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> As far back as 2016 they were claiming they had full SDC capability above human driver safety One crash/incident doesn’t mean it’s less safe than a human dri
by Scoundreller 8y ago
> As far back as 2016 they were claiming they had full SDC capability above human driver safety
One crash/incident doesn’t mean it’s less safe than a human driver on average, even if it’s something a human driver might have avoided.
We should expect different failure modes from a machine, but adopt it anyway if it avoids enough human failure modes to make up for it.
Source: my thermostat thought 33C was an acceptable temp once, but I still didn’t switch to full-manual HVAC control.
- tptacek 8y agoDon't Teslas fare significantly worse than cars in similar class in terms of driver fatalities?
- lordalch 8y agoI don't have the fatalities stats, but their safety ratings have been perfect. [0] https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/20/tesla-model-3-earns-perfect-5-star-nhtsa-safety-rating.html https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/20/tesla-model-3-earns-perfect-...
- Scoundreller 8y agoDunno, maybe. I do wonder which cars Tesla gets lumped in with. There can be a difference between a $75k ICE driver and a $75k electric driver. The point is, one stupid decision by a machine doesn’t prove much.
- salawat 8y agoSo... Two planes falling out of the sky, killing 400 shouldn't be taken as proving anything? Or how about 1 stupid decision by a radiotherapy machine? Ever heard of THERAC-25? In each case, it was just 1 stupid decision by a machine. The entire reason Engineering as a practice is a thing is because when you implement the capacity for a stupid decision into a system that is then mass produced, dire consequences can result. I look down on any thought process that doesn't discriminate between the difference between 0 and 1. If the system provably worked, that decision would not have happened (0). The stupid decision happened (1), however, which means it can happen again at a poorly understood confluence of circumstances. To err is human, and we forgive each other every day for it. To err as a machine is a condemnation to the refuse bucket, repair shop, or back to the drawing board. To err so egregiously as a machine to cause an operator and those around them to lose their life is willful and moral negligence on the part of the system's designer. Slack is cut when good faith is demonstrated, but liability is unambiguous. The hazard would not be there if you hadn't put it there.
- Scoundreller 8y agoAnd people have died and been paralyzed as a direct result of the flu vaccine. Death and paralyses that would not have occurred had they not received that vaccine. Does that mean the flu vaccine should get dumped in the refuse bin? Similarly, some other aircraft flying today/tomorrow has automation with an unknown bug/issue that will cause loss of life. Should we disable everything except the 6-pack and stick and rudder? It would have saved the lives killed by automation, but we would have more aviation death overall.
- perl4ever 8y agoDoes that mean you believe the decision to ground 737 max 8s is incorrect?
- salawat 8y agoLiability is still clear, and in the specific case of medical practice, a degree of "we can't foresee everything" is implicit in that our understanding of the governing principles of the human body is incomplete. Aviation does not have that excuse. The 737 MAX 8 system description is enumerated from the ground up. Seeing as there was so much recertification effort that didn't need to be done, it makes the failure to properly handle the MCAS implementation all the more damning. This wasn't some subtle bug. This was an outright terrible design choice. Anyone with any experience composing complex systems out of smaller functional building blocks should have been able to look at the outputs, look at the inputs, and realize there was the potential for catastrophic malfunction. As I've said elsewhere, automation should make flying a plane easier when functional. When non-functional, however, the pilot should still be able to salvage the plane. That requires clear communication of what automation does, and what it's failure modes are.
- slg 8y agoAre you asking about Teslas or Teslas being driven by Autopilot? Autopilot so far has a fatality rate of roughly 0.25 per 100 million miles. Just for information's sake the overall rate in the US in 2017 was 1.16 per 100 million miles. Although there are plenty of caveats that should prevent you from comparing those numbers directly. The national number is for all cars, all drivers, all conditions, etc while those driving a Tesla in Autopilot are generally considered to be in a safer cars, safer conditions, and be safer drivers than average.
- FireBeyond 8y agoTesla drivers have the luxury of turning autopilot off in suboptimal conditions. Human drivers don't. Like you say, this number is really valuable only for Tesla marketing.
- heavenlyblue 8y agoTesla would have had 0 fatalities in total if the Autopilot disengaged just before hitting the barrier.
- SilasX 8y agoFor all driving protocols P, and accidents A, P would have zero fatalities if it switched to a better protocol just before encountering the situation that led to A.
- heavenlyblue 8y agoThat's exactly what I am trying to say. Yet Tesla implies their tech is statistically superior to human drivers, yet can disengage at any time.
- SilasX 8y agoAh okay. Sorry, easy to misread people on this topic.