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If you're not on the largest coin for any particular interchangeable hashing algorithm then you're susceptible to these attacks, as people from a larger coin co
by CydeWeys 8y ago
If you're not on the largest coin for any particular interchangeable hashing algorithm then you're susceptible to these attacks, as people from a larger coin could simply turn their hardware against you and take you out.
That means: For SHA256^2-specific hardware, Bitcoin (the real one, not Cash, Gold, or SV), for scrypt, Litecoin, and for anything mined on GPUs, Ethereum (not Classic).
- lvs 8y agoA defense against this is merged mining (e.g. Dogecoin and Litecoin, Namecoin and Bitcoin).
- sp332 8y agopeople from a larger coin could simply turn their hardware against you and take you out. Only at the expense of leaving their coin more vulnerable to a similar attack.
- CydeWeys 8y agoNot if you're much larger than the alternatives, which tends to be the case.
- kuhhk 8y agoOr they could just hop amongst 50 $smallCoins, destroying each, before jumping back into BTC/ETH. Thereby destroying all $smallCoins and driving users into $bigCoin
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- garmaine 8y agoNot until the difficulty adjusts, and the attack takes less time than that to execute. And they'd have to be equally sized to actually leave the other coin vulnerable in any case, not asymmetric as in this case.
- jonahx 8y agoWould you mind elaborating on this for someone unfamiliar?
- mikeyouse 8y agoMost proof of work coins use unique hashing algorithms and the miners are custom-designed ASICs that are extremely efficient at that one specific algorithm. If per chance, your coin uses the same algorithm as Bitcoin [ SHA-256(SHA-256(Block Header)) ], a small portion of the much larger Bitcoin mining community could turn their miners toward the smaller coin and quickly overwhelm their network to perform a 51% attack. The Bitcoin community can perform something like 40 billion gigahashes per second, most 'shitcoins' have total mining capabilities of 0.05x that if not less. It's a quick economic calculation for any miner or group of miners to decide to attack a smaller double-SHA-256 coin, as long as the total hashing power of the smaller coin's network is small enough and the coin valuable enough.
- jancsika 8y agoImagine all the Bitcoin miners out there right now using their ASICs to do extremely efficient hashing in the hopes of generating a block reward. Let's didactically suppose there are 100 such miners total. Now imagine Dinkycoin comes along and releases their cryptocurrency that uses the same hashing mechanism for the block reward. Initially they have the block difficulty level pretty low as there aren't that many people participating in it yet. Dinkycoin hopes that eventually enough people will join the network so that the total hashing power will be something approaching Bitcoin's. Great. But atm their total hashing power is a very small fraction of Bitcoin's total hashing power. I don't care enough to go find out how infinitesimal it would be-- enough to say very small. Now suppose one of the Bitcoin ASIC miners gets bored one day and decides they don't like Dinkycoin. If they devote their ASIC to mining Dinkycoin they will immediately have more hashing power that the rest of the Dinkycoin network. That would virtually guarantee they solve every block of Dinkycoin and reap every reward. They'd easily have 100% control of the network at that point. For example-- suppose Dinkycoin says you need 20 confirmations before accepting that a transaction "went through." Well, the Bitcoin miner can use their enormous hashing power to go back 20/30/whatever blocks and build a competing branch from that historical point. And since the miner has 1000% more hashing power (or whatever the number is) than the entire Dinkycoin network, they can build a competing branch from that historical point that will eventually have solved more/more difficult block rewards than the branch the rest of the network builds off the current branch. Once the Bitcoin miner has a competing branch with greater total difficulty than the rest of the network, the network must accept that branch as the winner. Well, the devs can decide to do otherwise for whatever professed reason and roll back/hard fork/whatever. But that kind of "do over" would degrade trust in the cryptocurrency itself. Users would be afraid of another future attack. After all, they were initially told 20 confirmations was enough. How do they know 40 confirmations is any safer? (And again, if the attacker has superior hashing power to the rest of the network it isn't meaningfully safer.) Of course such a miner would be wasting all of their hashing power to screw with Dinkycoin's network. But to screw up most PoW cryptocurrencies you only really need 51% of the total hashing power. Even with that the attacker will eventually always beat the rest of the network to produce the "longest" chain. (Also, I think you can still cause problems for many cryptocurrencies with even less than 51% control.) Anyhow, do the math with the real numbers and you'll see that a real Bitcoin miner could devote a tiny percentage of their mining power and still own fledgling cryptocurrencies like the Dinkycoin example. Moreover, they can trivially collude with the other 99 Bitcoin miners to devote an even smaller part of their hashing power to owning Dinkycoin, or even automate the process of smashing any coin that uses their same hashing scheme, based on any criteria whatsoever. And it gets worse because in the 51% percent attacks I've read about in the real world, it isn't a big time miner with a grudge. Rather, it's someone who saw a weak point in a combination of a dinkycoin, an exchange, and several other moving parts and just rented a hashing rig to pull off an attack. Most PoW cryptocurrencies naively assume miners will choose greed over destructive tendencies without ever investigating whether those two paths are really mutually exclusive. Edit: clarification Edit: what happened to the web site that compares hashing power of the various SHA256-based coins, scrypt, etc.? Those orders-of-magnitude differences are quite instructive. But I can't find a site that lays it out nicely.
- WalterSear 8y agoHooray decentralization!
- Scoundreller 8y agoIf a 51% attack is mounted by adding hash power, wouldn’t the existing miners on the target coin also start shutting down[1] because the competition is higher, reinforcing the strength of the attackers? [1] or migrate from to another coin, such as the coin that the attackers left to fill their void?
- bdonlan 8y agoWith a 51% attack the additional hash power is not visible on the chain until the attack is triggered to perform a rollback.
- Scott_Sanderson 8y agoSorry for being that guy, but it is usually called a re-org not a rollback
- dragontamer 8y ago51% attackers mine in secret. Basically, you spend your coins today, while controlling a 51% share. When everyone else's 49% hash-power creates 98 blocks, your 51% share will create 102 blocks. But secretly. That's the key. Now that your chain is +4 ahead (or wait even longer and become +10 ahead), you can spend your coins on the public chain. Then, you publish your 102 alternative blocks (which barely adds any hash power to the chain), and spend your coins again on the 2nd chain. A 51% is the end-all-be-all for a cryptocoin. If you're vulnerable to the 51% attack, the coin is effectively worthless. ----- The only way to beat a 51% attack is to build more hash power than the attackers. IE: Prevent the attackers from getting to 51%.
- koolba 8y agoOr wait for many more confirms that the attack is impractical.
- dragontamer 8y agoI'm not sure that is possible. If a 51% attack for 1-week costs $1-million USD to pull off (hypothetical round numbers against a hypothetical coin)... then how many confirms do you wait for? If you wait for 1008 confirms (for a transaction of $1 Million USD), then that doesn't stop the attack at all. After all, the attacker simply has to perform $2 Million USD worth of double-spends during that timeframe to make a profit. (Not necessarily with you, but across the entire blockchain). After waiting 1008 confirms (1-week for a 10 minute/block coin), the attacker simply replaces those 1008 blocks with his 1049 secret-blocks and makes his chain the longest. That means that ALL spends for the past week are nullified, allowing the attacker to double-spend his coins on the new blockchain. ---------- In effect, waiting for 1000-confirms (or whatever) is closing the barn door after the horse has bolted. It doesn't protect your transaction... it protects the NEXT GUY's transaction. In any case, the attacker gets to double-spend his money, which probably includes a large exchange (where you can turn coins into US Dollars easily).