4 ms·
Senior network engineer for an mid sized ISP here: These people should be ashamed of themselves. I honestly don't care even the tiniest bit about whatever sort
by walrus01 8y ago
Senior network engineer for an mid sized ISP here: These people should be ashamed of themselves. I honestly don't care even the tiniest bit about whatever sort of excuses or justification they put up.
It should not be necessary for a consumer end user (whether residential or business) of an ISP in the US or Canada to treat their ISP as hostile, and develop workarounds like VPN tunneling their traffic, such as I would do if I found myself using an ISP in Turkey for a month.
This bullshit of injecting content into pages has been tried before, a long time ago by Comcast. I really don't see the point to it in an era of LetsEncrypt and nearly everything worthwhile moving to TLS1.2 or better end-to-end.
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/08/comcasts-dns-redirect-service-goes-nationwide/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/08/comcasts-dns-red...
Also you absolutely should not mess with DNS returns from your client-facing recursive resolvers. Various ISPs have tried things like redirecting nonexist results to pages laden with "suggestions" and "advertising".
- api 8y agoUnfortunately enough ISPs have abused their position that treating them as hostile is where we're going. VPNs are a stopgap. The future is end-to-end encrypted protocols like QUIC that obscure even connection state information and prevent anything from being modified in transit at all, DNS over HTTPS, etc. Everything has to be encrypted and authenticated end-to-end.
- walrus01 8y agoYes, I agree. If the global internet community is developing software to deal with threat models that deal with a worst case scenario (the government of Uzbekistan ordering ISPs to randomly block things), the Chinese great firewall, and so forth, we absolutely need technology like encrypted SNI in TLS1.3 and similar. If we develop software with end-to-end crypto to deal with repressive-regime threat models, its crypto should also be inherently sufficient to deal with more normal traffic interception and modification attempts. A lot of non democratic regimes in places outside of North America take a very blunt approach, of having government agencies order all of their domestic ISPs to simply null route huge chunks of the Internet (like, entire ipv6 /16s belonging to Azure and AWS) in order to ban politically objectionable sites. Or to order all ISPs to be singlehomed to, and downstream of the government state run telecom. There is one ASN in Iran which is allowed to have international IP transit connectivity to other non-Iranian ASes, for instance. https://bgp.he.net/AS12880 https://bgp.he.net/AS12880
- jillesvangurp 8y agoYes, men in the middle cannot be trusted. Especially ISPs. Most mean well but are incompetent. Some don't mean well and are incompetent. ISPs that mean well and actually know what they are doing are relatively rare. If you have a device with wifi, most of the time you are on untrusted networks. So, it makes no sense whatsoever to default to some random isp's DNS just because the wifi you are on is suggesting that you use it.
- behringer 8y agoThey're only rare because their CEOs go to jail: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nacchio https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nacchio https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2015/04/29/joe-nacchio-speaks-out-on-prison-broken-justice.html https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2015/04/29/joe-nacch...
- gnode 8y ago> Everything has to be encrypted and authenticated end-to-end. This isn't really enough. Even with QUIC / TLS your ISP can still know what endpoint you're connecting to, which may in itself be too bad. This is the problem VPNs are solving (or at least moving the trust). There's also the touted alternative of conglomerate everything onto Cloudflare and have encrypted SNI.
- walrus01 8y agoIf your ISP is doing netflow analysis and DPI on your connection (like the Chinese GFW), with malicious intent specifically aimed at you, you're pretty much screwed anyhow. If they decide to start blocking traffic to VPN endpoints and such. This can be seen if you try running a non-obfuscated openvpn link into and out of China.
- gnode 8y agoExcluding steganography, an eavesdropper will know if they're unable to understand your communications. What's important is that what they can glean isn't enough for them to be specifically motivated or able to harm you. Being seen to be using a VPN only labels you as a VPN user. In China, the authorities dislike individual VPN use, and attempt to curb it with technical measures, but for the most part, they don't go around imprisoning people only for VPN use, because there isn't much expected gain to be had from the average VPN user.
- walrus01 8y agoThe new thing with the GFW in the last 3-4 years is to identify VPN-resembling traffic from DPI, using a fully automated/scripted system, and then over a period of several hours/days, the GFW causes incredibly high packet loss for all traffic to/from the non-china endpoint, eventually culminating in a nullroute of all traffic.
- dylz 8y agoWithout malicious intent, ISPs are already doing this, both to sell aggregated traffic data and to shit all over their network. On Sprint and ATT Mobility I cannot maintain many TCP connections for long durations - websockets will be killed after a while and require reconnection, long-connected TCP games will drop after a few minutes, quite a handful of HTTPS/TLS sites do not load and immediately hardfail with a TLS protocol error or connection reset, traffic appears modified and periodically injected, DNS is hijacked, images' hash values do not match the server side on plaintext connections, NXDOMAIN DNS values are hijacked, traffic crossing any port will be tampered with as long as it looks like HTTP/1.x, etc.
