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Intel underplayed the exploit and told ZDNet that the VISA issue requires physical access to the machines and the Intel-SA-00086 vulnerabilities have already be
by userbinator 8y ago
Intel underplayed the exploit and told ZDNet that the VISA issue requires physical access to the machines and the Intel-SA-00086 vulnerabilities have already been mitigated.
Am I the only one here who thinks "threat model" and isn't all too worried? Physical access = full control, I've long held that belief and am not happy that this freedom is continually being eroded in the name of ever-increasing ridiculous "security" (a lot of it against the user, for things like DRM, as mentioned in one of the other comments here.)
Debugging/"test mode" features are basically present in all modern CPUs. I would not bet that Intel is the only one.
Edit: such features have been present in CPUs dating back to the late 70s, so perhaps "modern" isn't needed: see http://forum.6502.org/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=3366 http://forum.6502.org/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=3366 and http://e4aws.silverdr.com/hacks/6500_1/ http://e4aws.silverdr.com/hacks/6500_1/
- deathanatos 8y agoThe next sentence in the article, > The researchers however disagreed with Intel's comments and reportedly said in an online discussion that the patched Intel firmware can be downgraded using Intel ME, making the chipset vulnerable and opening the door for accessing Intel VISA. I agree that "physical access" is a threat that I'm not too concerned about¹. But the researchers don't seem to agree that that's the extent of the issue. ¹If physical access means "disassemble the case and do X". If physical access is "two seconds with an exposed USB port", then that's a different matter.
- mirimir 8y agoRackable servers typically have a locking front cover to prevent that. You can buy CoverLocks for desktops.[0] This Kensington USB lock also looks interesting.[1] The keys are unique, by the way. 0) http://www.computersecurity.com/coverlock/ http://www.computersecurity.com/coverlock/ 1) https://www.amazon.com/Kensington-Cable-Guard-Rectangular-K67719US/dp/B001XUQNDY https://www.amazon.com/Kensington-Cable-Guard-Rectangular-K6...
- cm2187 8y agoWith encrypted drives and TPM you can still raise the bar pretty high before physical access means you have control. You may have control of the hardware, but not of what’s running inside.
- MrXOR 8y agoThe main thing is "Why undocumented?", not threat model and physical or remote exploit.
- CodeWriter23 8y ago> The main thing is "Why undocumented?", not threat model and physical or remote exploit. No, the main thing is if VISA is for qualifying chips on the production line, why don’t they burn a fuse permanently disabling it on chips that pass QA?
- MrXOR 8y agoYet another main question, because ...
- smalley 8y agoVISA isn't for qualifying chips as much as it is for debugging chips including customer returns. Long ago access to limited versions of the signals was given to some customers under NDA and customers had the ability to set customer fuses which would prevent Intel from unlocking the debug features. There's also an unsupressable "debug enabled" bit hardwire to a lot of these functions if I remember so the parent system can always see if somebody turned on the debug functions. Turning on debug functions also usually had the effect of disabling/corrupting important key material. This said, its basically a giant signal mux system run into a main block, you'd be pretty limited on what preselected signals are available at a time. People were also reasonably careful not to give entire busses of signals at once.
- userbinator 8y agoTesting/debugging features are intended for internal use only and can expose proprietary information about their implementation, so only Intel and possibly some motherboard manufacturers are allowed the knowledge. Speaking of documentation, while not fully open, Intel/AMD are already ahead of many others when it comes to documenting things. Look at the SoCs used in smartphones and tablets, or the infamous Raspberry Pi. AFAIK, Intel is not in the business of making secure cryptoprocessors like the ones used in payment cards and SIMs, but once again even with those you are very unlikely to find public documentation --- everything is NDA'd. That said, don't get me wrong, I'm not advocating for leaving things undocumented; just explaining how it usually turns out that way.
- bsder 8y ago> Am I the only one here who thinks "threat model" and isn't all too worried? Physical access = full control, I've long held that belief and am not happy that this freedom is continually being eroded in the name of ever-increasing ridiculous "security" (a lot of it against the user, for things like DRM, as mentioned in one of the other comments here.) People care because that means that when you run something in the "Cloud(tm)" you have to trust the cloud provider. The goal of things like "SGX" was so that you could run things on machines under someone else's control and still trust the results.
- rficcaglia 8y agoSGX doesn’t guarantee results, just isolation. You would still need a protocol for confirming that the code was error free, didn’t leak data, not to mention side channel attacks and timing analysis. Oblivious RAM, FHE, ZKSNARKs are to be considered when you don’t trust the hardware, the users, the cloud, administrators, etc. Some combo of TEEs, formal verification, binary verification, FHE, etc. might keep your data secure for a little while...maybe.
- rednixion 8y agoI was shopping a few months back at a store with a particularly disinterested cashier who was doing something on their phone and was also charging it using the USB port that was on the register. It struck me as something that you probably shouldn't be able to plug your personal device into but that it is likely a common practice when nothing actually prevents it. Made me wonder if an attack scenario would be feasible where compromised phones could be used for targeted attacks utilizing one of the USB vulnerabilities; essentially just laying dormant until the user plugs into something interesting to charge. Assuming that: Physical access vectors are often deemed a low priority/less likely to be patched and that testing if an employee cares more about the BYoD security policy or their dying phone will have not favor infosec. It seemed like an interesting way to get access to point of sale systems that I had not heard anyone talk about before. Some other privilege escalation vulnerability would have to be exploited go beyond the usual app malware capabilities but I don't know enough about USB or mobile OS's to know if it would be possible even with root(maybe that's why no one talks about it).