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I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You liter
by simonh 8y ago
I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing.
If my decisions are not a product of my prior state, then they are not my decisions. The definition of 'me' is my prior state. If my decisions are unpredictable given complete knowledge of my prior state, and the ability to extrapolate it forward, then the decisions do not come from me. If they're not mine, then I have no responsibility for them. Any discussion of my responsibility for my actions must take into account my personal contribution to the decision as a being.
Dualism does not solve this problem. It simply foists a chunk of a person's state into some non-material constituent, but if that constituent does not have a persistent (though presumably malleable) state or does not deterministically contribute to the process, again whence comes responsibility?
- all2 8y ago> The definition of 'me' is my prior state. I don't think this is true. We know that thought and memory are constrained (accessed) at a physical level - at least to some extent. That is, damage to your physical brain can result in diminished or eliminated access to those things. Indeed, thought as we know it seems to be a physically mediated process (perhaps not completely defined by our physical bodies, but at least influenced to some extent). As well, emotion is a physically mediated phenomena. Even our experience of this existence is physically mediated. Without a functioning body we lack the ability to experience. So what does that leave you to be? You are, at your basest existence, the ability to choose. A choice engine with a physical layer; a physical memory, physical emotion, the ability to think. But at your foundation, you choose. You remember, but unless you choose, you are nothing but memory.
- simonh 8y ago>I don't think this is true. We know that thought and memory are constrained (accessed) at a physical level - at least to some extent. That is, damage to your physical brain can result in diminished or eliminated access to those things. Sure, the damage changes you. It becomes a new part of your state prior to making a decision. >You remember, but unless you choose, you are nothing but memory. Completely agree, but we don't think really know much about the relationship between how we store memories and how we incorporate those into a decision making process. I may be wrong, I don't know much about neuroscience. My take is though that it doesn't matter. All of that is part of our self. Memories, decision making processes, neurochemistry, it's all part of our state and our decisions are only truly 'ours' to the extent that this state determines or influences them.
- all2 8y ago>it's all part of our state and our decisions are only truly 'ours' to the extent that this state determines or influences them. I suppose the argument I was trying to make was about what is fundamentally 'you' or 'me' and what could be emergent properties. I agree that our decisions rest on prior states. Even if we remember nothing of our past, that has an effect on what and how we choose.
- sooheon 8y ago> You are, at your basest existence, the ability to choose. A choice engine with a physical layer; a physical memory, physical emotion, the ability to think. But at your foundation, you choose. I don't see how this is at odds with the prior state view. You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment. The physical layer is the choice engine, and it physically must continue to make choices until it is incapacitated or dies. You are a state machine that must step through its state transitions to the beat of the universe, navigating your small corner of it, enjoying the ride (or not), until you cease to function, and the state machine of the universe runs on without you.
- all2 8y ago> You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment. This makes sense. There's no choice unless there's a dimension (some state variable) that can we can move in. We have stuff that can be state (matter and energy) and dimension (time) to move in. In terms of state, my argument is that choice is a core piece of 'me' and 'you'. I don't know how to make an effective argument for the separateness of choice and state, but I think it makes sense to consider them as separate things. We possess state like we possess the space we exist in, in time. You could say that your choices are like driving a car. Navigating streets (or offroad!) is like choosing from possible states.
- sooheon 8y agoI think we're in agreement, except that I believe that whatever capacity you have for choice is also stored as state. What you call state and choice, I might call state and procedures. Both are stored in the substrate of the brain as state, just like data structures and the code that operates on them are both stored as data.
- tylerjwilk00 8y agoEven if it is correct to say that, "You are a state machine." and "prior state" is an input to the state generation function of the machine, this is _not_ incompatible with free will, and does _not_ require a pre-determined universe. Simply put, current state as an input does not necessitate pre-determination. I think the point user all2 was making is that if we remove the prior state modifier from the generate state function then the core piece that is left over is "your basest existence".
