4 ms·

Everytime Signal is brought up someone just has to chime in saying ‘we must abandanon Signal at all costs because metadata’. The metadata limitation is well kno

Everytime Signal is brought up someone just has to chime in saying ‘we must abandanon Signal at all costs because metadata’. The metadata limitation is well known and if metadata interception is a problem for your threat model there are steps to obscure your identity or you should use a different tool. For the 99% of other cases where I just don’t want anyone snooping on my conversation with friends and family but don’t care that people know I’m obviously conversing with my friends and family Signal is great. Let’s not throw Signal out just because the metadata is still there.

StudentStuff 8y ago
Briar is good if metadata is a prime concern, but even Matrix, XMPP and email have very similar metadata problems to Signal, plus contact discovery problems as you can't casually gather that your friend or relative is on the platform (phone numbers mostly solve this).
e12e 8y ago
If metadata is good enough to drone strike weddings, it's probably good enough to throw you in a concentration camp too. And since data never dies, it might be enough to throw your grand kids in concentration camps. Now, protecting everyone's meta data is hard (probably impossible), and I don't mean to be defeatist - but "it's just metadata" doesn't sit well in a post Snowden world. We know all large intelligence agencies hoover up this stuff. And we also know that agencies are made up of people, and some people abuse their access.
- bronco21016 8y ago
  I certainly don’t mean to discount the importance of metadata. I specifically mentioned ensuring Signal fits your threat model. To suggest that metadata of communication over Signal between my spouse and I will be used against my grand kids one day is a bit absurd though. Of course there’s tons of metadata connecting my spouse and I. It would be more suspicious if there wasn’t.
  - e12e 8y ago
    Spouse, "family" and friends are different goalposts. Mapping friends and family is AFAIK a key part of who gets bombed by the cia. Sure, if your spouse is found to be an "enemy of the state" under a new totalitarian government - your immediate family will have problems. If a friend turns out to be union organizer, you might be banned from jobs, if the government decides to collude with employers (again).

StudentStuff 8y ago

Briar is good if metadata is a prime concern, but even Matrix, XMPP and email have very similar metadata problems to Signal, plus contact discovery problems as you can't casually gather that your friend or relative is on the platform (phone numbers mostly solve this).

e12e 8y ago

If metadata is good enough to drone strike weddings, it's probably good enough to throw you in a concentration camp too. And since data never dies, it might be enough to throw your grand kids in concentration camps. Now, protecting everyone's meta data is hard (probably impossible), and I don't mean to be defeatist - but "it's just metadata" doesn't sit well in a post Snowden world. We know all large intelligence agencies hoover up this stuff. And we also know that agencies are made up of people, and some people abuse their access.

bronco21016 8y ago
I certainly don’t mean to discount the importance of metadata. I specifically mentioned ensuring Signal fits your threat model. To suggest that metadata of communication over Signal between my spouse and I will be used against my grand kids one day is a bit absurd though. Of course there’s tons of metadata connecting my spouse and I. It would be more suspicious if there wasn’t.
- e12e 8y ago
  Spouse, "family" and friends are different goalposts. Mapping friends and family is AFAIK a key part of who gets bombed by the cia. Sure, if your spouse is found to be an "enemy of the state" under a new totalitarian government - your immediate family will have problems. If a friend turns out to be union organizer, you might be banned from jobs, if the government decides to collude with employers (again).