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Ricochet-IM: Anonymous, decentralized, metadata-resistant instant messaging
- kodablah 8y agoI'm building something similar using Tor, but using v3 addresses. As v3 is now the default and recommended onion version, will this project move to them? The address are much larger and more unwieldy. However, I've found publishing ephemeral v3 services to be much faster (i.e. a couple of seconds vs a minute). Also since it's basically the ed25519 pub key, the address is enough to be able to verify signed content.
- sphinxpy 8y agoHave you published to git? I have been wanting to try Ricochet but its inactive state makes me nervous.
- kodablah 8y agoIn very early stages (like too early to know what's going on or why I'm taking certain approaches). However, I have built a couple libraries I leverage. There is a Tor embedder/controller [0] (with a project assisting with statically linked Tor [1]) and there is a Go wrapper for locally encrypted Sqlite [2] (which I need to update). That Tor controller even has a gRPC example that shows the basic idea of starting an onion service and communicating over Tor. 0 - https://github.com/cretz/bine https://github.com/cretz/bine 1 - https://github.com/cretz/tor-static https://github.com/cretz/tor-static 2 - https://github.com/cretz/go-sqleet https://github.com/cretz/go-sqleet
- sphinxpy 8y agoThanks for the links. I will check it out. Recently I created a hidden service using whonix but didn't get a chance to build the site itself. actually created a couple different types so I have a little, very little, experience in the creation and utilization of H.S. but I look forward to looking at your idea and work. The concept is something that has a lot of positive possibilities.
- alphagrep12345 8y agoTor can also be de-anonymized if a person controls a significant chunk of the network. However, if we keep changing the route constantly, (instead of establishing a static route during startup time and just reusing it, as tor does), we might make a much better and safer system. As you can expect, creating route takes time and defeats the purpose of IM.
- pseudalopex 8y agoTor changes routes every 10 minutes.
- jstanley 8y agoI believe cwtch[0] is essentially Ricochet, but with support for group chats and v3 addresses. [0] https://cwtch.im/ https://cwtch.im/
- kodablah 8y agoYup, saw them, they had even looked at using my Tor Go controller lib. I look forward to watching it develop towards end user friendliness. I am a fan of the project.
- owenversteeg 8y agoSo my security knowledge is a bit lacking. Is there anything that would make using cwtch less secure than using Riochet by itself?
- jstanley 8y agoJust potential vulnerabilities in the implementation AFAIK. Cwtch hasn't been audited whereas Ricochet has.
- digianarchist 8y agoConsider adding forward-secrecy and encrypting the payloads (beyond the Tor transport) as Richochet does neither.
- kodablah 8y ago> Consider adding forward-secrecy Considering. But since it is user-to-user, you can only trust the user to store it how they want since they are gonna see it in the clear at some point. Forward secrecy for the data at rest (i.e. in the DB) could have value but my current on-disk DB doesn't support this. But on the wire assumes MITM which should not be the case for user-to-onion. There is some defense in depth, but it's not something I'll target for MVP. There will be a built in data-expiration feature. > and encrypting the payload What does encrypting the payload help with when talking to an onion is already E2E encrypted? I do plan on encrypting at rest, but not in transit at least not at first. Could move to do TLS, but I'd be doubling Tor efforts because I'd probably just encrypt+sign w/ that same ed25519, so there'd be no real value.
- digianarchist 8y ago> "But since it is user-to-user, you can only trust the user to store it how they want since they are gonna see it in the clear at some point." That's a problem with almost every messaging system. I wouldn't worry about that. > "What does encrypting the payload help with when talking to an onion is already E2E encrypted?" It would be a requirement of PFS, but I meant encrypt at rest - my mistake.
- bflesch 8y agoProject seems inactive, last commit on github in mid-2017. Is there any special reason this was posted?
- johnchristopher 8y agoI think it's in reaction to Show HN: Whapp-irc – A simple WhatsApp IRC gateway (github.com) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18897347 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18897347 I think there's a pattern that an open source alternative or lookalike project gets posted when a proprietary one (or linked to a non-opensource one) hits the front page.
