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The objections to a golden key are irrespective of whatever system permits the golden key access. Your hashchains are completely irrelevant. The courts will use
by sobellian 8y ago
The objections to a golden key are irrespective of whatever system permits the golden key access. Your hashchains are completely irrelevant. The courts will use some key to sign their request, and that key will leak.
Cryptography reduces message security to key security, nothing more.
- FakeComments 8y agoThat’s why it’s a two stage system: leaking the key only permits forged requests, but an attacker still has to spend the time reversing the hash chain. For each and every phone they want to crack. Apple has also done a reasonable job of holding onto their signing keys, to date.
- jhayward 8y ago> Apple has also done a reasonable job of holding onto their signing keys, to date. How do you know that?
- FakeComments 8y agoBecause whoever has stolen them has been reasonably discreet, and we don’t see compromised Apple things all over the place — which means if they’ve been stolen at all, it’s been by high class attackers. If your goal is to stop the NSA et al stealing a key or owning a device, you’ll be sad. But if your goal is to change the law and redefine the parameters of them owning devices, you might make progress. The political process will insist on a means to access these devices, and they’ll accomplish it by one means or another. By engaging with instead of fighting that, we gain the ability to have a say on what those means are.