6 ms·

"What ends up happening is that a candidate who would not otherwise be in the majority can end up as mayor because he/she was everybody’s second choice." But,

"What ends up happening is that a candidate who would not otherwise be in the majority can end up as mayor because he/she was everybody’s second choice." But, isn't that the whole point? ... that a compromise, perhaps centrist, candidate can emerge victorious?

aidenn0 8y ago
But the question is, is this a good thing? If 51% of the population want an extremist candidate, but also like a centrist candidate, then IRV incentivizes them to lie on their ballot and promote a candidate they don't like over the candidate they do like.
- corysama 8y ago
  Compared to the common “first past the post” voting, yes it is a good thing. This is because the common voting system encourages a “two extremist parties” system where everyone is effectively voting “greater horrible evil vs lesser horrible evil”. https://youtu.be/s7tWHJfhiyo https://youtu.be/s7tWHJfhiyo
  - xvedejas 8y ago
    Here's the problem though; IRV doesn't really do the thing you want it to. It can actually make an extreme candidate win even when voter opinion is centered around a moderate candidate. It's very obvious in this visualization (from the site linked a few comments ago): http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png
    - ChristianBundy 8y ago
      > It's very obvious in this visualization (from the site linked a few comments ago): http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png Just a friendly note: this visualization means nothing without context, and is far from "obvious". Unfortunately, I'd place this in the category of "things that are obvious to people who already believe it". Is there a better way to go about explaining your idea?
      - xvedejas 8y ago
        Sorry, I should have mentioned again the above link, which provides context: http://zesty.ca/voting/sim http://zesty.ca/voting/sim To paraphrase, this is a simulation which places candidates and voters on a two-parameter preference space. This is useful because two dimensions are easy to visualize, but the same intuitions apply to higher-dimensional spaces. Each point is colored to answer "which candidate wins when the popular opinion is normally distributed about this point?". That means the fractured visualization shows IRV's non-monotonicity, and how even when popular opinion is close to a centrist candidate (here in red) it might be that the voting system results in the election of an extreme candidate (green).
    - tree_of_item 8y ago
      What is obvious about that image?
  - baddox 8y ago
    I don’t think the problem with having only two viable parties is that they will both tend to be extreme (and that doesn’t strike me as empirically true at the US federal level). Rather, I think the problem is that parties have aggregate power, which means that individual policy preferences get bundled together in ways that may not match an individual voter’s preference. What if I prefer one policy that’s only part of the party X platform, and another that is only part of the party Y platform? Or, another way to think about this party aggregation: what if I prefer the candidate from party X for my local congressional district, but I can’t stand the thought of the likely Speaker of the House of party X?
johnchristopher 8y ago
Correct me if I am wrong but there are no guarantees this candidate is a compromise. He might be on a whole different political spectrum and agenda.
- bunderbunder 8y ago
  What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't make sense or aren't coherent. I've frequently got serious doubts about their ability to function competently - let alone effectively - in the position they're applying for. With IRV, though, I could see a situation where they are much more likely to win simply because, nowadays, Republicans' and Democrats' general level of mutual disdain is such that I wouldn't be surprised if it ends up being common for people who identify with one major party to rank the candidate from the other major party below every other candidate more-or-less out of spite.
  - boomboomsubban 8y ago
    >What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't make sense or aren't coherent This is a symptom of our current system. Anybody who has any ambition in politics will modify some of their positions to fit one of the major two parties. If running for another party wasn't a death sentence, you would see more competent candidates in those parties.
    - bunderbunder 8y ago
      Yep. Just trying to think through plausible practical scenarios where IRV might produce a bad outcome. Which is worth doing because, regardless of what the ideal situation is, if it's associated with a spectacularly bad outcome in one of the earlier elections that uses it, that's going to be a big impediment to wider adoption.
  - __d 8y ago
    Even in a sharply polarized contest, it's usually the case that most of the "third party" candidates receive fewer first-preference votes than those from the major parties. So the minor parties (and independents) are eliminated first, and their preferences are distributed. Which usually means than one of the major party candidates scrapes over 50%, reflecting the minor party voters' basic preference for one of the major parties over the other. In this (common) situation, I think IRV actually works really well. The major parties still end up in government, but they see the first-preference percentages for the minor parties, and understand what policy positions are important to the electorate.

