4 ms·
Attack or otherwise, this is ultimately a hardware reliability problem. Any access pattern that can cause bit errors is indicative of faulty memory. If I rememb
by userbinator 8y ago
Attack or otherwise, this is ultimately a hardware reliability problem. Any access pattern that can cause bit errors is indicative of faulty memory. If I remember correctly, the original Rowhammer paper shows that RAM from ~2009 and before was completely unaffected. Yet in the continuing quest for higher densities and lower costs (is RAM not cheap enough already?) the manufacturers are sacrificing reliability and correctness, and IMHO that is not acceptable, nor is their insistence that this is not a problem (it seems they were powerful enough to convince one well-known memory testing application to make the RH test optional(!) and spread FUD that it wasn't really a concern if that test failed, because a lot of RAM would fail it.) NO access pattern should ever cause errors to occur on correctly functioning hardware.
- firethief 8y agoSometimes it's worth dealing with complex abstractions in a higher layer rather than making the sacrifices necessary to implement a neat abstraction natively. The problem of corruption at the physical layer when certain types of bit pattern occur is also encountered when transmitting data over a wire; constraining the physical parameters to remain suitable for the naive representation of binary works well for getting a signal across the PCB, but would be extremely limiting at intranet scales. The usual approach is to modulate the data in a way that avoids encoding the problematic bit patterns. Are the tradeoffs necessary to maintain the simple abstraction worth it in this case? I don't know, but considering how much of a bottleneck RAM has become for modern hardware, I think it's worth considering the alternatives.
- clhodapp 8y agoI think the problem here is that nothing at a higher layer is mitigating the effect of the attack. It's not so much a choice to put the complexity where it is cheapest as it is a total ball-drop on overall composite system correctness (and thus security). From a different angle: I think your point is fair but I also think that for it to apply to this situation, the memory vendors would have needed to loudly and openly say that they were invoking that tradeoff so the OS vendors could adjust. Presumably that would also result in a lot of benchmarking being done to see if the net effect of a physical-layer vulnerability and a software-layer mitigation was actually a net positive.
- mindslight 8y agoSure, but the abstraction of "RAM" basically prescribes something uniform and lossless, fundamental to the operation of most any software. If we can make volatile memory chips significantly more dense by letting them be lossy, then lets either add another layer to the memory hierarchy and/or rename L3 cache to RAM and move the L3<->L4 mechanics into real software. At any rate, manufacturers shouldn't just be silently eroding the abstraction so they can compete on density harder.
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 8y agoThere is nothing wrong with tradeoffs. There is everything wrong with violating an agreed-upon abstraction while pretending that you are not. There is nothing wrong with selling RAM where certain access patterns corrupt the content in predictable ways. There is everything wrong though with selling that RAM for use in systems that are known to expect RAM to return exactly the bits written to it with a certain (high) degree of reliability. And it is wrong precisely because it is not a tradeoff. If you are honest about the properties of the RAM you are selling, then that is the basis for the system designer to make a decision whether using your RAM with an appropriate interface is a better choice than using more reliable RAM with a "traditional interface". Pretending that your RAM is suitable for the "traditional interface" is what prevents the tradeoff from happening and is essentially fraudulent.
- jacob019 8y agoUnfortunately (consumer) markets rarely agree with this sentiment. A race to the bottom is normal.
- throwawaymath 8y ago> is RAM not cheap enough already? RAM is pretty expensive.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- Cyphase 8y agoRelative to what?
- peteretep 8y ago> IMHO that is not acceptable, nor is their insistence that this is not a problem It seems the market doesn’t agree with you. Why do you think that is?
- astazangasta 8y agoBecause markets summarize information in a single variable, price, and thus make it difficult for consumers to observe the erosion of quality that goes along with lower price. This is especially true if there is a concerted effort to pretend that the loss of quality is minimal or unimportant. Thus we end up with cheap crap everywhere; within a decade people have forgotten that they ever had a higher-quality product available and accept the new, lower standard as their baseline.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- wybiral 8y agoIt can take time before the market catches up to what is happening and responds.
- TeMPOraL 8y agoBecause in a competitive environment, any value that can be sacrificed by one party to briefly get ahead of their competitors, will be sacrificed by everyone. That includes "quality", "correctness", and "not lying about it". Also known as race to the bottom.
- twtw 8y agoCalm down. If you want lower performance in return for better reliability and security, just turn on the mitigations and/or increase the refresh rate.
- Dylan16807 8y agoProperly done Target Row Refresh has a circuit-size cost around 0.1-0.2% and a performance cost of 0% or <0.1% depending on whether an attack is happening. The serious impacts show up when you can't rely on it being done properly, and have to use expensive workarounds.