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So every attempt to improve on physical paper ballots and manual counting seems doomed to fail. I'm not surprised having seen how secure most secure IT turns ou

So every attempt to improve on physical paper ballots and manual counting seems doomed to fail. I'm not surprised having seen how secure most secure IT turns out to be. How can we either a) learn to stop fixing it as it seems quite far from broken, or b) achieve something that's actually an improvement?

jcrawfordor 8y ago
The same type of seal is used in securing physical ballot boxes (and in fact is used on these digital tabulators to secure their ballot receiver box), so this kind of issue is not unique to electronic voting systems. Paper-based voting also uses a system of seals to ensure integrity.
- NeedMoreTea 8y ago
  The difference of course is there are manual observers, usually independent and from the main parties, watching physical ballot boxes while they're "live". Making tampering harder even if the seals are defective.
  - jcrawfordor 8y ago
    I'm not sure that this is a useful difference. Physical ballot boxes often sit unattended overnight in the case of early voting centers (and in some cases even in regular voting locations depending on local procedure), and digital tabulators are usually observed at all times that they are unlocked. If anything digital tabulators may be somewhat more secure from this perspective, because they typically require authentication with a cryptographic token (which is held by the presiding judge of the polling location or a similar person) before they will count any ballots. This is a second measure preventing ballot stuffing when unattended as compared to a ballot box without on-site tabulator. The issue is different for direct-recording electronic (DRE) or "paperless" machines, but this article pertains to digital tabulators that are actually a voting machine and ballot box in one: they scan the ballot and then retain it in a box for later audit. The seals pictured are actually used to secure the ballot box, not on the machine itself which sits on top of the box.
ridgeguy 8y ago
I agree with your first sentence. We don't yet know how to make an IT-based voting system that is as secure as paper ballots. Paper ballots have attack surfaces, to be sure. It's just that they don't scale well, and that greatly limits the damage. I really don't need to know the vote count 9 µsec after the polls close. I really do need to know the vote count is accurate or can be audited if need be.
- worldsayshi 8y ago
  > voting system that is as secure as paper ballots I think it's not about security per say. It's more about scrutability. While it may be possible to build a system that is more secure in principle it's a lot harder to build a IT-based voting system that a person from the street can comprehend and scrutinize in a days work.

jcrawfordor 8y ago

The same type of seal is used in securing physical ballot boxes (and in fact is used on these digital tabulators to secure their ballot receiver box), so this kind of issue is not unique to electronic voting systems. Paper-based voting also uses a system of seals to ensure integrity.

NeedMoreTea 8y ago
The difference of course is there are manual observers, usually independent and from the main parties, watching physical ballot boxes while they're "live". Making tampering harder even if the seals are defective.
- jcrawfordor 8y ago
  I'm not sure that this is a useful difference. Physical ballot boxes often sit unattended overnight in the case of early voting centers (and in some cases even in regular voting locations depending on local procedure), and digital tabulators are usually observed at all times that they are unlocked. If anything digital tabulators may be somewhat more secure from this perspective, because they typically require authentication with a cryptographic token (which is held by the presiding judge of the polling location or a similar person) before they will count any ballots. This is a second measure preventing ballot stuffing when unattended as compared to a ballot box without on-site tabulator. The issue is different for direct-recording electronic (DRE) or "paperless" machines, but this article pertains to digital tabulators that are actually a voting machine and ballot box in one: they scan the ballot and then retain it in a box for later audit. The seals pictured are actually used to secure the ballot box, not on the machine itself which sits on top of the box.

ridgeguy 8y ago

I agree with your first sentence. We don't yet know how to make an IT-based voting system that is as secure as paper ballots. Paper ballots have attack surfaces, to be sure. It's just that they don't scale well, and that greatly limits the damage. I really don't need to know the vote count 9 µsec after the polls close. I really do need to know the vote count is accurate or can be audited if need be.

worldsayshi 8y ago
> voting system that is as secure as paper ballots I think it's not about security per say. It's more about scrutability. While it may be possible to build a system that is more secure in principle it's a lot harder to build a IT-based voting system that a person from the street can comprehend and scrutinize in a days work.