3 ms·
> What meaningful difference is there? There would not be a meaningful difference in terms of being able to tell if it was compromised. There would be a meanin
by cbsmith 8y ago
> What meaningful difference is there?
There would not be a meaningful difference in terms of being able to tell if it was compromised. There would be a meaningful difference that you would now have an operational exposure of the session keys, that fundamentally undermines not just PFS but potentially the encryption protecting the session in general.
> You can verify what it sent, but that doesn't prove it wasn't compromised.
You're right. The semantics of what you are trying to prove isn't so much that it wasn't compromised, but rather to verify that there wasn't some kind of leakage of data from the system, which is a subtly different thing.
- Dylan16807 8y ago> There would be a meaningful difference that you would now have an operational exposure of the session keys, that fundamentally undermines not just PFS but potentially the encryption protecting the session in general. That's no worse than before, where you could use the private key to undermine the encryption. You could also end up with a much better system if you encrypted the session keys so that only the auditing device can decrypt them.
- cbsmith 8y ago> That's no worse than before, where you could use the private key to undermine the encryption. > > You could also end up with a much better system if you encrypted the session keys so that only the auditing device can decrypt them. We're speculating about the trust model and the constraints it must operate within. The private key isn't getting transmitted continuously over the network, so perhaps with some trust models transmitting session keys is equivalent, better, or worse. Given that the people actually working in the space have clearly put a lot of thought into how to best fit their needs, I wouldn't presume that they got it wrong.