the preliminary report for autopilot engagement, and two warnings, and two disconnects.
  - nraynaud 7y ago
    That’s ignoring cat III landings. When landing in dual autopilot there is no disengage possible.
  - FabHK 7y ago
    AFAIK, the autopilot disengages when there's an AoA disagree (=handling it correctly), while MCAS doesn't disengage, instead diving the plane into the ground (=not handling it correctly).
  - Someone1234 7y ago
    > The autopilot systems cannot cope with AoA disagree, that's why MCAS came into play. The Ethiopian pilots (for some reason) kept trying to engage autopilot. Unfortunately for them MCAS is only needed when autopilot is disabled. Factual errors in this post include: - MCAS wasn't designed because "autopilot systems cannot cope with AoA disagree." MCAS couldn't handle AoA disagree, that's the whole crux of the problem. - MCAS wasn't enabled at all when autopilot was. Only manual flying. - MCAS was designed to simulate the non-Max 737's thrust curve to maintain a similar type rating FOR PILOTS. It had nothing to do with autopilot at all. - The Ethiopian Airline pilots never tried to enable autopilot, and didn't "keep trying to engage autopilot" that's pure fiction. MCAS used trim to counter-act an overeager upwards angle during key parts of the flight like take-off. It used electronic trim to accomplish this and a single AoA sensor to determine when. The Ethiopian Airline pilots, per the initial crash report, correctly disabled the electronic trim system (both disabling the yoke trim switch and MCAS). However were unable to manually re-trim the aircraft using the trim wheels due to the aerodynamic forces placed on the aircraft (via hard trim counteracted by hard elevator). This forced the Ethiopian Airline pilots into a difficult choice; and they ultimately decided to re-enable electronic trim and use the yoke trim switch (which is more powerful) to fix the trim. Unfortunately MCAS trimmed the aircraft further, they lost control, and the aircraft crashed. At no point did autopilot play any role in the crash.

ulfw 7y ago

You’re right and wrong. It’s not about ‘they willingly didn’t buy the warning light’ but it was indeed American Airlines who pushed Boeing into making another shortcut warmed up 60 year old design plane with the 737max by asking for a quick lower cost plane. Lower cost that could only be achieved by lower kerosine sucking engines (which didn’t fit under the 737) and by ‘oh god forbid we do not want to train pilots’ type rating commonality. Let’s not forget that the whole “we only got training via an iPad lesson” is exactly what American et al wanted. They wanted to save money on simulator lessons / new typerating training.

phire 7y ago

The airlines thought they had the warning light. Boeing thought they had delivered the warning light all airlines as a default. It was only later that Boeing discovered they messed up and had made the warning light dependant on another feature which was optional. And then Boeing didn't tell airlines about the broken warning light until just a few months ago.

jordache 7y ago
what a cluster F of permissions management F Boeing

deleted 7y ago

[deleted]

mort96 7y ago

Hmm, I don't know. It seems reasonable for an airline to think that A) the standard plane is more than safe enough (as it should be), and that B) other airlines will have a competitive advantage if they don't opt for the warning light. We can certainly blame them for putting profits above safety by taking calculated risks, but I don't think we can expect companies to act otherwise, at least under current economic systems. Really, it's Boeing, and governmental oversight bodies, who were in the best position to know if the plane was dangerous without a warning light, and therefore to make sure all planes have a warning light.

simion314 7y ago

Really, if you buy a car with 6 airbags that are missing is your fault that you did not bought the model that included an extra airbag ? You were tricked to believe you were safe, Required safety features should not randomly be present if I don't buy extra packages. Edit What if they also forgot to enable other things, it is possible that this warning is one of a couple of things that got rushed and not properly tested.

kjar 7y ago

Making a safety feature costing a small fraction of the plane is straight up dumb and irresponsible- Boeing F’d up hard and are now in CYA mode

nraynaud 7y ago

Nope, they left out the angle of attack indicator which their pilots are not trained to use. They had no clue that they were leaving the disagree indicator with it and that this indicator was crucial for an MCAS that they didn’t know existed, and why doesn’t the MCAS handle the disagree correctly while the autopilot can?

inferiorhuman 7y ago
why doesn’t the MCAS handle the disagree correctly while the autopilot can? The autopilot systems cannot cope with AoA disagree, that's why MCAS came into play. The Ethiopian pilots (for some reason) kept trying to engage autopilot. Unfortunately for them MCAS is only needed when autopilot is disabled.
- cmurf 7y ago
  It is correct to say the autopilot disconnects, and will not reconnect, when there's AoA disagreement. This is mentioned in the emergency Airworthiness Directive as one of the indicators for MCAS upset. It's not unusual to engage autopilot during climbout, I only see one explicit instance in the preliminary report for autopilot engagement, and two warnings, and two disconnects.
- nraynaud 7y ago
  That’s ignoring cat III landings. When landing in dual autopilot there is no disengage possible.
- FabHK 7y ago
  AFAIK, the autopilot disengages when there's an AoA disagree (=handling it correctly), while MCAS doesn't disengage, instead diving the plane into the ground (=not handling it correctly).
- Someone1234 7y ago
  > The autopilot systems cannot cope with AoA disagree, that's why MCAS came into play. The Ethiopian pilots (for some reason) kept trying to engage autopilot. Unfortunately for them MCAS is only needed when autopilot is disabled. Factual errors in this post include: - MCAS wasn't designed because "autopilot systems cannot cope with AoA disagree." MCAS couldn't handle AoA disagree, that's the whole crux of the problem. - MCAS wasn't enabled at all when autopilot was. Only manual flying. - MCAS was designed to simulate the non-Max 737's thrust curve to maintain a similar type rating FOR PILOTS. It had nothing to do with autopilot at all. - The Ethiopian Airline pilots never tried to enable autopilot, and didn't "keep trying to engage autopilot" that's pure fiction. MCAS used trim to counter-act an overeager upwards angle during key parts of the flight like take-off. It used electronic trim to accomplish this and a single AoA sensor to determine when. The Ethiopian Airline pilots, per the initial crash report, correctly disabled the electronic trim system (both disabling the yoke trim switch and MCAS). However were unable to manually re-trim the aircraft using the trim wheels due to the aerodynamic forces placed on the aircraft (via hard trim counteracted by hard elevator). This forced the Ethiopian Airline pilots into a difficult choice; and they ultimately decided to re-enable electronic trim and use the yoke trim switch (which is more powerful) to fix the trim. Unfortunately MCAS trimmed the aircraft further, they lost control, and the aircraft crashed. At no point did autopilot play any role in the crash.