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But maybe better pre-2009: > Surprisingly, modern Linux systems no longer collect entropy from IRQ timings. The Linux kernel maintainers deprecated the use of
by Scoundreller 8y ago
But maybe better pre-2009:
> Surprisingly, modern Linux systems no longer collect entropy from IRQ timings. The Linux kernel maintainers deprecated the use of this source in 2009 by removing the IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM flag, apparently to prevent events controlled or observable by an attacker from contributing to the entropy pools.
> Although mailing list discussions suggest the intent to replace it with new collection mech- anisms tailored to each interrupt-driven source [21], as of Linux 3.4.2 no such functions have been added to the ker- nel.
> The removal of IRQs as an entropy source has likely exacerbated RNG problems in headless and embedded devices, which often lack human input devices, disks, and multiple cores. If they do, the only source of entropy—if there are any at all—may be the time of boot.
- X6S1x6Okd1st 8y agoRemoving something from an entropy pool because it could be used by an attacker seems really odd to me.
- schoen 8y agoIt may have been inspired by arguments like https://blog.cr.yp.to/20140205-entropy.html https://blog.cr.yp.to/20140205-entropy.html (although that one was published five years later than the change we're talking about).
- clarry 8y agoThat would be rather misguided though. It's not like a device is going to know the exact time the interrupt handler routine would run, hash it, and go back "whoops, better not fire an interrupt yet because it won't be on the right tick!"
- loeg 8y agoNo. The fundamental problem — random blocks arbitrarily after seeding, and urandom does not block even before seeding — existed prior to the 2009 change.