- mlthoughts2018 8y ago> “If my decisions are unpredictable given complete knowledge of my prior state, and the ability to extrapolate it forward, then the decisions do not come from me.” I don’t see how that conclusion follows from that premise. In fact, the whole free will debate is uninteresting to me exactly because it seems like a dissolvable semantics question regarding what does “me” mean. Is it a totality of some prior physical state? Is it supernatural? Depending on what somebody arbitrarily chooses for that, it seems to more or less force a conclusion about free will. E.g. a supernaturalist might believe my decisions are fully determined by “me” but that “me” is a concept that partially exists outside of the applicability of physical laws.
- naasking 8y agoYou're better off thinking about the logical properties that entail moral responsibility. Consider that it makes no sense to hold a car engine morally responsible for malfunctioning and killing its passengers, but it does make sense to hold a driver responsible (and it might make sense to do the same for a general AI in the future). Why? What distinguishes how we deal with one deterministic system over another? That's what free will is. The debate has progressed quite well over the past century, and most philosophers are Compatibilists like the OP for very good reasons.
- sooheon 8y agoI love your framing of the question, but am frustrated with the Compatibilist conclusion. "Moral responsibility" is a heuristic for our monkey brains, tapping into evolved ideas of justice, accounting for imperfect prediction of future events, attempting to control human behavior one way or the other. The reason we don't lecture engines about morality is because it is perfectly clear that they obey only one kingdom of rules, the physical. Humans also must obey physical rules, but there are so many layers between base physics and human behavior that we speak in very fuzzy heuristic terms about morality. This does not mean free will is anywhere to be found in one of those intermediate layers, just that it's too complicated a machine for us to analyze like an engine, so we resort to using the levers and knobs that evolution gave us. IOW, free will is a "god of the gaps", only existing while we still lack the knowledge to better understand the layers between our gross beliefs/actions and base physical processes.
- naasking 8y ago> I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Exactly! We don't hold babies or the insane responsible for their choices precisely because they don't make choices for well-founded reasons, they simply act somewhat randomly and so clearly don't have a well-founded, deterministic decision procedure. Holding people responsible is how we refine the deterministic decision procedure of a functional brain. I think it's important people understand that the term "free will" as used in physics simply isn't the "free will" used in law, philosophy or by lay people. They're talking about a type of freedom which lets them set parameters of an experiment independently of the system they're measuring.
- fjuerfilis 8y agoI had a similar reaction. Nondeterministic conceptions of free will similar to that of this paper are really more like an intoxicated state or something, where behavioral outcomes are totally unpredictable. It's the absence of free will, but due to complete randomness rather than complete control. The prior state idea seems more accurate, but even that (at least in its extreme state) doesn't seem to me to encapsulate the idea of free will because it disallows the idea of a decision being undetermined and free to decide. I personally think the notion of free will is fallacious because it's poorly defined, or even undefinable. I admit I could be totally wrong about that, but I think lack of predictability leads to an illusion of free will. It's the same illusion as the god illusion, injecting agency as an explanatory mechanism when there is none, either through chaotic processes, true randomness, or epistemological weaknesses.
- simonh 8y ago>The prior state idea seems more accurate, but even that (at least in its extreme state) doesn't seem to me to encapsulate the idea of free will because it disallows the idea of a decision being undetermined and free to decide. I certainly think randomness comes into play for sure, but conceptually my personal prior state might include a source of randomness. It could be just one factor, and I might make choices based on my memories and preferences to allow greater or lesser input from that randomness, or I might lack the mental tools to prevent that randomness from manifesting in my actions. At an extreme that might be a form of pathology and then we can talk about the limits of personal responsibility in various circumstances. The idea that my state leads to my decisions still holds though.
