16 ms·
Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding
- rootusrootus 8y agoStill making more than one a day. Maybe they're running out of places to park 'em.
- tus87 8y agoIf by places you mean customers that sounds about right.
- kyrra 8y agoIncorrect. They still have a backlog of 4600 planes to deliver. And they aren't laying anyone off. https://www.npr.org/2019/04/05/710477435/boeing-to-slow-production-of-737-max-jets-as-it-works-on-flight-control-software https://www.npr.org/2019/04/05/710477435/boeing-to-slow-prod...
- tus87 8y agoThen why are they slowing production? Interesting how the article doesn't explain that. > had a common link of a malfunctioning flight-control software called MCAS. My understanding is the software was fine, it was faulty sensors with no redundancy and poor feedback displays to pilots.
- testuser2131 8y ago> My understanding is the software was fine, it was faulty sensors with no redundancy and poor feedback displays to pilots. And who is managing one sensor only or not providing the feedback? The MCAS software
- jdsully 8y agoIf the planes aren't allowed to fly, then they won't have any place to put them. Boeing Field is pretty small.
- saryant 8y agoThe FAA will grant special permits for flying grounded planes without passengers. This isn't that big of a problem.
- inferiorhuman 8y agoMy understanding is the software was fine, it was faulty sensors with no redundancy and poor feedback displays to pilots. The software is quite flawed (and operates differently than how it was described to the FAA) but there are two (thus redundant) sensors being used in a not-so-redundant manner.
- foobarbazetc 8y agoDenial is the first stage... :)
- panarky 8y agoNot only a longer grounding, but some airlines are canceling orders and many passengers don't want to fly in them. The 737 Max could become the Edsel of airplanes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edsel https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edsel
- rpiguy 8y agoUnlikely as there are no readily available replacement planes for airlines who need to replace their fleet. Airbus can only produce so many, the supply chains and production facilities just aren’t there. Even if Airbus somehow magically increased their production by 50%, Boeing would still sell 2000+ 737 MAX planes (or the previous generation 737 models)
- rootusrootus 8y agoHistory suggests that people will forget this very quickly. I wouldn't be surprised to see Boeing 'rebrand' the plane as 737-8, but it probably won't be necessary.
- rwc 8y ago737-8 already exists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Next_Generation#737-800 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Next_Generation#737...
- rootusrootus 8y agoThe 737-800 is a 737NG. The model number for a 737 MAX-8 is 737-8. That's why I put rebranding in quotes -- it's already the official designation for the plane. I could see them dropping the public "MAX" branding from what they print on the side of the plane and just calling it 737-8 (and -7, and -9, for the other models) everywhere.
- adrr 8y agoI won’t fly one unless it has 3 angle of attack sensors. Since that can’t be easily found out, I’ll avoid them.
- tus87 8y agoI wonder how high the scandal goes. I mean does the CEO have to sign off on design decisions like the engine misplacement on the MAX?
- heymijo 8y agoGood question. This is not my domain, but it reminds me of financial fraud, accountability of those at the top, and the consequences they face. I was studied accounting in the wake of the major accounting scandals of the late 90's/early 00's. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was passed. It states that the CEO and CFO are directly responsible for their company's financial statements. AIG was the first major accounting fraud post Sarbanes-Oxley. Investigated by the SEC, determined non-criminal, CEO stepped down, and that was his consequence. [1] Boeing's CEO, Dennis Muilenberg, has the blood of 346 people on his hands. He is at the top, it is his organization, and his responsibility. I hope an investigation determines if it is criminal. I think one of the major shifts I would like to see in our society is holding those in power to account. Whether it's accounting, aviation, banking, it doesn't matter. As it stands those at the top rarely pay for their malfeasance. [1] https://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=honors_proj https://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&cont...
- bilbo0s 8y agoI'm pretty familiar with how all this works on the FDA side with medical devices/software. If it's the same general setup as on the medical side with the FDA, then it's a virtual certainty that liability will fall with some compliance and QA types, as well as any engineers or engineering managers who signed the relevant documents. Those signatures are all legally binding, and represent to everyone up the chain that the systems in question are functioning properly. If the government can show that the systems in question could not have been functioning properly, they got you. (Another thing we learned from our lawyers about the FDA side, each document that you signed, represents one count of lying to the federal government at a minimum. Multiply that by the number of documents signed to get a single system through, and you get an idea of why you should never sign anything if you have any reservations at ALL. No matter how slight the reservation. No matter how much pressure the higher ups put on you. I think the rules are the same on the FAA side. So these guys have really stepped in it.) That said, they may be able to snag a few executives here or there, but only if they can prove who knew what, and when. Execs, you would think, would be pretty careful about liability type things, so they could look very hard and not find anything on any of the execs. It would not be collusion or preferential treatment, it's just hard to find that kind of a smoking gun in a mountain of electronic documents and messages. (I strongly suspect that if the government were to press hard enough though, that some of the engineering managers and compliance types would turn state's evidence to get lighter sentences. At that point, you could probably get some execs I'd imagine? Still might be hard though.) The engineers and QA/Compliance folks, though, should really be consulting with outside counsel. Just as a precautionary measure. I wouldn't trust Boeing execs to not throw me under the bus. And this time around, it looks like a pretty big bus. I don't think you survive this hit.
