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Ish. I think with a user process in OsX you don’t get passwords saved in keychain, which might well be what you are really after, these days.
by toyg 8y ago
Ish. I think with a user process in OsX you don’t get passwords saved in keychain, which might well be what you are really after, these days.
- breatheoften 8y agoDoes root access directly get you keychain credentials (or does it only get it via the possibility of key logging)?
- acdha 8y agoIn the past, you’d be able to read it out of the process memory when the keychain was unlocked. I believe that’s been locked down in the last couple of releases, however.
- dzhiurgis 8y agoHow about all the other password managers, especially Chrome's?
- toyg 8y agoIt depends how well they are implemented (what is stored where, how it is stored and accessed, etc). It would be certainly trivial to grab the necessary files from a Chrome or Firefox profile, but if they are well-encrypted they could be practically uncrackable (although, as we know, that definition changes so fast these days). At that point it becomes about attacking or impersonating the actual process, which is not that easy - you might need another exploit for the app, or replacing the entire app without arising suspicion (a lot of apps are not even installed in the user profile, so this might well be impossible). In the end, it very much depends, but I don’t think it’s as trivial as some suggest - at least for mass-attacks/viruses, specific targeting is a different ballgame.
- shhehebehdh 8y agoNowadays I don’t think chrome even stores the passwords locally. Maybe for signed out users but it seems like all my passwords are stored at passwords.google.com.
- pvg 8y agoIt very much stores the passwords locally, even if you enable syncing. It wouldn't make sense for it not to.
- ficklepickle 8y agoGnome keyring was storing credentials in memory in plain text until very recently https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20781 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20781
- geofft 8y agoWith arbitrary code execution you can just wait around until the keychain is used and then grab it out of that process's memory, or prompt the user to unlock it with a convincing-sounding dialog, or whatever.
- foota 8y agoMaybe I'm missing something, but reading something from another process' memory isn't a thing you can do, is it?
- geofft 8y agoIn general, for processes running as the same user on traditional desktop / server OSes (Windows, Mac, UNIX), it is. On mobile it's not because they had no backwards compatibility to care about (specifically, iOS applies heavy sandboxing to apps and Android runs them as different Linux user IDs). And desktop app stores are moving towards the same model. On Linux, SELinux/AppArmor/etc. might also prevent this depending on config. More fundamentally, an unsandboxed process can do things like set environment variables, update config files, modify applications installed into the user's home directory, read your browser cookies, etc. as a consequence of traditional desktop apps having unrestricted access to the user's home directory, so preventing reading memory doesn't really prevent one app from attacking another.
- foota 8y agoHuh. Thanks, I'm surprised I didn't know that.
- JoeSmithson 8y agoI don't think that's true at all, not since like Win95 days at least... Perhaps I'm also completely misinformed or misunderstanding what GP is saying but each process is meant to get it's own virtual address space
- 8y ago