- fjuerfilis 8y agoYes, I agree that is one model, but what I wrestle with ultimately I suppose is whether indeterminism per se is what defines free will, in part or whole. If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Does that encapsulate the notion of free will? Maybe? But both of those are still causally deterministic in a sense, in that even with randomness, there's some point at which the random components of the system causally impinge on the systematic part. I think at some point notions of intervention or change become critical. So, for example, I think implicit in the idea of free will is the idea that an individual can freely choose to change their decision in some repeatability sense, and this change cannot necessarily happen in any other way, such as from outside influence. Just to make it clear, let's say there's two choices or choice types, A and B. A is "bad" and B is "good," in whatever sense (utilitarian, moral, whatever). Key to the notion of free will it seems is that one could change, of their own volition, their choice, from A->B or B->A. In practice we can't rewind time or transport to possible worlds in a counterfactual sense, but we do talk about decisions as interchangeable and repeatable. E.g., someone can choose whether or not to take a drug at one point, and then, at a later point, choose again whether or not to take the drug. In one metaphysical sense, those decisions are not the same because circumstances have changed, but we treat them as the same. I think the idea of free will is that someone could change their decision, to an extent that another person could not. That is, I cannot make you change your choice, only you can. This is fine at some level, but what if someone wants to change their mind but cannot? E.g., a drug addict or someone trying to lose weight? What about something simpler, like decision under a lapse in attention? How do we define volition or lack thereof? Or, maybe more importantly, let's say the external individual in question is omniscient. If an omniscient external individual cannot alter your behavior, why would you hold that individual responsible in a free will sense? That is, let's say someone truly wants to change, but an omniscient being could not even help and change them. Why should the non-omniscient individual seeking change be held responsible? This is all stream-of-consciousness, but I think at some point the notion of free will starts to lead to counterintuitive problems and/or becomes very poorly definable. At some level I suspect it implies not only autonomy but complete agency, which is suspect.
- n4r9 8y agoThis is sort of a semantic quibble over what the "free" in "free will" really means. Does it mean freedom from the external environment outside my head? Freedom from my past light cone? Freedom from legal, cultural or other sorts of coercion? Or does it really mean "self-determination"? It's fairly clear that the author's are using the light-cone sort of definition, but they discuss this ambiguity towards the end on p.230: > Some readers may object to our use of the term “free will” to describe the indeterminism of particle responses. Our provocative ascription of free will to elementary particles is deliberate, since our theorem asserts that if experimenters have a certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom. Indeed, it is natural to suppose that this latter freedom is the ultimate explanation of our own.
- ElBarto 8y agoIt depends if your discuss the issue purely on philosophical terms or based on physics. In classical physics a closed system is purely determined by its initial state. So considering the universe as such a system, everything that is happening, including me typing this, is a deterministic and predictable function of the state of the universe at the big bang, and thus free will is an illusion. In that sense, actual free will requires unpredictability in the physical world because free will is unpredictable behaviour. That's where quantum physics becomes crucial.
- starbeast 8y ago>I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. Causal chains are required for free will to make sense, but causal chains do not require robust pre-determination. We regularly simulate causal chains that make a narrative sense and are predictive, but only within complexity limited bounds, without the infinite precision needed for robust pre-determination.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- colanderman 8y agoFollowing that train of thought, could free will simply be the capacity to predict one's own (deterministic) actions, based on one's current state, and ascribing that to some internal volition? Similarly, the "inner monologue" simply the capacity to observe one's own (deterministic) thought process? Conversely, is the judgement that another entity is free-willed no more than an admission that one is unable to predict that other's actions, though that other can predict its own?
- jymbo 8y agoHow free-willed or "alive" an object is, from one subject's perspective, will have a lot to do with how _unpredictable_ the possible futures of the object seem, relative to that subject.