- tibbydudeza 8y agoLike the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.
- Retric 8y agoAt best, stricter regulations may have resulted in a different design to comply with US regulations. The FAA is not a global organization, they don’t have oversight over any of the crashed aircraft. So, it’s tricky to place blame on US regulators for foreign crashes.
- jeltz 8y agoThat just means FAA wasn't the only inept organization.
- Retric 8y agoBlaming EASA/FAA/Boing etc feels good, but calling them inept becase they are not perfect is overstating things. Looking back it seems like an obviously bad call, but that’s hindsight bias.
- jeltz 8y agoI did not blame FAA, I was just pointing out why your logic was flawed. Just because the plane crashes did not happen in the US does not mean that the FAA may not be at fault. The FAA had approved the plane and it was operated the same way in Africa as in the US so it is just chance that none of the crashes happened in the US.
- Retric 8y agoFAA has many regulations that most of Africa does not. So, no they where not operated in the same fashion. It’s still been grounded in the US for good reasons, but you can’t take individual regulations in isolation.
- jarym 8y ago“This came so quickly and was steep” Somewhat poor choice by the writer here given the association.
- jayalpha 8y agoROTFL
- foobarbazetc 8y agoThis plane is dead. People just haven’t accepted it yet.
- cryptonector 8y agoI think that would be unfortunate. I don't think it should die over this. The issues are eminently fixable. But a number of executives may have to exit Boeing, and the FAA, in order for the plane to not die, and all the issues must be fixed of course.
- tanilama 8y ago> The issues are eminently fixable Not really. I am no expert, that is why I no longer trust FAA/Boeing telling me it is safe any more, at least in this particular case. As a passenger, I would avoid buying tickets from this plane even it means more cost
- DuskStar 8y agoWhat about it isn't fixable? Redundant (and thus more reliable) AOA sensors + a less aggressive MCAS system that at maximum displacement can't override the yoke would be more than enough of a fix for me.
- m_mueller 8y agoNot GP but I'm mainly wondering about the likelihood of departure stalls with this design.
- cryptonector 8y agoIn the event that MCAS is disabled, the pilots will have to work harder to notice impending stalls and prevent them. Which is why this requires training.
- 8y ago
- smaili 8y agoPrimary tldr's: > Boeing hasn’t announced what the second software problem is. LNA is told it is the interface between the MCAS upgrade and the Flight Control System, but specifics are lacking. > LNA interprets these combined events as indicative the MAX will be ground well past the Paris Air Show in June.
- test6554 8y agoFixed Title: A halt in the production of Boeing MAX airplanes is a sign that they will be grounded for a long time.
- andrewflnr 8y ago> (((Boeing MAX) production) cut) signals (long grounding) I had a heck of a time parsing that. I kept trying to read the "grounding" as something related to electrical grounding, wondering what "long grounding" was in that context and how Boeing had screwed it up
- salawat 8y agoPutting on the Wild Ass Guess hat. I remember reading that the MCAS system uses the exact same physical contacts as the pilot's electrical trim adjustment switches. I'm wondering if they're trying to change their software implementation to more cleanly separate the two abstractions in the code in order to avoid having to do a hardware or firmware change on the jackscrew motor controllers. If before, the signalling was such that the signalling was handled as a sort of one off block jammed into some function somewhere, they may now have to be doing much more thorough refactoring to separate out those interfaces, and improve the traceability, testability, and readability, all with the overhead of a system likely reclassified to "catastrophic" system hazard rating. Either way, after some number crunching of my own, I can only see going forward with MCAS reasonable if there is some way to discretely disable its' ability to signal the jackscrew motor while leaving the electronic trim available in case of erroneous MCAS activation in the future, because with the requisite torque involved to quickly actuate that control surface against potential overspeed loads exacerbated by elevator up pitch commands, you'd need the electric motors, period. Without taking into account friction, and using the stabilizer dimensions of the 737-800, in air conditions approximate to Addis Ababa, at 350 knots, discluding extra load from elevator up, and assuming an M24 jackscrew thread, it would have taken 357 ft-lbs torque to actuate against that wind load. That's the output of a non-trivial automotive engine to bring that down to something the non-mathematically inclined can recognize, and while theoretically may be possible to gear for from a hand crank, I'm not confident I'm going to be able to figure out a gear train that can gear reduce enough to allow anywhere near enough speed when rotated by one pilot to get that horizontal stabilizer where it needs to be in so short a length of time. Either way, I foresee a lot of chaos, and scrutiny moving forward in the handling of this, and can only hope we can finally come to terms as a nation with why certain regulatory agencies are worth the cost of investing in if only to keep the seeds of such tragedies as happened here from ever being able to germinate again.