- WorldMaker 8y agoUnfortunately even QUIC and DNS over HTTPS can't save us from the ISPs (and Enterprise ITs) that think TLS/SSL proxies are a good idea, and especially sadly things like QUIC and DNS over HTTPS may push more ISPs towards that line of thinking.
- jimktrains2 8y agoThat would still require a custom cert installed on the end user device, which may not be feasible in the case of some iot devices and generally a pain for most users in general, especially as more websites pin their certificates.
- WorldMaker 8y agoPain for the users has never stopped enterprises from doing it, sadly.
- jimktrains2 8y agoThat is often handled by group policy. I'm not entirely aure how pinni is handled, maybe it's disabled in ie or chrome via group policy too?
- WorldMaker 8y agoJust because it is handled automatically by "group policy" doesn't mean that users don't feel day-to-day pains from it. It just means it is more likely that don't understand where their pain is coming from. ("If I pull up google.com in Chrome or IE it works, but why can't I use Firefox?" "Because we don't support it here." [Because group policy deploying CA certificates to it is harder and it has stricter CA requirements, such as no self-signed certs.]) Enterprise IT can sweep some of that under the rug by controlling which software is allowable to be installed at all, but there's always going to be edge cases in a TLS Interception environment to cause users papercuts, at the very least. To answer your direct question: So far pinning in browsers is still just TOFU [Trust on First Use], I think? So pinning alone still works with TLS Interception so long as it is intercepted on Day One. The Chrome security team has been threatening for a couple versions now that certain pinned lists, including (but not limited to) Google's own sites, would be baked into the browser in such a way that no one should be able to disable them. I wish they have the gumption to pull that off. With Chrome being the current darling browser of a lot of the same IT groups using TLS Interception, that might actually send a clear message that TLS Interception is a bad idea. Unfortunately, it might just be received as "Here's Google's list of sites that have to be whitelisted or outright blocked from our Interception Proxies so as not to confuse our users", but that would still be a step in the right direction in so far as end-to-end internet security.
- liveoneggs 8y agoI attempted to organize resistance within the dns/network group when my former job had us implement this but did not get any support. Oh well.
- WorldMaker 8y agoMy ISP (Time Warner/Charter/Spectrum) DNS hijacked bing.com [0] and non-existent domains for their own "search page" [1]. Since then I've been sure to always configure my own DNS in my router. (Used Google's 8s for a while, now on Cloudflare's 1s.) It's unfortunate that I have to treat my ISP as hostile, but they are the only high speed provider to my address. I sadly can't even assume that there is anyone in management there that feels ashamed at their hostile practices. It's just "good business" to squeeze free ad dollars from your users as you take advantage of your monopoly position to keep prices as high as the market will bear while doing so. [0] Even if I didn't prefer Bing, hijacking any of the major search engines just because it might be an "accidental default" and "no one would notice" is just wrong on so many levels. [1] Scare quotes because it was 90% terrible ads and 10% barely legible search results from who knows what API.
- markovbot 8y agoThat's horrible, did you call them up and ask why their DNS servers are fraudulently lying about IP addresses of certain high traffic domains?
- WorldMaker 8y agoI hate how the conversation goes when I ask them why they are adding fees to my bills that don't make any sense. (I intentionally own all my own equipment, why would I ever have an "equipment return fee" show up other than them trying to screw me over and see if I notice?) I complained to some friends that are very low on the totem pole and they agreed with me that DNS hijacking is extremely wrong but had zero power to do anything. We need strong Regulatory Commissions to hold these sorts of Monopolists accountable, and right now the political climate in states like mine remains that "Regulations are Bad" and "Profit/Greed are Good".
- jrnichols 8y agoI have the feeling they wouldn't get much past the overly scripted front line service, unfortunately.
- 8y ago
- haasted 8y agoLet’s not forget to include Belkin among the companies that have attempted variations of this. In this case, it was their wireless router which would grab a random out-going request and serve up advertisements instead. Imagine being in the middle of buying plane tickets and suddenly finding yourself at a random advertisement. https://www.geek.com/news/belkin-routers-misdirect-users-to-advertising-sites-553765/ https://www.geek.com/news/belkin-routers-misdirect-users-to-...
- walrus01 8y agocheap router manufacturers have been doing dumb things for a long time: http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~plonka/netgear-sntp/ http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~plonka/netgear-sntp/
- JohnFen 8y ago"It should not be necessary for a consumer end user (whether residential or business) of an ISP in the US or Canada to treat their ISP as hostile" It should not be, I agree, but the sad fact is that if the ISP is one of the heavy-hitters, then you absolutely have to treat them as a hostile force to be defended against and worked around. Because they are.
- skuhn 8y agoComcast is still doing content injection, for a similar reason. If you go over your monthly quota, they inject a pop-window into HTTP sites to inform you. Every other business manages to inform customers by e-mail or text message or phone call, but ISPs have these additional options by virtue of the product they provide and they just can't seem to help themselves (at least for the large shitty ones, which they all become eventually).
- anticensor 8y agoWhich mid-sized Turkish ISP do you work at? Netspeed or TÜRK.net?