4 ms·

I think "someone sitting in the pilot's seat will always be able to crash the plane" is a pretty reasonable assumption. (How do you prevent an intentional cartw

I think "someone sitting in the pilot's seat will always be able to crash the plane" is a pretty reasonable assumption. (How do you prevent an intentional cartwheel on takeoff or landing? There are regions of the flight envelope where 2-3 seconds of pessimal input are unrecoverable. ATC override won't help you there) So given that, we aren't trying to prevent the pilot/copilot from intentionally crashing the plane, we're trying to prevent two things: 1. Prevent any passenger on the flight from crashing the plane 2. Prevent anyone from crashing the plane into a location of their choice Locking cockpit doors prevent the first one. Locking cockpit doors plus 2-in-cockpit rules (as mandated by the FAA, and not implemented by GermanWings) do a good job of preventing the second.

DoctorOetker 8y ago
>I think "someone sitting in the pilot's seat will always be able to crash the plane" is a pretty reasonable assumption. The English language is a bit poor on existential and universal quantifiers, which renders the above sentence a bit ambiguous: it could be interpreted as 1) "For every flight and prevention method there will always exist some opportunities for a pilot to crash the plane" (with which I tend to agree) or 2) "For every flight and prevention method, the pilot will at all times be able to crash the plane" (with which I don't agree) >(How do you prevent an intentional cartwheel on takeoff or landing? There are regions of the flight envelope where 2-3 seconds of pessimal input are unrecoverable. ATC override won't help you there) I tend to agree. >So given that, we aren't trying to prevent the pilot/copilot from intentionally crashing the plane This doesn't follow. We can still limit the attack scenarios to say situations like landing and taking off. It doesn't need to be binary, a reduction in threats is still desriable. For example if Lubitz had been even more antisocial in his destruction by suicide, he could easily have crashed the plane into the surface storage for nuclear waste next to a nuclear power plant. The reactor itself does not house that much nuclear material, while the typical surface storage next to it tends to contain a lot of nuclear waste. He might still kill the passengers on landing and take off, but as crude as it sounds, it's still better than losing the very same passengers and having a nuclear contamination on our hands! The 2-in-cockpit rule sounds rather weak in my opinion, as it becomes a matter of who is stronger or who strikes first, the element of surprise etc...
FabHK 8y ago
> someone sitting in the pilot's seat will always be able to crash the plane yeah, in the Airbus A300 just kick the rudders a few times fully left to right (see American Airlines Flight 587) [1] > 2-in-cockpit rules (as mandated by the FAA, and not implemented by GermanWings) Just to clarify, GermanWings was not under FAA jurisdiction, so the 2-in-cockpit rule did not apply. Also, EASA implemented the 2-in-cockpit rule in 2015 after the GermanWings accident [2], but withdrew it in 2016 and replaced it with a more flexible rule [3] after consultation with stakeholders, as "the rule to have 2 persons in the cockpit at all times introduces additional safety and security risks." [4] As I said somewhere above, there's rarely scope for a pareto improvement in aviation. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587 [2] https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/easa-recommends-minimum-two-crew-cockpit https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/easa-rec... [3] https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/minimum-cockpit-occupancy-easa-issues-revised-safety-information-bulletin https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/minimum-... [4] https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/end-2-persons-cockpit-rule-sight https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/end-2-persons-cockpit-rule-s...
- foldr 8y ago
  >yeah, in the Airbus A300 just kick the rudders a few times fully left to right Kicking the rudder fully left to right a few times would most likely put any modern airliner outside of its structural limits (and would probably injure lots of passengers even if it didn't). I believe the A300 had very sensitive rudder controls, which made it possible to create extreme loads on the rudder via a sequence of relatively small back-and-forth movements.

DoctorOetker 8y ago

>I think "someone sitting in the pilot's seat will always be able to crash the plane" is a pretty reasonable assumption. The English language is a bit poor on existential and universal quantifiers, which renders the above sentence a bit ambiguous: it could be interpreted as 1) "For every flight and prevention method there will always exist some opportunities for a pilot to crash the plane" (with which I tend to agree) or 2) "For every flight and prevention method, the pilot will at all times be able to crash the plane" (with which I don't agree) >(How do you prevent an intentional cartwheel on takeoff or landing? There are regions of the flight envelope where 2-3 seconds of pessimal input are unrecoverable. ATC override won't help you there) I tend to agree. >So given that, we aren't trying to prevent the pilot/copilot from intentionally crashing the plane This doesn't follow. We can still limit the attack scenarios to say situations like landing and taking off. It doesn't need to be binary, a reduction in threats is still desriable. For example if Lubitz had been even more antisocial in his destruction by suicide, he could easily have crashed the plane into the surface storage for nuclear waste next to a nuclear power plant. The reactor itself does not house that much nuclear material, while the typical surface storage next to it tends to contain a lot of nuclear waste. He might still kill the passengers on landing and take off, but as crude as it sounds, it's still better than losing the very same passengers and having a nuclear contamination on our hands! The 2-in-cockpit rule sounds rather weak in my opinion, as it becomes a matter of who is stronger or who strikes first, the element of surprise etc...

FabHK 8y ago

> someone sitting in the pilot's seat will always be able to crash the plane yeah, in the Airbus A300 just kick the rudders a few times fully left to right (see American Airlines Flight 587) [1] > 2-in-cockpit rules (as mandated by the FAA, and not implemented by GermanWings) Just to clarify, GermanWings was not under FAA jurisdiction, so the 2-in-cockpit rule did not apply. Also, EASA implemented the 2-in-cockpit rule in 2015 after the GermanWings accident [2], but withdrew it in 2016 and replaced it with a more flexible rule [3] after consultation with stakeholders, as "the rule to have 2 persons in the cockpit at all times introduces additional safety and security risks." [4] As I said somewhere above, there's rarely scope for a pareto improvement in aviation. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587 [2] https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/easa-recommends-minimum-two-crew-cockpit https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/easa-rec... [3] https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/minimum-cockpit-occupancy-easa-issues-revised-safety-information-bulletin https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/minimum-... [4] https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/end-2-persons-cockpit-rule-sight https://www.eurocockpit.be/news/end-2-persons-cockpit-rule-s...

foldr 8y ago
>yeah, in the Airbus A300 just kick the rudders a few times fully left to right Kicking the rudder fully left to right a few times would most likely put any modern airliner outside of its structural limits (and would probably injure lots of passengers even if it didn't). I believe the A300 had very sensitive rudder controls, which made it possible to create extreme loads on the rudder via a sequence of relatively small back-and-forth movements.