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If I was a journalist covering any sort of geopolitical stuff I'd 100% have my phone reviewed by infosec experts regularly and change devices frequently. And id
by dmix 8y ago
If I was a journalist covering any sort of geopolitical stuff I'd 100% have my phone reviewed by infosec experts regularly and change devices frequently. And ideally use separate phones for external work related contacts, day-to-day in-office work, and personal life.
- neilv 8y agoWere I that journalist, the first thing I'd do would be to soil my drawers, because I'm not brave enough to operate with some of those kinds of potential adversaries. But, a hypothetical braver me would then know (from my alternate universe life as a techie) that I can't trust any of my devices much, in any case, no matter how many experts review them or how many burners I cycle, and that I should use the devices accordingly.
- steve19 8y agoJournalists are not paid enough to buy disposable iPhones frequently.
- CharlesColeman 8y ago> Journalists are not paid enough to buy disposable iPhones frequently. If I were Apple, I'd give journalists all the "disposable" iPhones they need to swap them frequently for free. My only condition would be to periodically inspect them for hacking activity, or have them specially instrumented to detect it. It would be a good way to ferret out state-actor zero days (or increase the security of the platform by making state-actors horde exploits even more jealously).
- bigiain 8y agoI like this idea. Apple could do it practically for free too, if it was something like "Any accredited journalist can trade their iPhone for a refurb at any Apple store at any time. We'd appreciate, but not require, some information about the general areas of stories you cover and any threats you're suspicious might be focused on you."
- munk-a 8y agoEeeeh... except, if a journalist was enrolled in this program then Apple would (almost certainly) know which journalists were getting new phones and various three-letters could pressure Apple into loading targeted software into phones for specific journalists. Also, this comment isn't intended to touch the question of Apple's trustworthiness so please don't wave downvote over that, I am merely stating that such a system would _really_ motivate three-letters to put an immense amount of pressure into compromising such a system (whether they did so with or without Apple's co-operation can remain untouched).
- rosser 8y agoIf the program were set up as above, such that any accredited journalist could walk into any Apple Store at any time and do the thing, the logistical challenges in having custom, pre-compromized phones on-hand everywhere ("Why aren't we just grabbing those from normal inventory? Isn't that weird?"), or having to bake a "Glenn Greenwald" image onto the phone when he walked in, would probably be noticed. EDIT: What's to stop Mr. Greenwald from sending a buddy from an old job to swap a new device on his behalf?
- munk-a 8y agoBecause they'd need to be an accredited journalist, and the presenting of any kind of proof to that end would be enough for three-letter agencies to wiggle their way into a compromise of the system - including the fact that glenn may send his old buddy frank in to collect his phone, so better give either one of them one of the tainted ones. I misread the original proposal a bit and had assumed it'd be a mail-in-service, but with even determination the three-letter folks could probably leave spiked devices in the stores glenn would be likely to walk into. This is more reasonable but I still have reservations.
- gpm 8y agoIf it was set up well the journalist could have the exact new phone in hand disconnected from any wires that might flash it before announcing he was a journalist. I don't think there is a way with current technology to discretely have people or computers setup to recognize Greenwald (let alone all his friends) in a good percentage of Apple stores before the transaction is completed. Even if it is possible to identify Greenwald and friends before the transaction that access is probably only available to the actual NSA, not ex NSA employees. On the other hand - you've now identified the phones for remote exploit. Also identifying which journalists are significant enough to be beneficiaries of this program is probably hard.
- pytyper2 8y agoThese would be business expenses and would hopefully be reimbursed. You didn't interpret the suggestion in a very charitable way.
- rosser 8y agoA smartphone is already the wrong tool if you're in that job. The baseband is a de facto rootkit.
- tptacek 8y agoNo, it's not. This is a myth that refuses to die, and like the "one big thing" everyone seems to "know" about mobile security.
- rosser 8y agoYou obviously know vastly more about security than I do, but I don't understand how a black box with DMA doesn't implicitly compromise the rest of the device, for people whose threat models might include state-level actors — and particularly their shadier bits. EDIT: Is it just a matter of there being easier/cheaper vectors? Also, phrasing.
- kasey_junk 8y agohttps://www.synopsys.com/dw/dwtb.php?a=hsic_usb2_device https://www.synopsys.com/dw/dwtb.php?a=hsic_usb2_device Most modern smartphones use usb for baseband comms. I’m no expert but I don’t think the DMA thing hasn’t been true widely for a very long time.
- rosser 8y agoI'm finding product briefs for 4G and 5G basebands listing host DMA capabilities, so it's still enough of a thing to keep vendors offering it.
- tptacek 8y agoYou should use, exclusively, modern iPhones or, if you have an expert to help set it up, a flagship Google Android phone. I'm sure there are lots of off-brand Android phones that have basebands with full DMA access and no meaningful IOMMU configuration.
- gpm 8y agoIf it was me I would just assume that my phone was compromised, that the mobile network is compromised, and that any wifi network I'm on is compromised. Cheap semi-disposable laptop + trustworthy encryption (edit: Probably with OpenBSD as the OS) is the best you can do, and if I don't have encryption I trust for the task at hand a wired network. It's unfortunate that wireless networks apparently uniformly have terrible encryption and poor security. There is no fundamental reason this needs to be the case.
- tptacek 8y agoGiving a journalist an OpenBSD laptop to replace their modern iPhone (or, I suppose, carefully-configured expert-vetted flagship Google Android phone) would be a really good way to get them owned up. For most users, laptops are much less secure than iOS devices. Most of the security engineering in OpenBSD protects users from other users, which is not a security barrier that matters to 90% of endpoint users. Most of the security engineering a modern smartphone protects a single user's applications from each other, which very much does matter.
- dontbenebby 8y agoIIRC most of these exploits require either physical access, or clicking a link in an email or text. I'm not sure anyone will burn a no interaction zero day on a human rights journalist. I suspect that kind of thing is hoarded by the big boys for when life and limb are on the line.
- gpm 8y agoTrue, but if you're a journalist I can't imagine how you avoid clicking on links sent to you reliably. And if something 'important' comes your way you might just elevate yourself to the "big boy" level of exploits.
- tptacek 8y agoA "click a link in an email" exploit is probably not too expensive to burn on a journalist, and "click this link in this email" is absolutely one of the top 3 attack vectors for ordinary users.
- Macross8299 8y agoA a security-conscious journalist paranoid enough to use burner phones hardly qualifies as an "ordinary user", even if they aren't traditionally technical.
- tptacek 8y agoLots of people do all sorts of theatrical security things without having any real savvy for the real threats they face.
- dontbenebby 8y ago>Lots of people do all sorts of theatrical security things without having any real savvy for the real threats they face. For example, switching to a dumbphone makes them likely to be more insecure, since they usually operate on 2 or 3g and offer zero encryption.