8 ms·
Now that everybody, even non-pilots on HN like me, know how to turn MCAS off, it doesn't really make sense to keep them grounded.
by trhway 8y ago
Now that everybody, even non-pilots on HN like me, know how to turn MCAS off, it doesn't really make sense to keep them grounded.
- tyingq 8y agoIt's there to solve a problem though. You can cut power to the recalled airbags in your car too.
- close04 8y agoIf turning it off was a fix then it wouldn't have been there in the first place.
- samfisher83 8y agoI am sure the feature is there to help keep the plane stable. It can be flown without the system being on if the sensors don't work. You can drive your car without cruise control, but it makes it more convenient with it on.
- close04 8y ago> the feature is there to help keep the plane stable And we don't want that? > You can drive your car without cruise control Sure, because cruise control is there to allow me to be lazy, not to keep my car on the road. The aircraft has handling deficiencies at high angles of attack due to the engines being mounted differently. The MCAS is there to correct this. It's this or redesign the plane. Only 2 things that could have helped: an angle of attack disagree light to warn the pilots of the issue, and to to retrain the pilots. The first was sold just as an optional package, the second was considered unneeded since Boeing treated the new plane as a perfect equivalent of its predecessor. Disabling the MCAS is not a fix and without it the plane is not certified to fly.
- samfisher83 8y agoIt works when the sensor works. When it doesn't you need to fly it manually.
- close04 8y agoWhat I'm saying is that the MCAS is there so the plane can get the certification. You can fly the plane without it but it's not considered normal (or safe) operation. Which is why it must be there and it must work. You can fly a plane without an engine if needed but just try certifying a plane with one engine under one wing.
- peteradio 8y agoThe feature is there so pilots don't have to be retrained on the different handling of the plane. It was entirely cost avoidance on Boeings part. To say that they could just turn it off is also an admission that the plane is not the same and pilots would need to be retrained. Boeing can't have it both ways.
- asynchronous13 8y agoWhile pilots now know how to counteract this specific problem, it also highlighted how flawed the safety analysis of this plane was. It makes sense to re-evaluate to make sure there isn't a second problem that just hasn't killed anyone yet.
- Splines 8y agoPlus, how much testing has the airplane gone with MCAS in an off state? Certainly less time than in the on state.
- LeifCarrotson 8y agoAnd at the next level up the causality chain, the safety analysis was flawed because of the regulatory capture of the FAA by Boeing. Should we therefore ground and review all the planes?
- matz1 8y agoAgree, seems like waste of resources to keep them grounded.
- Pharmakon 8y agoI’d prefer to waste the resources of an airline or Boeing, rather than the kind of “waste of resources” in losing whole plane loads of human beings. Turning off MCAS solves one problem and trades it in for another, it is not a waste of resources to solve all of the relevant problems. What is a waste is pretending that wasted resources is the worst thing that can happen here when we have two fatal crashes being investigated.
- copperx 8y agoWhat an irresponsible comment. One can't just hand-wave away safety protocol, even if the failure appears to be obvious.
- matz1 8y agoThe issue is more of incompetent pilot. As indicated that the day before the lion air crash, the pilot know what to do to handle the issue. At least for lion air, the airline has been locally famous for being careless about maintenance and pilot training.
- perl4ever 8y ago"Stop Trying to Fix the User" https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/10/security_design.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/10/security_desi...
- peteradio 8y agoYou could also say that Max flights now require 3 pilots to safely manage.
- matz1 8y agoNo, what required is a properly trained pilot.
- toast0 8y agoGiven that there was a second crash , similar to the first, I don't think this argument holds.
- MertsA 8y agoAt the time of the second crash it wasn't as clear what the likely culprit was. If it was believed to be a defect with the aircraft at that time then most other countries would have already grounded them by then. I think that's a bad argument to make as well, but not for those reasons.
- sokoloff 8y agoEveryone who earned a type rating to fly 737s also knew how to turn it off, by following the non-normal (aka "emergency") checklist memory items for stabilizer runaway. It is shocking to me that the second crash happened, if they both turn out to be MCAS and stab trim sourced. How could you step into the cockpit of a 737-Max that day and not know about the MCAS issue and be primed to respond according to the checklist? I have to add that I'd be happy to put myself or my family onto a 737-Max flown by a US-flag carrier (Southwest, American, United [Delta doesn't fly the -Max]), as I believe there's a significant variance in crew training worldwide.
- trhway 8y ago>It is shocking to me that the second crash happened, if they both turn out to be MCAS and stab trim sourced. How could you step into the cockpit of a 737-Max that day and not know about the MCAS issue and be primed to respond according to the checklist? the MCAS caused almost crash the day before the first crash of the same plane - it was only that off-duty pilot who knew about MCAS and thus saved the plane. Yet the next day that plane flew again with an MCAS unaware crew. Looks like some systemic issue. Grounding of the planes would allow to correct the specific tech issue of MCAS. Whether the systemic issue is going to be corrected is yet to be seen.
- jrockway 8y agoBad sensor data was represented as accurate sensor data. It is easy to solve some problem you know is occurring, it is hard to solve a problem where something weird happens and the data in front of you is telling you that what you think is happening is not what is happening. ("I think we're stalling." "Nah, the sensor that directly measures that says we're not." "Hmm, what else could it be? Get me the checklist" crash) It shocks me that the redundant angle of attack sensor and the "disagree" light is not standard equipment. Who is buying multi-million dollar airplanes and cares about the cost of an angle of attack sensor and a lamp? Not people that care about safety, that's for sure. I know the airline industry loves nickel-and-diming their customers, but safety equipment is a little more important than priority boarding and a checked bag. It is shameful that Boeing adopted that business model. More on angle of attack sensors: https://www.flightliteracy.com/angle-of-attack-indicators/ https://www.flightliteracy.com/angle-of-attack-indicators/. If you fly GA, you should get one. Having a readout of the flight energy you have available is one of the greatest safety upgrades you can make.
- justin66 8y agoThe misfeatures that are suspected to have contributed to the recent accidents exist in part to keep the plane similar enough to previous 737s that lengthy pilot retraining is not necessary. Now that that fiction has been dispelled, additional training seems to be called for. (probably a bit more is needed than passing on whatever knowledge 'non-pilots on HN' have picked up)
- peteradio 8y agoThe whole point of MCAS was to avoid pilot retraining on the different handling characteristics. To say that you can just not have that system is also to say the pilots need to be retrained for the Max planes. Something that Boeing felt necessary to avoid and thus implementing this MCAS. Now that 2 planes have crashed you can't just say "Oh Okay just turn MCAS off duhhhhhhhhh".
- cmurf 8y agoThe plane isn't airworthy in an MCAS upset condition resulting from faulty AOA sensor. That's because numerous contraindications are happening in the cockpit as a result, including the failed side stick shaker activating. In the Lion Air 34 and 610 flights, the stick shaker was active almost continuously. That's not airworthy. Also, the autopilot uses stabilizer trim. If you turn stabilizer trim to cutoff, you have no autopilot. Also, the emergency airworthiness directive says it's possible a runaway continues even after stabilizer trim is set to cutoff: If runaway continues, hold the stabilizer trim wheel against rotation and trim the airplane manually. Once there was a second crash, with stabilizer jackscrew in the full nose down position, it was untenable to allow the planes to be considered airworthy, for the very central reason that we don't completely understand what happened and how to avoid it. The proper response in aviation safety is not to assume pilots are doing the wrong thing upon receipt of an emergency airworthiness directive. It's to assume they are following the directive. You don't just pretend they're morons and keep on subjecting the general public to risk, while you guess at what the problem is.