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Good winning over Ideal is a desired outcome when Ideal doesn't have the votes to win. That's one of the main attractions of non-plurality voting. The point of

by jadell 8y ago

Good winning over Ideal is a desired outcome when Ideal doesn't have the votes to win. That's one of the main attractions of non-plurality voting. The point of approval voting is not to rank candidates as Ideal > Good > Bad, that's what IRV is. Approval voting says, "These candidates are equally acceptable to me, so I'll be happy if any of them win over the candidates I didn't vote for."

notahacker 8y ago
Sure, but what the OP is saying is that in practice there's a massive tactical decision over whether to vote for "good" or not in a tight race, because "these candidates are equally acceptable to me" is a relatively rare situation
- jadell 8y ago
  I don't think that's a rare situation at all. There's a large population out there that doesn't identify with R/D (in US politics), but does identify more closely with a 3rd party. But they never vote for them because "tactics". That doesn't mean those people wouldn't find R or D acceptable, it just means the're ideologically closer to a 3rd party. What AV is trying to get at is the situation where the most people are accepting of the outcome. If a candidate is not acceptable, you don't vote for them. The situation you're describing is not one of selecting from Ideal, Good, Bad; it's the situation of selecting from Ideal, Somewhat Bad, Bad. If you're unwilling to vote for a candidate, they are by definition not "Good" to you. So you would just vote for the Ideal candidate in that situation. In the worse case (everyone just votes for a single candidate), AV simply acts as FPTP. In the average and best case, the candidate that is acceptable to the most voters wins. Look at it from the view of the US's extreme polarization: if I'm strongly for A, and you're strongly against A, nothing will be done if A wins. But I'm strongly for A, and we're both "meh" on B, then B might not get everything done that either of us wants, but at least the process won't completely break down.
  - notahacker 8y ago
    But assuming most of these people consider R and D acceptable but actively prefer the third party (if they consider them equally acceptable FPTP isn't really depriving them of their ideal electoral choice), AV is inferior to most other non FPTP votes like IRV, which accurately represent their preference for the third party first, and the Rs and Ds only if that party can't win. AV has a pretty significant "if I tick the good candidate box, am I impairing my ideal candidate's chances of winning?" problem.
    - jamesonquinn 8y ago
      IRV actually has the opposite problem: "If I vote for my ideal candidate, am I impairing the good candidate's chance of winning?" For instance, if it were Nader/Gore/Bush with 26%/25%/49%, and (hypothetically) all Nader voters preferred Gore over Bush but not all Gore voters preferred Nader over Bush, then voting for Nader instead of dishonestly choosing the "lesser evil" Gore would end up electing Bush. No voting method can entirely escape both of these problems. But newer methods like STAR voting balance them against each other and manage to minimize both.
      - flukus 8y ago
        > No voting method can entirely escape both of these problems. But newer methods like STAR voting balance them against each other and manage to minimize both. First you need to demonstrate that it's a problem in reality, there are very few times in history where it has been a real issue. Alternative to IRV are usually much more complex which is a terrible tradeoff for an almost entirely imaginary problem. Star voting has the same problem as star rating systems, almost everyone will score either a 5 or a 1.
        szemet 8y ago
        almost everyone will score either a 5 or a 1 Then it will be similar to approval voting. Previous comments complained that approval is bad because you cannot express detailed preferences, but you say no one wants to anyway? So then approval is ok?

by jadell 8y ago

notahacker 8y ago

Sure, but what the OP is saying is that in practice there's a massive tactical decision over whether to vote for "good" or not in a tight race, because "these candidates are equally acceptable to me" is a relatively rare situation

jadell 8y ago
I don't think that's a rare situation at all. There's a large population out there that doesn't identify with R/D (in US politics), but does identify more closely with a 3rd party. But they never vote for them because "tactics". That doesn't mean those people wouldn't find R or D acceptable, it just means the're ideologically closer to a 3rd party. What AV is trying to get at is the situation where the most people are accepting of the outcome. If a candidate is not acceptable, you don't vote for them. The situation you're describing is not one of selecting from Ideal, Good, Bad; it's the situation of selecting from Ideal, Somewhat Bad, Bad. If you're unwilling to vote for a candidate, they are by definition not "Good" to you. So you would just vote for the Ideal candidate in that situation. In the worse case (everyone just votes for a single candidate), AV simply acts as FPTP. In the average and best case, the candidate that is acceptable to the most voters wins. Look at it from the view of the US's extreme polarization: if I'm strongly for A, and you're strongly against A, nothing will be done if A wins. But I'm strongly for A, and we're both "meh" on B, then B might not get everything done that either of us wants, but at least the process won't completely break down.
- notahacker 8y ago
  But assuming most of these people consider R and D acceptable but actively prefer the third party (if they consider them equally acceptable FPTP isn't really depriving them of their ideal electoral choice), AV is inferior to most other non FPTP votes like IRV, which accurately represent their preference for the third party first, and the Rs and Ds only if that party can't win. AV has a pretty significant "if I tick the good candidate box, am I impairing my ideal candidate's chances of winning?" problem.
  - jamesonquinn 8y ago
    IRV actually has the opposite problem: "If I vote for my ideal candidate, am I impairing the good candidate's chance of winning?" For instance, if it were Nader/Gore/Bush with 26%/25%/49%, and (hypothetically) all Nader voters preferred Gore over Bush but not all Gore voters preferred Nader over Bush, then voting for Nader instead of dishonestly choosing the "lesser evil" Gore would end up electing Bush. No voting method can entirely escape both of these problems. But newer methods like STAR voting balance them against each other and manage to minimize both.
    - flukus 8y ago
      > No voting method can entirely escape both of these problems. But newer methods like STAR voting balance them against each other and manage to minimize both. First you need to demonstrate that it's a problem in reality, there are very few times in history where it has been a real issue. Alternative to IRV are usually much more complex which is a terrible tradeoff for an almost entirely imaginary problem. Star voting has the same problem as star rating systems, almost everyone will score either a 5 or a 1.
      - szemet 8y ago
        almost everyone will score either a 5 or a 1 Then it will be similar to approval voting. Previous comments complained that approval is bad because you cannot express detailed preferences, but you say no one wants to anyway? So then approval is ok?