4 ms·

I had a similar reaction. Nondeterministic conceptions of free will similar to that of this paper are really more like an intoxicated state or something, where

• simonh 8y ago
  >The prior state idea seems more accurate, but even that (at least in its extreme state) doesn't seem to me to encapsulate the idea of free will because it disallows the idea of a decision being undetermined and free to decide. I certainly think randomness comes into play for sure, but conceptually my personal prior state might include a source of randomness. It could be just one factor, and I might make choices based on my memories and preferences to allow greater or lesser input from that randomness, or I might lack the mental tools to prevent that randomness from manifesting in my actions. At an extreme that might be a form of pathology and then we can talk about the limits of personal responsibility in various circumstances. The idea that my state leads to my decisions still holds though.
  • fjuerfilis 8y ago
    Yes, I agree that is one model, but what I wrestle with ultimately I suppose is whether indeterminism per se is what defines free will, in part or whole. If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Does that encapsulate the notion of free will? Maybe? But both of those are still causally deterministic in a sense, in that even with randomness, there's some point at which the random components of the system causally impinge on the systematic part. I think at some point notions of intervention or change become critical. So, for example, I think implicit in the idea of free will is the idea that an individual can freely choose to change their decision in some repeatability sense, and this change cannot necessarily happen in any other way, such as from outside influence. Just to make it clear, let's say there's two choices or choice types, A and B. A is "bad" and B is "good," in whatever sense (utilitarian, moral, whatever). Key to the notion of free will it seems is that one could change, of their own volition, their choice, from A->B or B->A. In practice we can't rewind time or transport to possible worlds in a counterfactual sense, but we do talk about decisions as interchangeable and repeatable. E.g., someone can choose whether or not to take a drug at one point, and then, at a later point, choose again whether or not to take the drug. In one metaphysical sense, those decisions are not the same because circumstances have changed, but we treat them as the same. I think the idea of free will is that someone could change their decision, to an extent that another person could not. That is, I cannot make you change your choice, only you can. This is fine at some level, but what if someone wants to change their mind but cannot? E.g., a drug addict or someone trying to lose weight? What about something simpler, like decision under a lapse in attention? How do we define volition or lack thereof? Or, maybe more importantly, let's say the external individual in question is omniscient. If an omniscient external individual cannot alter your behavior, why would you hold that individual responsible in a free will sense? That is, let's say someone truly wants to change, but an omniscient being could not even help and change them. Why should the non-omniscient individual seeking change be held responsible? This is all stream-of-consciousness, but I think at some point the notion of free will starts to lead to counterintuitive problems and/or becomes very poorly definable. At some level I suspect it implies not only autonomy but complete agency, which is suspect.
    • simonh 8y ago
      I think randomness really is a red herring. To the extent that a decision of ours is random, it is not ours. That doesn't necessarily absolve us of responsibility. In No Country for Old Men a guy flips a coin to decide if he will kill someone. He chose to flip the coin though - delegating a choice to randomness does not abrogate us of responsibility. By doing so he created the framework in which the outcome arrises, whatever that outcome is. He made it possible, even likely and bears responsibility for that by selecting the set of possible outcomes and the degree of randomness. Also he does this many times, so it wasn't a "random choice to randomly choose", it's a consistent repeated pattern of behaviour that directly emerges from his personal ongoing mental state. I don't go around randomly killing people and that's a consistent pattern that emerges from my persistent ongoing (if evolving) mental state and it _is_ a free choice. The fact that it's pre-determined is fine, because it means it comes from me.
      • intralizee 8y ago
        He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different. If I’m a product of every moment, where the previous moments factor into my current moment.. I would only consider myself free if I had full control before birth into how my life plays out. Nobody is making choices is what I observe everyday, only forces are occurring and under the illusion or simply a disguise of choice.
        • simonh 8y ago
          >He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different. To some extent yes, our choices and scope of action is constrained by our essential nature, some of which is determined before we are even born. However this doesn't absolve us of all accountability. It simply sets up a framework within which we can discuss what accountability is and how we want to manage it. This is a difficult issue and I don't have all the answers about accountability, I see my take on it as my starting point for the discussion about it not the end. I believe in rehabilitative rather than retributive justice because of this. Also see my reply to fjuerfilis.
• jymbo 8y ago
  > it disallows the idea of a decision being undetermined and free to decide That doesn't compute. A decision doesn't do deciding. A decider decides decisions. Any phenomena of "will" necessarily implies contingency on a prior. To ask for non-contingency is to ask for freedom _from_ will.
• antidesitter 8y ago
  > a decision being undetermined If a decision is undetermined, i.e. not determined, how can it be called a decision?