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> There is a significant difference between deterring personal crimes (e.g. robbery at gunpoint, carjacking, murder) and deterring 'economic crime'. The relati
by AnthonyMouse 8y ago
> There is a significant difference between deterring personal crimes (e.g. robbery at gunpoint, carjacking, murder) and deterring 'economic crime'.
The relationship is the opposite of the one you're describing.
The problem with personal crimes is that everyone has a different utility function. If you could steal a million dollars at risk of a month in jail, many people would take the risk. Fewer at six months in jail. Fewer still at a year. Fewer still at five years. So you need as high a penalty as you can get without violating proportionality (or reaching the point of diminishing returns, once nearly everyone who can be is deterred).
There are some people who aren't even deterred by the death penalty, e.g. because they'd rather have the money needed to save their kid's life even if it costs them their own, but that's pretty rare. Most of the people who aren't deterred by even large penalties are simply the people who don't expect to be caught, or don't realize they were violating of the law to begin with.
By contrast, for economic crimes, nearly everyone's utility function is the same. If you can save $2000 by taking a 50% risk of having to pay the $2000 anyway plus a $1500 fine, it's profitable. If you can save $2000 by taking a 50% risk of paying the $2000 anyway plus a $2500 fine, it isn't. A $3000 fine provides no additional deterrence, and anything more is just a money grab. Even the $1500 fine may be higher than strictly necessary, because getting fined at all results in a PR hit that independently provides a non-zero deterrence value.
That isn't to say that a small fine won't leave a large number of violators, but they're no longer the people overtly doing the calculations. They're the people who assign negligible probability to getting caught, or who don't even realize they're violating the law. No amount of higher penalties will deter them, the only thing that works against that group is vigorous enforcement -- which works fine (better even) with modest penalties, because all you really need to do to get those groups into compliance is to tap them on the shoulder and explain how they're not.
- pbhjpbhj 8y ago>everyone's utility function is the same // It really isn't. The cost of a $2000 for a poor person is huge, the cost for a richer person - whilst significant - is not debilitating. If you've 10% chance of getting caught then a rich person can afford it, getting caught really doesn't hurt so much. That's why progressive justice systems use means tested fines for things like speeding. I'm going to guess you're relatively wealthy, your analysis seems entirely wrong to me. What you get with small fines is people will pay, even if they didn't deserve the fine, because of the cost of time/effort to challenge it. If a company can save €100k for multiple years, the only downside being that if they're the 1:10000 that are caught they'll have a €20k fine, the financial analysis - morals aside - says don't pay, unless the €20k would sink you.
- AnthonyMouse 8y ago> The cost of a $2000 for a poor person is huge, the cost for a richer person - whilst significant - is not debilitating. Which is irrelevant for economic issues because both values are in the same units. An hour may be worth more than $500 for a rich person and not a poor person, but $3500 is more than $2000 for everybody. > That's why progressive justice systems use means tested fines for things like speeding. Then the super rich will hire a chauffeur to do their speeding for them, or fly in a helicopter, so all you're doing is creating a differential between the low and middle income people. But then either the fine is oppressively high for middle income people or is an inadequate deterrent for lower income people. Because dollars have a declining marginal utility when you get more, but the relationship isn't linear. Someone who makes $60,000 may have effectively the same disposable income as someone who makes $30,000 (i.e. both near zero) because the first person has higher costs (housing/transportation/other cost of living) needed to live in the area where the higher paying job exists. You also end up penalizing the person who has "double the income" because they have three kids to support and have to work two jobs. Means tested fines are a populist farce. > What you get with small fines is people will pay, even if they didn't deserve the fine, because of the cost of time/effort to challenge it. This is not a deterrence issue, and can be solved by returning to the person the true entire cost of the resources and time taken to successfully challenge a false claim against them. > If a company can save €100k for multiple years, the only downside being that if they're the 1:10000 that are caught they'll have a €20k fine, the financial analysis - morals aside - says don't pay, unless the €20k would sink you. If the €20k would sink you then surely the €100k/year would, so the amount of the fine in that case is irrelevant. The real problem in your scenario is the 1:10000 chance of getting caught. If you could clear €100k/year for ten years with a 1:10000 chance of getting caught, the fine would have to be ~€10B, which would obviously annihilate any entity for which €100k/year was a meaningful amount of money to be worth skimping to begin with. Which means that no amount exists that could act as an adequate deterrent for a small organization and that probability of getting caught. Any amount over their total enterprise value couldn't actually be paid and therefore doesn't act as a deterrent. What you need is to improve the chances that they'll be caught. In which case you don't need such a large fine.