- colanderman 8y agoYep. This is what I mean by my second paragraph -- when I believe something else to be free-willed is exactly when I cannot predict its actions, but believe it to be capable of doing so (i.e., it believes itself to have free will). So, a pachinko ball, while its haphazard movement is unpredictable by me, does not have free will, because it does not have the capability to predict its own movement. Nor does an individual ant, since I can predict its actions in response to chemical stimuli, regardless of whether it can. Whereas myself... I know people in general can have a variety of responses to any given stimuli. But I know exactly what response I will have to a stimuli that has just occurred. From my point of view, I am very free-willed! After all, I'm "choosing" one out of a multitude of possible responses to this stimuli. But really, my "choice" is determined by physics, and the illusion of free will is exactly that I -- as the sole entity with the capability to observe my own internal state -- can predict my response, and no-one else can. I think also, an additional factor is that of volition: the actions I take should somehow derive from, and act to fulfill, what I consider to be my (chemically deterministically determined) desires. Otherwise I might perceive "someone else" to be in control of my person.
- jymbo 8y ago
- jymbo 8y agoWhich is why this paper proves the Copenhagen interpretation of QM is wrong.
- srtjstjsj 8y agoYou are assuming your conclusion. If free will exists, it might exist outside the current understanding of physics. Most likely, it does (if it exists!)
- jymbo 8y agoPhysics assumes the conclusion. If free will exists (which it appears to), it must exist within the contingencies of physics. To assume otherwise it to say that you don't like physics.
- simonh 8y agoI did address dualism. I'm not making any assumptions about whether dualism is true or not. If dualism is true, the immaterial part is just another form of state that is part of the self from which the decision emerges.
- jimjansen 8y agoYou guys can philosophize until you are blue in the face but the type of free will that laypeople think of when you say free will, libertarian free will, is virtually certain not to exist. Everything else is just semantics.
- dmreedy 8y agoI'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system sufficiently powerful to say all true things is unable to prove all of them). Things that we cannot write proofs about, that we must accept as axioms (for example, in the space of ethics and morality) may be trivially expressible in the higher-order logic of meta-heaven. Say now too that the dualistic, non-material constituent, the Soul, exists in this meta-heaven. It has access to this higher-order reasoning, and can make causal decisions according to it. However, to its physical coupling in the reality subset, these decisions will appear to be random and non-causal. They will be the outcome of nothing from within the universe. Manifestation of Free Will and Randomness can be considered to be indistinguishable in this sense, from the perspective of something inside the system that they are operating on. It still pushes the problem 'up' one level, but who knows what the physics of a meta-heaven looks like. We can't even imagine it, in the way that a computer can't imagine its own halting. Hence all the talk of ineffability in the older dogmas of the world.
- SubiculumCode 8y agoDo you mean something like: There exists a multiverse in which the soul gets to choose which element of the multiverse it resides in moment to moment. So while each element of the multiverse (a particular reality) is completely deterministic, the one experienced by the soul is chosen.
- dmreedy 8y agoSure, if you want to keep the 'influence' between the two systems to a minimum. If you allow the mutation of the subset reality by a soul in the meta-heaven, then you can have it all operate in a single universe; the soul is capable of adjusting the nondeterminism of particles in the brain, thereby making decisions happen that appear random to us, but are informed by a higher system of reasoning. In the way that a programmer might adjust constants, or a video game player might choose stats. And just want to reiterate: I'm not trying to advance this explanation! Just fun to think about.
- tylerjwilk00 8y agoWe are probably arguing semantics but the alternative to pre-determination is not free will as much as it is probabilistic. Yes this _will_ happen verse this will _most likely_ happen. Free will is the ability to influence the probability that a certain outcome is realized. Your decisions could be predictable as a function of probability. Your definition of 'me' (your prior state) includes the quantum states of your constitute parts. Just because there is a degree of uncertainty in those states does not mean they are not of 'you'. The degree of pre-determination is just a matter of scale (akin to classical vs quantum). The deeper you go the less pre-determined something can be.
- yters 8y agoNon-determined is not the same as random. Randomness is undetermined, but not coextensive with the concept. A common error I see in these debates.
- phkahler 8y ago>> Any discussion of my responsibility for my actions must take into account my personal contribution to the decision as a being. >> again whence comes responsibility? The only reason I can think of to assign responsibility is to "correctly" respond. Particularly in the form of reward or punishment. But if a person is not responsible for their actions, then neither is anyone responding to them. "Responsibility" comes from some sense of morality, which doesn't really exist without free will does it?
