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It could be a weaker argument: One can theoretically make a fully materialistic device acting in a way indistinguishable from consciousness. Which still preser
by viraptor 8y ago
It could be a weaker argument: One can theoretically make a fully materialistic device acting in a way indistinguishable from consciousness.
Which still preserves the question: if you can reliably fake knowing Chinese, do you know Chinese?
- joe_the_user 8y agoYeah, the thing about the argument is it mixes together two close but distinct arguments in a way that makes it harder to argue with either. On the one hand, there's the implication that because it's just books and boxes & whatever, it can't do the impressive feat of speaking Chinese. On the other hand, there's the implication that if it is a "room" or "computer" or something doing the speaking of Chinese, it can't "really" be doing it because it doesn't have the spark of life or a soul or whatever magic one might name. And because the argument has a bit of both these claims to it, it is hard to address since a proponent can go back and forth between them. That this argument was taken seriously by philosophers was rather disheartening to me when I discovered this, when it became obvious there really wasn't any more there than a colorful (but not particular relevant) metaphor.