- tropo 8y agoSo, to get the aircraft back flying again, we just need to mandate some physical strength standards for air crews.
- joshbaptiste 8y agoThe 737MAX was designed to compete with A320NEO .. why Did Boeing have to move the engines forward while Airbus did not ? AFAIK the NEOs weren’t a complete redesign either
- bronco21016 8y agoThe 737 rides significantly lower. Check out the 737-700/800/900 series and you’ll notice the engine cowl (inlet) is not perfectly round at bottom because of ground clearance. This is likely a design choice leftover from the original 737 series that used JT8D engines which are turbojet engines rather than high bypass turbo fans that make modern airliners efficient. Because Boeing has been so set on retaining the original type certificate they’re restricted in how much they can change the airframe. The only way to slap bigger more efficient high bypass turbo fans was to move them forward and up.
- AnssiH 8y agoJT8D are low-bypass turbofans, not turbojets. But yes, their diameter is smaller than modern engines, thus the issue.
- joshbaptiste 8y agoah thanks
- filereaper 8y agoLooks like the 737 MAX issues are going to overshadow the unveiling of the 777x...
- remarkEon 8y agoI apologize if this is too soon to ask this question, or if it comes across as crass given that 346 people are dead because of this failure. What kind of long term implications could this have for the Aerospace industry in the US? Will we see some fundamental changes in safety oversight, or design, for these aircraft? Is this a "back to the drawing-board" moment for Boeing and the 737?
- thefounder 8y agoWould you still fly with Boeing Max after all this? I understand that the "issue" can be fixed with software but it looks like a hardware/design issue in the first place. If your highest priority is safety the software should be used only when the hardware fails not to support a flawed design.
- Innominate 8y agoI would be perfectly comfortable flying on the 737 Max right now even without the software fixes.
- thefounder 8y agoHow is that? Even if its nose goes down after take off? That's something for sure.
- Someone1234 8y agoThat's an irrational position. After the Ethiopian Airlines initial report was released pilots were discussing refusing to fly them even for ferry flights (i.e. no passengers). The Ethiopian airlines crew followed Boeing's post-Lion Air safety bulletin and still crashed. There's no safe way to operate a 737 Max in its current state. The hypothetical recovery techniques (e.g. point nose down to release pressure on the horizontal stabilizer) only work at high altitude, which is notable if Ethiopian airline's AOA sensor was damaged by a bird strike right after take-off. Nobody who understands the current state of this investigation should be saying they'd be comfortable on a 737 Max without changes. The "pilot training" narrative isn't just dead, but dead, buried, with a tomb stone. Sure, pilots should have received training on MCAS existing, but MCAS was commanding trim changes that aren't easily recoverable under any circumstances and certainly not if you follow procedure and disable electronic trim. Nobody should fly on the 737 Max until an update completed, I'd go so far as to suggest that the US/EU should ban ferry flights.
- Zak 8y ago> The hypothetical recovery techniques (e.g. point nose down to release pressure on the horizontal stabilizer) only work at high altitude That's not quite right. Manually operating the motorized trim as soon as unwanted nose-down trim is detected prior to disabling it with the cutout switches appears to be a viable means of recovery. It's also an undocumented, timing-sensitive procedure in a critical phase of flight, which is not anything resembling what airline pilots want from their planes.
- the_fonz 8y agoThis doesn't go far enough. As reported by Al Jazeera in 2010, critical structural elements of the 737 NG that were supposed to be CNC'ed were handmade and grossly out-of-spec, leading to at least three deaths when 737 NG's broke apart in several sections on runway overruns, while in the past airframes held together intact in such events, protecting passengers. Boeing then covered up and scuttled its own investigation panel after management didn't like its conclusions. tl;dr: 737 NG and MAX aircraft are fundamentally unsafe because of systemic lapses in regulatory oversight. These aircraft cannot be made safe economically due to Boeing's regulatory capture of the FAA, so it's best to never fly on them. In my mind, Boeing as a passenger transport company is, or should be, finished. How they acted regarding the 737 NG and MAX are criminally-unforgivable.
- cmurf 8y agoI think there's a non-zero chance that the 737 MAX is going to end up with a type certificate. MCAS causes the MAX to behave differently than an NG, whether it's working as designed or not. And also that it can be disabled, immediately means the airplane isn't airworthy as certified and without a type rating the pilot isn't either. Before this article I would have said, approaches zero chance a type certificate would be required. But the idea it would take 6-8 months to get it flying again? That's so outside the realm of what I was expecting that there must be some talk about it.