aidenn0 8y ago

But the question is, is this a good thing? If 51% of the population want an extremist candidate, but also like a centrist candidate, then IRV incentivizes them to lie on their ballot and promote a candidate they don't like over the candidate they do like.

corysama 8y ago
Compared to the common “first past the post” voting, yes it is a good thing. This is because the common voting system encourages a “two extremist parties” system where everyone is effectively voting “greater horrible evil vs lesser horrible evil”. https://youtu.be/s7tWHJfhiyo https://youtu.be/s7tWHJfhiyo
- xvedejas 8y ago
  Here's the problem though; IRV doesn't really do the thing you want it to. It can actually make an extreme candidate win even when voter opinion is centered around a moderate candidate. It's very obvious in this visualization (from the site linked a few comments ago): http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png
  - ChristianBundy 8y ago
    > It's very obvious in this visualization (from the site linked a few comments ago): http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/54,47_77,64_13,10_irv.png Just a friendly note: this visualization means nothing without context, and is far from "obvious". Unfortunately, I'd place this in the category of "things that are obvious to people who already believe it". Is there a better way to go about explaining your idea?
    - xvedejas 8y ago
      Sorry, I should have mentioned again the above link, which provides context: http://zesty.ca/voting/sim http://zesty.ca/voting/sim To paraphrase, this is a simulation which places candidates and voters on a two-parameter preference space. This is useful because two dimensions are easy to visualize, but the same intuitions apply to higher-dimensional spaces. Each point is colored to answer "which candidate wins when the popular opinion is normally distributed about this point?". That means the fractured visualization shows IRV's non-monotonicity, and how even when popular opinion is close to a centrist candidate (here in red) it might be that the voting system results in the election of an extreme candidate (green).
  - tree_of_item 8y ago
    What is obvious about that image?
- baddox 8y ago
  I don’t think the problem with having only two viable parties is that they will both tend to be extreme (and that doesn’t strike me as empirically true at the US federal level). Rather, I think the problem is that parties have aggregate power, which means that individual policy preferences get bundled together in ways that may not match an individual voter’s preference. What if I prefer one policy that’s only part of the party X platform, and another that is only part of the party Y platform? Or, another way to think about this party aggregation: what if I prefer the candidate from party X for my local congressional district, but I can’t stand the thought of the likely Speaker of the House of party X?

johnchristopher 8y ago

Correct me if I am wrong but there are no guarantees this candidate is a compromise. He might be on a whole different political spectrum and agenda.

bunderbunder 8y ago
What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't make sense or aren't coherent. I've frequently got serious doubts about their ability to function competently - let alone effectively - in the position they're applying for. With IRV, though, I could see a situation where they are much more likely to win simply because, nowadays, Republicans' and Democrats' general level of mutual disdain is such that I wouldn't be surprised if it ends up being common for people who identify with one major party to rank the candidate from the other major party below every other candidate more-or-less out of spite.
- boomboomsubban 8y ago
  >What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't make sense or aren't coherent This is a symptom of our current system. Anybody who has any ambition in politics will modify some of their positions to fit one of the major two parties. If running for another party wasn't a death sentence, you would see more competent candidates in those parties.
  - bunderbunder 8y ago
    Yep. Just trying to think through plausible practical scenarios where IRV might produce a bad outcome. Which is worth doing because, regardless of what the ideal situation is, if it's associated with a spectacularly bad outcome in one of the earlier elections that uses it, that's going to be a big impediment to wider adoption.
- __d 8y ago
  Even in a sharply polarized contest, it's usually the case that most of the "third party" candidates receive fewer first-preference votes than those from the major parties. So the minor parties (and independents) are eliminated first, and their preferences are distributed. Which usually means than one of the major party candidates scrapes over 50%, reflecting the minor party voters' basic preference for one of the major parties over the other. In this (common) situation, I think IRV actually works really well. The major parties still end up in government, but they see the first-preference percentages for the minor parties, and understand what policy positions are important to the electorate.