- DyslexicAtheist 8y agoI shared it because I've been messing around with ricochet this weekend. I did look at the sources and couldn't find anything that I hated. Some problems exist in the latest debian package (in sid) related to the AppArmor configuration ... (see my issue I created in their github). So this is how I ended up posting it ... I wasn't aware of this other WhatsApp post. WhatsApp is snakeoil imo. Though you're probably right about the tendency of people to share related things. Not just when a non FOSS project gets posted on HN but in general people remember similar things and then post it. See the comment here on briar, which is a promising project too. But it serves a different use-case - I want a non mobile solution I can run on FOSS system with FOSS hardware TL;DR: I no longer use phones in the traditional sense - only burner phones for 2FA without apps and not for making calls ... Ricochet delivers that because I can launch it via a Debian, Tails[1], QubesOS whatever ... :) [1] requires a little fuckery but not too bad: https://incoherency.co.uk/blog/stories/ricochet-tails.html https://incoherency.co.uk/blog/stories/ricochet-tails.html
- mkagenius 8y ago> Do not rely on Ricochet for your safety unless you have more trust in my work than it deserves This is an interesting line from the github readme. And I applaud for being humble. This is something which seemed lacking when I read about dapps (etherium) -- people rarely talked about having low trust on contracts written by somebody else.
- DyslexicAtheist 8y agoI personally prefer as you said the humble approach - in fact seeing any security software not display a big fat warning is for me a warning. Telegram has a RCE 0day, not to mention their snake-oil cryptography track record (Diffie-Hellman backdoor). Ricochet was audited in 2016: https://twitter.com/torproject/status/699668346921332737 https://twitter.com/torproject/status/699668346921332737 And since then things have moved forward only very slowly, but I do not see this as a sign of the project being abandoned more like that there aren't enough people to maintain it. FWIW the @torproject still endorses ricochet for now: https://twitter.com/torproject/status/1073322441836036096 https://twitter.com/torproject/status/1073322441836036096
- dfabulich 8y agoI don't think that's the same Ricochet? @Ricochet on Twitter is associated with Ricochet dot com, "the leading place for civil discussion of the center-right and beyond." It requires paid membership. (Though perhaps @torproject meant to link to this Ricochet IM product and not @Ricochet...?)
- DyslexicAtheist 8y agooh dear :D ... well spotted! that's most certainly not an endorsement for the former and was supposed to point to the ricochet IM. (facepalm) :)
- jstanley 8y agoFor avoidance of doubt: it is Ricochet IM that was security audited: https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/ricochet-security-assessment-public-report/ https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/ricochet-security... But yes looks like the tweet is @ the wrong account.
- aleken 8y agoBriar project is doing something similar. https://briarproject.org/ https://briarproject.org/ Actively developed
- dfabulich 8y agoThe design doc is here. https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet/blob/master/doc/design.md https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet/blob/master/doc/desi... It describes one of its goals as, "Resist blacklisting or denial of service against users." Preventing both blacklisting and DoS seems contradictory to me in an anonymous messaging protocol. If an anonymous party wants to spam me to make the product effectively unusable, I either need to be able to blacklist them, or to whitelist known contacts, in which case none of them are anonymous.
- jstanley 8y agoIt means there's no third party (including Ricochet devs!) that can blacklist users. You can easily delete contacts you don't want to receive messages from -- and in fact the UI is lacking in this regard: if you delete someone and subsequently change your mind, the only way to fix this is to edit the config file manually and remove them from the list of blocked contacts. Source: am a very happy Ricochet user.
- dfabulich 8y agoBut the anonymous user can create N anonymous accounts and spam you N times with N accounts, right? That's where spam forces us to choose between blacklisting people and whitelisting (which breaks anonymity).
- jstanley 8y agoSure, then you'd get N contact requests which you'd have to ignore (which has the same effect as deleting a contact which you'd previously accepted). But people can spam your email account as well. When this became a problem, spam filters were developed. There's no reason the same thing couldn't happen in Ricochet if spam became a problem. Ricochet's problem isn't that too many spammers are using it. It's that almost nobody at all is using it.
- dfabulich 8y agoEmail spam filters didn't/don't actually work that well without de-anonymizing features like SPF and DKIM. I'm not saying that spam is a problem today, but that the design goals of Richochet don't allow it to deal with the spam problem for users who actually want anonymous messaging.
- est 8y agoI hope open source IM focus more on client usability & UX. Many of the feature centric programs are simply too ugly to use.