- okintheory 8y agoI think you're taking the wrong message away from the following simple idea: "Good decisions depend on taking the available information into account." If we take this for granted, then it's not clear why free will is a good thing. How would you say pre-determined actions and free will are compatible? I would say they are not (and indeed randomness doesn't really help). In contrast, I would claim that the only sensible definition of free will is based on dualism: Many people seem believe there's some inherent aspect of them that is separate from the physical world and is the source of their self and will. If, like me, you don't believe in dualism, then the conclusion is that we don't have free will.
- tylerjwilk00 8y agoThe only conclusion here is that you believe free will can only be explained by dualism. Quantum nonlocality [1] provides at least one other explanation as a place free will may hide. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_nonlocality https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_nonlocality
- okintheory 8y agoCould you elaborate on what the definition of free will you're going by is? And how it's possibly supported by quantum non-locality?
- simonebrunozzi 8y agoI had this exact discussion with my grandfather (a catholic) when I was 11 years old (I'm 41 now), and rejecting most religious stuff I was fed with at the time. It is an incredibly fascinating debate.
- whack 8y ago> If my decisions are not a product of my prior state, then they are not my decisions. The definition of 'me' is my prior state. There are two problems with this definition of free will. First, it implies that your present self (and future selves) are all entirely subservient to your prior state, and surrounding environment. Ie, the present you has no way of overcoming your past self or your environment. This means that you're essentially sitting in a roller-coaster ride, with no levers to pull or opportunity for change. Sure, your past self made the decision to get on the ride. But your present and future self are all helpless from that point on. Second, did even your past have any free will? The chain of causation extends all the way back. Your past self at time T-X is itself entirely subservient to your past self at time T-X-1. Extend this all the way back, and you realize that you're subservient to your "self" at the moment of conception. At no point did your consciousness have any ability to change the course of the life that was already plotted for it. If I predict at the moment of your birth, every single thing that will happen in your life and every decision you will make, can you really claim to possess free will? Hence why people try to cling on to randomness and uncertainty. "If the future can be perfectly predicted, people definitely do not have free will => ergo, if the future cannot be perfectly predicted, then maybe we have free will?" I agree with you though that this is shoddy reasoning. Just because there exists randomness at the quantum level, just means that we're passengers in a driverless car that's rolling dice. Randomness that we have no control over, does not grant us free will in any way.
- mreome 8y agoI think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" and in favor of "If the future can not be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" If an entity's decision process is is not not dependent and repeatable based entirely on it's internal state and perceptions of it's environment, then it must be dependent on some external random element, and that element not being part of that entity, means it's choice is not entirely of it's own free will. This argument rejects duality of course, as one's "will" itself could be the external element.
- 8y ago
- cryptonector 8y agoI think there's no such thing as free will in any case. At least for the religions notion of free will floating around in my mind: if (!is_fully_deterministic(universe) && have(universe, RANDOM_CHOICE)) assert(!have(universe, FREE_WILL)); if (is_fully_deterministic(universe)) assert(!have(universe, FREE_WILL)); The only remaining way to have that sort of free will is to have non-random laws that somehow are not fully deterministic. I'm not sure what that would mean. Non-random -> deterministic, no? However, even in a fully-deterministic universe, or a mostly-deterministic universe, we will appear to have free will in so far as we cannot read minds and we cannot predict next states for the universe on any scale, with any accuracy, and in any amount of time that would be practical for determining e.g. whether someone is at fault for their actions. And it's pretty clear that this will always be so. The question of whether we have free will, then, is sort of moot. From a social perspective we have little to choice but to act as if we do have free will.
- antidesitter 8y agoAlso known as Free Will Requires Determinism [0]. There's an Existential Comic about it [1]. [0] http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.001.0001/acprof-9780195189636-chapter-16 http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/978... [1] http://existentialcomics.com/comic/70 http://existentialcomics.com/comic/70