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I think it largely comes from uninterrogated/unrevised dualisms applied to the scientistic world. I think of Rosenberg's eliminativism as follows: a) Platonic
by evdev 8y ago
I think it largely comes from uninterrogated/unrevised dualisms applied to the scientistic world. I think of Rosenberg's eliminativism as follows:
a) Platonic realism is the only way our semantic categories/abstractions could be meaningful.
b) The world is physical (platonism is not true).
c) All our categories are meaningless! Our abstractions are unreal!
You can see it all follows from a), and there are serious questions about whether this is actually a physicalist philosophy...
- joe_the_user 8y agoIf instead of requiring various concepts of philosophy to be real, one simply requires them to be irreducible - not explanable as an ensemble effect of a larger system - then one winds-up with nearly the same thing. And I don't know how this requirement of irreducibility isn't a part of many philosophical views of the mind - specifically, isn't that what's important about "qualia", that they are irreducible?
- evdev 8y agoWhy would you require this? Concepts can either be a part meaningfully differentiated from the whole (neocortex, hypothalamus -> the whole brain) or an aggregate that while reducible to more basic parts is meaningfully differentiated from other similarly reduced aggregates (neocortex vs. hypothalamus). What seems to define the demand for the "real" or "irreducible" is wanting the nature of reality to in some sense "do" this differentiation "for us". And yes I would say that "qualia" insists on dualism.
- Nevermark 8y agoI agree but would fine tune your last statement to: "Assuming the experience of "qualia" is irreducible is to insist on dualism." The Qualia does exist. Unfortunately, no one can be told what the The Qualia is. You have to see it for yourself.